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1 
Introduction 
 
 
Purpose of my Inquiry 
When I pose the question “what does an image of performance look like” to 
friends and colleagues, most often the image that first comes to mind is of (human) actors 
performing live on a stage or (human) people performing their identity and culture.  
Rarely, someone articulates an image of performance in which something other than 
human bodies is central.  In fact, I have been hard pressed to find photo images of the 
very performances that I examine in this inquiry in which human actors are not the 
central focus.  The focus on human actors in photographing these performances along 
with the common human-centered responses to the question—what does an image of 
performance look like—exposes a tendency to think of performance as fundamentally a 
human activity and human cultural-artistic product.  Conventional ways of understanding 
performance often assume that human activity, human embodiment, and human identities 
are at the ontological center of “what performance is.”  In contrast to theorizations of and 
assumptions about the nature of performance that place live human embodiment at the 
foundation of what performance is, the purpose of my inquiry is to take up the question 
of how contemporary performance operates as a becoming—as a continuously unfolding 
relationality with others.
1
  This does not mean that I ignore human performers or that I 
determine what performance “is” in my inquiry but instead that I pay attention to 
encounter in performance from the perspective of involvement with the more-than-
human.  I work to theorize performance as a becoming—intervening in the conversation 
on what performance is by challenging assumptions that human activity and human 
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conventions are the determining and defining factors for performance.  Understanding 
performance as a becoming—a continuously unfolding relationality—diverges from 
ontological frames that define and determine performance according to the parameters of 
live human performers situated on a stage or in cultural production. 
I work to understand how performance operates as a becoming through a concept 
of relationality in which relation cannot be defined by its terms or as a comprehensible 
unity.  For example, one approach to understanding the nature of performance could 
work to draw out and explicate the discreet terms—such as (human) performers, an 
audience, and a live event—that appear to generally and universally comprise 
performance.  The program put together for many live shows—that both explicates the 
various terms, roles, and names of those who make performance and also materializes the 
relation between an audience and performers—is a good example of what might appear 
to be a comprehensible unity that could be understood as the foundation for the nature of 
performance.  In other words, the nature of performance could be articulated via the 
terms that appear to be generally applicable and characteristic of performance.  However, 
performance understood as a becoming through a concept of relationality realizes that 
conventions—such as a program—that outline the terms of performance cannot account 
for many ungraspable and unstable factors that are involved in performance.  For 
example, performance relationally thought emphasizes that performance occurs through 
encounter with others in and beyond live human embodiment—in multiple histories, 
overlapping experiences, atmospheric shifts, and a complex layering of interacting bodies 
that exceed any ontological determination.  Therefore, addressing the question—what is 
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the nature of performance—through relationality and becoming rather than fixed 
generalities means that I examine the open and regulative, the emphatic and generative, 
the perceptible and imperceptible, and the (non-oppositional) ephemeral and continuous 
qualities in performance from the perspective of a shared sphere of relationality that is 
one with becoming.  
I organize and focus my inquiry in four chapters that take up encounter with 
others in contemporary performance—in particular objects, landscapes, animals, and 
machines/technology.  I work to theorize performance as a relational becoming rooted in 
ongoing process and openness-of-interaction in-the-making as opposed to a product that 
is defined and determined by human creators and conventions.  The many not just human 
others that we encounter in performance force us to think and practice relationally—to try 
to understand how contemporary performance operates as an ungraspable and historically 
shaped relation that continues to give life and liveliness to emerging (human and more-
than-human) bodies and performances.  My inquiry—as an offering to the field of 
performance ontology in performance studies—takes up performance through the lens 
and question of relational becoming not as a human-nonhuman correspondence of 
identity formations but as a lively continuous-ephemeral living relationality.   
 
Literature Review 
The fluid and contested boundaries of performance studies is reflected in the fluid 
and contested boundaries of performance.  The question “What is performance?” 
permeates and shapes the field of performance studies as a discipline.  In Performance 
Studies An Introduction, Richard Schechner makes a distinction between the limited 
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domain of what “is” performance and the open field of “just about anything” that can be 
studied “as” performance.  Schechner argues that every action is a performance but under 
the purview of historical and cultural context and conventions only some actions are 
considered to be performance.
2
  Herein, the parameters of what performance studies as a 
discipline studies configures and reconfigures the ontology of performance.  Mary Strine, 
Beverly Whitaker Long, and Mary Frances Hopkins indicate that performance is an 
“essentially contested concept, meaning that its very existence is bound up in 
disagreement about what it is, and that the disagreement over its essence is itself part of 
that essence.”3  In an attempt to mark the disciplinary identity of performance studies, 
Ron Pelias and James VanOosting conceptualize performance as aesthetic 
communication, which in their words “may be defined from the singular perspective of a 
performer, a text, or an audience, or from the interaction among all three within a given 
context.”4  The basic framework and terms for delimiting the foundation for performance 
are encapsulated in performer, audience, event, and text—distinct ontological categories 
that are often thought (and assumed) as the foundation of performance.
5
  Jon Mckenzie—
in a critique of how performance studies develops a normative discipline—argues that a 
concept of liminality “remains key to articulating the efficacy of both cultural 
performance and performance studies, whether that efficacy be conceived as 
transgressive or resistant.”6  McKenzie’s “liminal-norm” in performance studies draws 
attention to the danger of concepts and conceptualizations in knowledge formations to 
become stable markers of truth and practice.  Therefore, performance even and especially 
within inquiries concerning performance ontology must not be reduced to any one model.  
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In my inquiry, I take up and build on the argument that performance operates as a 
becoming from the article “Rabbits, Machines, and the Ontology of Performance”—in 
which Aleksandra Wolska argues that performance might be understood not as a 
disappearance but as a continuation—a becoming—that extends beyond the parameters 
of a show to participate in the processes of life.  In the article, Wolska argues that 
performance continues past a live show not just in the memories of audience members 
who attended the live performance.
7
  Understanding performance as rooted in an 
ontology of becoming points not only to the enduring and ongoing continuation of a 
performance beyond the seemingly distinct and particular time, space, and bodies of a 
live production but also to the embedment of performance in living relational activity.  
An ontology of becoming underscores for performance the mobility of bodies in a 
corporeal and incorporeal world that continuously unfolds disrupting the barrier between 
performance and “real” life outside performance.  Performance as a becoming does not 
just unfold or continue past the parameters of a show, it also invites engagement with—a 
becoming with—an unfolding and continuous relationality with multiple and ever-
varying bodies. 
 I take up the primary question—what is the nature of performance—also taken up 
in the work of Herbert Blau (1999/2007), Peggy Phelan (1992/1997/2007), and Philip 
Auslander (1999/2007) through the question of how performance operates as a becoming.  
For both Blau and Phelan, the nature of performance is rooted in the (human) body 
performing death and in the ephemerality of live performance, which guarantees 
“liveness.”  Blau’s extensive and complex thinking on the nature of performance places 
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the human body and its carnality and mortality as the foundation for his experience of 
theatre and performance.  Blau argues that, “the [live human] body on stage is suffused 
with the vicissitudes of appearance, which complicate the question of liveness, all the 
more because you look, offstage, onstage, with more or less reciprocity during the course 
of performance.”8  For Blau, live performance comes into being through a 
“theatricalizing gaze,” which is comprised of the activity of consciousness and the 
reciprocated activity of consciousness that creates the audience.  Significantly, “the gaze” 
is an inflection of consciousness that occurs through looking.
9
  Therefore, the liveness of 
performance hinges on the centrality of the human body and on a modality of looking 
that spurs on the activity of consciousness.  Blau understands liveness as an affectivity of 
presence unique to live theatre, “[which] might better be thought of, through the 
undeniable palpability of its metaphysical absence.”10  The close-up encounter between 
human actors and spectators—which Blau stipulates as something other than raw 
experience—is at the root of his understanding of liveness.  In Blau’s ontological 
formulation of performance, the activity of representation forms perception in which 
performance’s “liveness” is an inevitable “lessness” through a temporality of death.     
Peggy Phelan also takes up the question concerning the fundamental nature of 
performance through the lens of liveness.  In Unmarked: The Politics of Performance, 
Phelan emphasizes the nonreproducibility of live performance, which resists capitalist 
processes of commodification through disappearance.  Phelan argues that a performance 
cannot be documented, recorded, “or otherwise participate in the circulation of 
representations of representations” without becoming something other than 
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performance.
11
  Under the paradigm of liveness, the only continuity that a performance is 
capable of occurs in a spectator’s memory of the live event.  Phelan asserts that, “live 
performance and theatre (‘art with real bodies’) persist despite an economy of 
reproduction…respond[ing] to a psychic need to rehearse for loss, and especially for 
death.”12  Picking up liveness at the nexus of a Freudian psychoanalytic divide between 
body and consciousness, Phelan asserts that the (human) body does not experience the 
world in the same way as consciousness, which orders itself discursively, 
narratologically, and chronologically.
13
  Phelan’s ontological formulation of performance 
aligns the body with the unconscious and the conscious with the intentional subject.  The 
separation between body and consciousness and the essentialist opposition between the 
live and the recorded cast the activity and ontology of perception within a paradigm of 
reproduction and representation. 
Responding to a grounding of the nature of performance in Blau’s and Phelan’s 
work that situates liveness—“real” bodies performing death—against mediated 
technologies of reproduction, Philip Auslander articulates an ontology of performance 
where the live and the mediated are intertwined.  Auslander states, “The progressive 
diminution of previous distinctions between the live and the mediatized, in which live 
events are becoming more and more like mediatized ones, raises for me the question 
whether there really are clear-cut ontological distinctions between the live forms and the 
mediatized ones.”14  The opposition between liveness and the mediatized hinges on and 
presupposes a human performer’s consciousness, carnality, and mortality.  However, in 
“Live from Cyberspace, or, I Was Sitting at My Computer This Guy Appeared He 
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Thought I Was a Bot,” Auslander argues that online chatterbots perform live even though 
“they are not alive, at least not in the same way” as a live human performer.15  While 
Blau and Phelan identify the ontological specificity or nature of performance in 
“liveness” and by opposing live performance to technologies of reproduction, Auslander 
approaches the question of ontology through the activity of a nonhuman performer that 
produces rather than a matrix of live and recorded performance in which a human actor 
performs.  In response to Auslander’s argument, Blau critiques the mediatized capitalist 
modality of production and reproduction as a “versatile fantasy making apparatus” that 
commodifies the look—not just the form—and “alters the meaning of presence in 
liveness.”16 
While Blau and Phelan ground the nature of performance in its ephemerality 
emphasizing the “liveness” of performance—real (human) bodies performing live, 
Auslander challenges emphasizing live human embodiment for understanding the nature 
of performance in arguing that mediatized chatterbots perform live even though they are 
not alive in the same way as a human body.  As I previously remarked, Aleksandra 
Wolska also challenges Blau’s and Phelan’s emphasis on liveness and ephemerality 
stating that performance has an ontology of becoming.  Wolska argues that a performance 
continues past the time and space of a live production in performances that unfold in 
other times and other spaces.  This proposal is rooted in Wolska’s examination of a 
performance—Rainpan 43’s machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, 
macines, machines (2008)—that she initially did not attend “live” but encountered in its 
continuation in the performers’ apartment.  Rather than being an ephemeral event that 
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disappears and only lives in the memories of the audience, the live performance of 
machines continues to unfold in additional performances such as that in the performers’ 
apartment.  Unimpeded by the ephemerality of “liveness” tied to the live performance 
event, the machines performance gets taken up and continues to “become” in everyday 
life and encounters beyond the live performance event.  I enter into this conversation in 
my inquiry.  I take up Wolska’s argument that performance has an ontology of becoming 
and further examine how performance operates as a becoming not just in its continuity 
but moreover in its relationality. 
The concept of relationality has been has been taken up in many philosophical 
and scholarly texts.  Rejecting the assumption that distinct corresponding terms that relate 
to each other determine relation, one philosophical vein of thought conceptualizes 
relation as preceding distinct interrelating correspondences.  Influenced by the writings of 
William James and Gilles Deleuze, Brian Massumi conceptualizes relation as an open-
ended sociality in Parables for the Virtual Movement, Affect, Sensation.  Massumi draws 
on James’ argument that relation is perceived as such in embodied activity, which occurs 
always in the midst of already ongoing participation.
17
  Relation therefore precedes 
recognizable correspondences, disrupts subject-object positioning, and appears as an 
“unspecified…intensity of total experience.”18  In this conceptualization, relation is the 
openness of bodies—in a continuation of variation rather than a regulation and 
standardization.  Understanding relationality as a shared realm from which distinct terms 
and interactions emerge refuses the assumption that the terms of relation precede their 
interrelating as already-constituted entities.  In other words, distinct terms emerge from 
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rather than determine relation.  Herein, ever-varying bodies are embedded in relation 
as—in Massumi’s concept of relation—real potential to be actualized. 
Nicolas Bourriaud also takes up relationality in Relational Aesthetics within the 
context of current fascinations in art with relation as the foundational principle for 
artwork.  Baurriaud confronts and critiques the emphases in contemporary art on 
intersubjectivty, interaction, encounter, and the disruption of social order.  Bourriaud 
marks a distinction between modern art that forms imaginary and utopian realities and 
contemporary art that forms and models ways of living in existing reality.  Bourriaud 
argues that artists working with relational aesthetics in a contemporary moment share in 
common the same practical and theoretical horizon, which he understands as the sphere 
of inter-human relations.  In framing aesthetics as that which sets humans apart from 
other animals, Bourriaud conceives of relational aesthetics as “[an] aesthetic theory 
consisting in judging artworks on the basis of the inter-human relations, which they 
represent, produce or prompt.”19  Under the rubric of relational aesthetics, artworks 
become moments and objects of sociability and artists take as their subject matter the 
entirety of human relations and social context.
20
  The type of relationality that emerges in 
contemporary art becomes for Baurriaud a “full-fledged form,” which labors to “re-
stitch” the relational fabric.21  Therefore, instead of performing weak social critiques, 
contemporary relational art re-forges and revitalizes the role of art as a way of not only 
ethically living in the world but also of critiquing normatized social organization. 
While I take up art—and more specifically performance—as relational and 
examine performance through phenomenal encounters, I diverge from Bourriaud’s 
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framing of relational art as a set of procedures that artists employ in their work, which 
have at their foundation and impetus inter-human relations.
22
  Instead of indicating the 
relational in art as the methods that a human artist performs, I understand relationality as 
the human and more-than-human domain in which performance is immersed and from 
which a performance emerges.
23
  I conceive of relationality for performance as an 
ungraspable and mobile confluence of relations that engenders ongoing liveliness 
(Chapter Two), continuity and ephemerality (Chapter Four), a modality of exposure that 
unhinges subjectivity from the stable and identified subject (Chapter One), and 
resistances that are entangled in structures of domination (Chapter Three).  This 
conception of relationality challenges the notions that performance hinges on 
ephemerality (conceived as disappearance) and live human embodiment.  While there is 
an affinity between my conception of relationality in performance and Bourriaud’s 
relationality as the work of the human artist insofar as both emphasize art as encounter 
and practice that is engaged with proposals for living in a shared world, I take up 
relationality not as a practical and theoretical device that artists utilize for artistic 
production from which the relational inter-human world comes but instead as a process 
through which performance—which includes the human and the more-than-human—
enacts its living embeddedness in and emergence from the relational world.
24
  Therefore, 
I do not emphasize—as Bourriaud does—that art is primarily a product of human labor 
rooted in the exploration of inter-human social bonds.  While I do not wholly disagree 
with Bourriaud’s argument, I take a different approach in my examination of how 
performance operates relationally.  Herein, I take up becoming not just as the 
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continuation of a live performance past the parameters of a show evident in Wolska’s 
argument but also as relational.  Again, I organize my inquiry along four relational fields 
in which humans are involved—with animals, machines and technology, landscapes, and 
objects.  My argument works to think through these relational fields for a better 
understanding of the nature of performance as a becoming—beyond the opposition 
between ephemerality (human bodies performing live) and continuity (the becoming of a 
performance past the parameters of a show) and beyond an anthropocentric emphasis on 
embodiment.  Therefore, I work to build on Auslander’s insight that the ontology of 
performance does not hinge on live human embodiment and Wolka’s insight that the 
ontology of performance exceeds the boundaries of the performance event. 
In Chapter One, I focus on human-animal encounter in performance through the 
lens of relationality and subjectivity as a way to complicate the anthropocentric 
dominance of thinking performance as live human embodiment rooted in the human 
subject.  I take as a case study Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny project (2000), described as an 
ongoing social event that includes the genetic manipulation and socialization of an animal 
and the public dialogue concerning the work.  I argue that the apparently discreet bodies 
and “intersubjects” in the GFP Bunny project—in particular Eduardo Kac and Alba—
emerge and encounter each other in exposure alongside and in addition to a complicated 
and unstable status as interacting subjects.  I work to draw out and examine the complex 
ties between subjectivity and exposure as a way to foreground exposure as rooted in 
relational encounter rather than “live” encounter.  Therefore, I examine the 
performance—which includes Eduardo Kac’s “GFP Bunny” chapter in Telepresence & 
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Bio Art Networking Humans, Rabbits, & Robots (2005)—in order to argue that a 
modality of exposure materializes in performance in relational encounter with more-than-
human others rather than as an effect of live human performers performing death on stage 
while examining the implications of subjectivity on and in this particular human-animal 
relational field.  I argue that performance as a becoming operates in a modality of 
exposure, which permeates relation and ruptures subjective identity distinctions.  Finally, 
I explicate a modality of exposure through the operative factors of love, care, affect, and 
listening. 
In Chapter Two, I take up performance intertwined with the materiality of objects 
and their relationship to conceptions of history and memory in an examination of how 
performance operates as a becoming at the nexus of human-object encounter.  I examine 
two performances—Hamed Taheri and Mojtaba Mirtahmasb’s performance-film Home is 
In Our Past (2003/2005) and a 2007 performance of Heiner Müller’s Explosion of a 
Memory/Description of a Picture (1984) that I directed for the Xperimental Theatre at the 
University of Minnesota.  I argue that performance operates as a becoming in a relational 
historical liveliness that exceeds “liveness” through an examination of historically, 
vitally, and collectively emerging objects in an ongoing relationality that permeates 
performance.  I argue that for performance as a relational becoming “liveness,” which 
indicates an ending, gets reconfigured as ongoing liveliness—an object’s continuous and 
ungraspable historical living in an ephemerality that persistently keeps on going.    
In Chapter Three, I take up the language of performance and productivity and the 
mandate of “performance” in the post-industrial era in order to question how performance 
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operates as a becoming at the nexus of human-machine/technology encounter.  I examine 
Rainpan 43’s performance machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines, machines (2008) and the rehearsal-performance process for Heiner Müller’s 
Die Hamletmaschine (1977) that I directed in 2006/2007.  I again diverge from the notion 
that the nature of performance is its ephemeral “liveness” in order to argue that the nature 
of performance inheres in process and movement—in mobile and embodied adjustments 
that indicate belonging in symbiotic webs of complexity and entanglement in structures 
of domination. 
In Chapter Four, I take up encounter with and within landscapes in order to think 
through how immersion in the world informs questions concerning and theorization of 
how performance operates as a becoming.  I examine three performances of the 
contemporary movement artists Eiko and Koma—The Caravan Project (1999 - 2013), 
Naked (2010 – 2012), and River (1995 – 2011).  In the final chapter of my inquiry, I 
further argue that the nature of performance is not an opposition between continuity and 
ephemerality but that relationality or becoming as the nature of performance emphasizes 
continuity and ephemerality.  In part, I take up phenomenology’s insights concerning 
practical engagement with and within the world in order to argue that performance as a 
becoming indicates a practice of wayfinding or following.  I examine Eiko and Koma’s 
performances—emerging in part from the founding work of Ohno Kazuo and Hijikata 
Tatsumi in Butoh—in order to explicate how wayfinding/following might be mobilized 
for understanding performance as a becoming beyond a focus on live human embodiment 
that performs death.  I argue that wayfinding/following a landscape explicates 
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performance not as an ending in ephemeral liveness but rather a continuous relation 
bound together in ephemerality and continuity—in ongoing separation and togetherness. 
In these four chapters, I enter into the conversation concerning the nature of 
performance occurring in the work of Blau, Phelan, Auslander, and Wolska in order to 
build on Wolska’s proposal that performance operates as a becoming.  I look beyond a 
mere opposition between ephemerality and continuity—whether a performance 
disappears or continues elsewhere—in order to better understand how bodies disappear 
and continue elsewhere.  My intervention in the conversation attempts to think beyond 
anthropocentric terms and an anthropocentric sensorium, and beyond the opposition 
between liveness and recording.  My inquiry therefore intervenes in the conversation on 
the nature of performance adjacent to the concerns of performance ecology—which 
critiques anthropocentric attitudes in theatre and takes up questions concerning the more-
than-human in theatre and performance.  My inquiry works to theorize how performance 
operates relationally as a becoming through encounter with others in order to examine the 
relational liveliness and mobility of performance in continuous-ephemeral becoming. 
 
Modes and Methods of Inquiry 
 In the following chapters, I pay attention to phenomena of encounter with 
landscapes, machines and technology, animals, and objects in performance.  I pay 
particular attention to (not just human) bodies in performance.  I take as a primary point 
for my examination embodied practical and relational engagement in order to more 
deeply and complexly understand “what is occurring” in performance.  The frames 
through which I investigate performance form a different perspective in each chapter.  In 
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Chapter One, I examine performance through the frame of exposure and intersubjectivity 
that labors to move beyond anthropocentrism.  In Chapter Two, I examine performance 
through the frame of historicity and memory as related to lively objects.  In Chapter 
Three, I examine the challenges and mandates of performance as a mode of productivity 
within late capitalism.  Lastly, in Chapter Four I examine the ways that performance 
enables a new way understanding immersion in-the-world through an eco-
phenomenological philosophical framework.  I take up these perspectives on my primary 
inquiry into how performance operates relationally—in continuous-ephemeral unfolding 
of bodies in encounter—in part through a phenomenological approach in order to closely 
examine the human-more-than-human embodied relational movements and encounters 
that comprise performance.  The critical mode of phenomenology has particular 
relevance for understanding how bodies encounter each other—through a formation of 
subjectivity tied to the human subject and body and beyond regularized and regulated 
formations of subjectivity (Chapter One), through history and memory in a historically 
rooted liveliness that extends far beyond the parameter of “liveness” (Chapter Two), 
through a mode of productivity that mandates effective performance and generates webs 
of complexity (Chapter Three), and through immersion with/in the world in a practice of 
wayfinding/following (Chapter Four). 
While Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology emphasizes inquiry into what shows 
itself to a transcendental ego or intentional consciousness, Martin Heidegger’s 
phenomenological paradigm places greater emphasis on practical engagement and 
interpretation within the world—emphasizing that phenomena cannot be understood 
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merely from the perspective of intentional consciousness.
25
  Phenomenology is not just a 
study of how phenomena appear to human consciousness in direct experience but also a 
study of how phenomena appear in an environmental encounter with others, which 
exceeds the capacity for intentional consciousness to see and understand.  Herein, 
phenomena occur environmentally historically and contextually, “behind one’s back,” as 
well as in consciousness.  In The Phenomenological Attitude, Bert States writes that the 
goal of a phenomenological critique of performance is to draw into apprehension “any 
instant that is perceptually ‘apprehended’ as carrying, or leading to, an intuition about 
what it is and what it is doing before our eyes.”26  States describes a phenomenological 
approach as a mode of thought that examines the un-apprehended relations of things, 
which works to draw these relations into apprehension.  I take up a phenomenological 
analysis not to question what shows itself just in a relation of correspondence to an 
intentional consciousness but moreover to question what relationally unfolds in 
performance—appearing and disappearing—whenever we environmentally encounter 
others within phenomena.   
I choose phenomenology as a theoretical mode because it draws attention to 
embodiment as a foundational mode of encounter, to meaning and feeling that arise in 
lived experience, and to practical engagement within the world.  The question of what 
performance is doing before our embodied eyes can be more complexly understood 
through a phenomenological analysis.  Phenomenology offers a path for critical analysis 
from the perspective of embodiment that, in States words, is in “pursuit of the culturally 
disguised thing.”27  The structure or essence of what is relationally occurring in 
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performance that I work to understand is not for me a scientific or metaphysical fact of 
matter but rather an indistinct and continuous relational encounter between embodied and 
mobile consciousness and the hiddenness of relation.  In working with a 
phenomenological approach, I work not to attribute phenomena to a distinct intentional 
consciousness that resides in a single stable subject but at consciousness-raising by trying 
to think through the perceptible and imperceptible movements of human and more-than-
human bodies within moments of encounter in performance.  This phenomenological 
approach emphasizes that the personal and the subjective are always taken up with the 
relational.  The more-than-human others such as machines or landscapes that organize the 
inquiry are not others from whom I determinately distinguish myself or the human but 
ever-varying diverse entities among whom I and other human beings are immersed.  I 
therefore do not begin from an isolated or outside perspective but first and foremost 
through a method of encounter—a method of “with”—in which the individual inquiry is 
something always already shared.  This means that I pay attention to phenomena of 
encounter between bodies in performance relationally bound together with each other and 
with my own engagement. 
I also draw on William James’ radical empiricism in paying attention to human 
and more-than-human bodies moving in the midst of an ungraspable relationality.  In 
Parables for the Virtual Movement, Affect, Sensation, Brian Massumi articulates the 
distinction between a reductive classical empiricism and an expanded empiricism based 
in the work of Henry James.
28
  Massumi argues that classical empiricism operates in a 
limited range of empirical reality, which does not allow for regions of the 
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indeterminate—the supraempirical and the infraempirical.  In contrast to a limited 
empiricism that progresses from description of isolated terms to predictive deterministic 
laws, expanded empiricism attends to movement and the felt reality of relationality.  
Herein, I select and analyze performances that emerge from encounter with the more-
than-human that cannot be reduced to predictive and deterministic constructs for defining 
human-more-than-human relation.  I select and analyze performances where the 
experience of encounter with others in performance exceeds the capacity for knowledge 
to classify the relation.  In Essays in Radical Empiricism, William James states, “We 
were virtual knowers…long before we were certified to have been actual knowers…by 
the percept’s retroactive validating power,” which ensures that relations in experience 
precede recognition and classifications of experience.
29
  James argues that relation is 
directly sensed between distinct terms in a way that is not reducible to distinct terms and 
identities.  Therefore, I choose to analyze performances that emerge from an ongoing 
relationality with a focus on the more-than-human, which directs my inquiry and 
attention towards movement and the incomprehensible in experience with others in 
performance.  The failure in methodological techniques to grasp relation gestures toward 
what unfolds beyond the radar.  While Brian Massumi in advocating for a radical 
empiricism argues that in phenomenology experience culminates in the personal—which 
is pre-embedded in the world in a closed loop of intentionality, a phenomenological 
analytical mode paired with radical empiricism attends to relational and embodied 
elements that no investigation—phenomenological or otherwise—might stabilize in a 
coherent, all-encompassing, and everlasting definition of relation in performance.
30
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 Finally, I draw on the insights of Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno in the 
work of historical materialism that emphasizes that objects of study are shaped through 
social and historical mediation and with ideological implications. Walter Benjamin 
reinforces that a materialist historiography enacts a critical moment in the construction of 
a dialectal image—a critical constellation—that ruptures historical continuity and totality.  
Taking up Benjamin’s conceptualization of the constellation, Adorno further argues that 
the constellation is meant to constructively assemble diverse historical fragments in a 
critique undomesticated by familiar and habituated thought and ideological 
presuppositions.  For Adorno, the constellation is a critical practice that might provoke a 
new consciousness of the ideological condition in which we are entrapped—a condition 
of barbarism in which the commodity form is the structuring principle of society.  Herein, 
the constellation takes on a critical force through a mediation that exposes historical 
contradictions that disallow identity thinking.  In contrast to the apparent stasis of 
Benjamin’s dialectical image, Adorno emphasizes a “reliquification” that occurs with the 
repetition of what has been congealed and abstracted in identity thinking and in historical 
progress.  Historical materialism provides a contrast and corrective to inquiries in 
performance ontology that risk creating a totality by which performance might be 
understood without recognition of socio-historical mediation and materiality.  In my 
inquiry, the performances that I examine do not fit together to create an ontological 
totality.  Instead, each chapter mediates and critiques a different and disparate fragment 
of performance ontology as a becoming.  My inquiry therefore operates through a 
confluence of philosophical modes that are in tension with each other.   
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 In an emphasis on existentials, fundamental ontology feeds on its own cultural 
and historical mediation obscuring its entanglement in the material conditions from 
which its conceptualizations emerge.  Historical materialism rejects the project of 
ontology that is invested in supposedly concretizing a universal abstract, which cannot be 
concretized.  In The Jargon of Authenticity, Theodor Adorno critiques Martin 
Heidegger’s phenomenological project as a project that creates an aura of the authentic in 
which the particularization of essence in the concept becomes absolute and fundamental 
without regard to subjective mediation.
31
  Adorno described this philosophy as striving 
for the concretization of thought and experience in the midst of a “total state of affairs,” 
which orients itself according to abstract exchange.  When phenomenology and ontology 
move away from the empirical world and empirical subjectivity, philosophical inquiry no 
longer need be concerned with how concepts are conceived and with how a being 
becomes what it becomes.  According to a concept of totality in fundamental ontology—
rather than becoming—the whole is pre-established over its parts.32  An ontology of 
becoming ruptures this order and reinforces that in the midst of movement—where there 
is no pre-established domain—the relational element is given precedence.  Therefore, in 
my inquiry I work not to create a totality by which performance ontology might be 
understood—as “live human embodiment” or otherwise—but a thinking of performance 
ontology that unfolds in a constellation of critical thought deeply connected to and 
emerging from the empirical world and empirical subjectivities. 
I take up six contemporary performance sites in empirical, phenomenological, and 
historical materialist modes and a method of performance analysis.  I examine these 
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performance sites: the GFP Bunny project (2000 and ongoing) in Chapter One, Home is 
In Our Past (2003/2005) and Explosion of a Memory/Description of a Picture (2007) in 
Chapter Two, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines 
(2008) and Die Hamletmaschine (2006/2007) in Chapter Three, and three 
performances—River (1995 – 2011), The Caravan Project (1999 – 2013), and Naked 
(2010 – 2012) of the contemporary movement artists Eiko and Koma in Chapter Four.  In 
the following section, I outline the chapters and also project an image of each 
performance, which embodies a phenomenological necessity from each performance that 
directs my inquiry into how performance operates as a relational becoming.  Herein, I 
follow the basis of a phenomenological method, which States indicates through Husserl 
as: “[a method where the phenomenologist] will project a single imaginative variant, but 
one that is strategic, crucial, and usually colorful, one that brings out a certain necessity 
in the thing we wish to examine.”33  The images reflect the chapter titles and the 
relational basis within which my examination works: Holding Animals, Materializing 
Objects, Moving Machines, and Following Landscapes.  The images are not imaginative 
constructions that I narrate but photo images from the performances that operate as 
imaginative rather than documentary windows, which open onto my performance 
analyses.   
 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One: Holding Animals   
In Chapter One, I take up subjectivity as a complex and politically ethically 
weighted site of contestation in transgenic artwork.  I begin with Eduardo Kac’s ongoing 
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social event and performance project GFP Bunny (2000).  I analyze the performance—
particularly through Eduardo Kac’s “GFP Bunny” chapter—which foregrounds human-
animal encounter via Kac’s engagement with a genetically “invented” bunny.  
Significantly, the text does not operate as a documentation of a prior live event but is in 
fact part of the performance.  I examine the performance in terms of an encounter in 
which subjectivity—operating within paradigms of domestication and discovery as 
phenomena of care and natural evolution—might function to stabilize bodies in discreet 
and normatized formations of the subject alongside a modality of exposure inherent in 
performance.  I pair Kac’s project with Jacques Derrida’s theorization of his own 
engagement with an unnamed cat in order to think through the difficulties and 
implications of understanding human-animal encounter in terms of the satisfaction of 
often competing subjective interests and as an unfolding open relation in exposure.  I 
argue that beyond the paradigms of domestication and discovery, relationality is not a 
factor of a body’s subjective (in)abilities in natural domestication or unnatural genetic 
manipulation but entails the generation of affect—relationally becoming through 
mobility, exposure, and an openness of bodies.  Herein, I emphasize that exposure in 
performance is not only a factor of live human bodies performing death but moreover a 
factor of openness to being affected, which surpasses the constriction of “live” human 
embodiment as the nature of performance. 
The photo image by Chrystelle Fontaine that I would like to introduce this site 
with can be viewed online at http://www.ekac.org/gfpbunny.  The image of Eduardo Kac 
holding Alba the rabbit—which also begins the “GFP Bunny” chapter—is a 
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consolidation and materialization of an intersubjective relationship.  The image also 
gestures towards a relational intimacy in which both human and rabbit are exposed.  
Herein, the viewer of the image is also drawn into relational exposure.  We become 
implicated in and part of the ongoing relation embodied in the image rather than stand 
outside of it.  I begin with the rich image of holding—one in which Alba holds Kac, as 
much as Kac holds Alba, as much as I behold their holding—in order to understand how 
performance operates as a becoming in a modality of exposure that is dis-operative with 
intersubjectivity as a regulative and normative formation at the nexus of human-animal 
encounter. 
I work to open up the following questions through a performance analysis that 
specifically looks at phenomena unfolding in performance at the nexus of human-animal 
encounter:  
 How are representational practices entwined in the determination of subjects and 
the unfolding relationality from which human and more-than-human bodies 
emerge? 
 What are the stakes in subjectivity and releasing subject positionality in order to 
gesture towards and attend to exposure and becoming in ongoing relationality? 
 How does intersubjectivity and exposure co-reside in human-animal encounter in 
performance? 
 How does a modality of exposure explicate how performance operates as a 
becoming beyond live human embodiment?  
 
Chapter Two: Materializing Objects 
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Chapter Two has two sections—Fragments in History and A Practice of 
Collecting—through which I examine the ways in which lively objects shape historical 
and collected living worlds in order to further animate and understand how performance 
operates as a relational becoming.  I begin with Hamed Taheri and Mojtaba Mirtahmasb’s 
performance-film Home is In Our Past (2003/2005) first performed at the City Theatre in 
Tehran, Iran in 2003 in order to examine how historical-material objects shape ways of 
narrating and experiencing history—in particular through a mode of recycling that gives 
rise to a tension between the capacity of objects to verify human history and identity and 
the proliferation of objects that fragments histories and identities.  I argue that historical-
material objects collage across time and context reasserting and reinserting themselves in 
ongoing relations reconfiguring historical narrative as a mutable and unfolding ongoing 
engagement with objects.  Home is in Our Past is a complex intertwining of a live 
performance, a documentation of that live performance in recording, and film.  While I 
briefly explicate the intertwining that the directors construct through the performance-
film, I analyze Home is in Our Past as a performance that I access via film. 
In A Practice of Collecting, I examine a production of Heiner Müller’s Explosion 
of a Memory/Description of a Picture (1984) that I directed at the University of 
Minnesota (2007).  In this section, I take up objects as active and lively in a mode of 
collecting that enlivens relations rather than signifies owners.  This section reworks and 
combines questions concerning the lively activity of an object in the previous 
performance through encounter with objects immersed in collection and incomplete 
mobile pictures that create fissured bodies and memories.  I argue that possession does 
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not just indicate property ownership but is moreover inherent in relationality—that 
possession not only occurs through personal and collective human stories, memories, and 
histories that become engrained in objects but also that the life of an object moves 
through a capacity for affect and continuing historical liveliness.   
Through performance analyses of these two performances—in particular the 
human-object open encounter within them—I argue that historical and collected objects 
explicate performance as a becoming that occurs through continuing liveliness beyond 
the ephemeral “liveness” of human bodies performing.  I would like to introduce these 
two performances through images of liveliness that emerge at the nexus of human-object 
encounter—which gesture toward the necessity of liveliness, persisting past liveness—in 
performance as a becoming. 
 
Object-shadows collecting in Explosion of a Memory/Description of a Picture.   
Photos by Justin Christy. 
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 Objects collecting in Explosion of a 
Memory/Description of a Picture.  Photos by Justin Christy. 
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Photos by Masoud Pakdel of objects covered in the slip of history in Home is in Our Past 
can be viewed in Michal Kobialka’s article “Tadeusz Kantor and Hamed Taheri Of 
Political Theatre/Performance.”34 
In Chapter Two, I work to open up the following questions through performance 
analyses that specifically look at phenomena unfolding in performance at the nexus of 
human-object encounter: 
 How does an object participate in relational processes over and above a simple 
role as an empty instrument for use by human actors or as a prop that signifies a 
specific time period and type of space in performance?  
 How does an object participate in and emerge from ongoing relation?  How does a 
historical-material object cross time and context?  How does an object create 
liveliness—beyond human liveness—for understanding how performance 
operates as a becoming? 
 How does the playful, lively, and sensual relationality of a collection create living 
more-than-human stories and images, create an excess of effects, and thereby 
exhibit an abundant power of affect and mobility? 
 
Chapter Three: Moving Machines 
In Chapter Three, I examine the entanglement of relationality with structures of 
domination through the operative notions of productivity and performance bound 
together through a mandate to perform in the post-industrial era. This chapter has two 
sections—Failing Machines and Practicing Machine.  In the section Failing Machines, I 
take up machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines (2008) 
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or more specifically the movement of the kinetic junk sculpture of Goldbergian machines 
that comprises the stage—a visceral and visual unfolding web of human-machine 
relations.  I draw out the tension between machinery as efficient commodity-convenience 
producers and machinery as producers of a mechanically rich dream infused with 
pleasure and the ridiculous.  I argue that even though a fully mechanized habitation can 
obscure disciplinary power and relations of control—mechanical habitation can also 
make magic through obsessive and inconvenient contraptions taken to creative excess.  I 
argue that in this mechanical system improper performance is a value and that working 
with these incessant incompetent machinic contraptions requires continuous relational 
immersion, learning, tinkering, and failing that revitalizes process.  I argue that 
performance as a becoming operates in lively movement in relational webs of 
complexity—again persisting past liveness—that nevertheless entangle with structures of 
domination. 
In the section Practicing Machine, I further my analysis of how performance 
operates as a becoming from the perspective of a rehearsal-performance process.  I take 
up the rehearsal-performance process for Heiner Müller’s Die Hamletmaschine (1977), 
which I directed in 2006/2007 for the Xperimental Theatre at the University of Minnesota 
and The Minnesota Fringe Festival at Theatre de la Jeune Lune.  I argue that a director 
must think and practice relationally in order to encourage a creative and symbiotic 
performance practice that is not rooted in structures of domination and mastery.  I 
emphasize in this section, invitational process—over the separation between audition, 
rehearsal, and production—that nurtures and challenges practicing bodies emerging in 
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instances of care, compassion, risk, conflict, and struggle.  Moreover, I argue that the 
politically and ethically weighted questions concerning symbiosis and domination cannot 
be resolved into a formula or model that might be generally and universally applied to 
performance making. 
I would like to introduce these two performances through images that draw out 
the machinic and mobile webs of complexity and movement in which humans are 
immersed with machines/technology in performance. 
 
 
 
Practicing machine in Die Hamletmaschine. Photo by Justin Christy. 
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Bodily immersion in machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines.  Photo by Jacques-Jean Tiziou. 
 
 
Machines machines everywhere in machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines, machines.  Photo by Jacques-Jean Tiziou. 
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In Chapter Three, I work to open up the following questions through performance 
analyses that specifically look at phenomena unfolding at the nexus of human-
machine/technology encounter: 
 How does human involvement with machines and technology envision relational 
webs of complexity and instrumental-industrial productivity?  How does a tension 
between mastery and magic permeate human involvement with machines and 
technology in performance?   
 What are the stakes in valuing perfectible product over ongoing relational 
process?   
 How do experiences of automation, efficiency, failure, and vulnerability permeate 
human involvement with machines and technology in performance?  How does 
human-machine/technology relation entangle symbiosis and domination? 
 
Chapter Four: Following Landscapes 
In Chapter Four, I take up landscapes in performance in order to theorize a 
practice of wayfinding/following, which is immersed in the world, for understanding how 
performance operates as a becoming.  I examine three performances of the contemporary 
movement artists Eiko and Koma—The Caravan Project (1999 - 2013), Naked (2010 – 
2012), and River (1995 – 2011)—which are rooted in Butoh, a form of dance founded by 
their predecessors Ohno Kazou and Hijikata Tatsumi. I argue that adjustment or 
attunement in a practice of wayfinding/following in performance functions as a 
synaesthetic involvement within a surrounding landscape.  I take up the insights and field 
of phenomenology in order to argue that adjustment or attunement entails a practice of 
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wayfinding/following—synaesthetically feeling and finding a way through and within a 
landscape of immersive relationality.  The pairing of phenomenology with the Eiko and 
Koma’s performances offers a way to think through performance as a becoming in which 
synaesthetic adjustments are continually and ecologically made.  I take up Eiko and 
Koma’s Naked, which I attended at the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, in order to 
examine how exposure and belonging within landscapes is entangled with artistic cultural 
framing—evident in landscape painting, institutionalized art spaces, and perspectival 
theatre conventions.  I reaffirm that the stakes of my inquiry are invested in a care-filled 
and responsible relational performance practice in which “culture” and “nature” are 
inextricably intertwined.  I further take up Eiko and Koma’s The Caravan Project—
which I examine via archival materials—in order to argue that wayfinding adjustment or 
attunement is an improvisational practice that occurs within a multitude of perceptible 
and imperceptible comings and goings in performance within an expansive landscape.  
Building on the im/perceptible relational unfoldings that I examine in The Caravan 
Project, I take up Eiko and Koma’s River, which I also encounter via archival materials.  
I argue that wayfinding/following adjustment or attunement is a dreaming-cognition-
hallucination that ruptures the appearance-reality duality.  Through a phenomenological 
examination of these performances—paying specific attention to human-landscape 
encounter in performance—I argue that wayfinding/following in performance indicates a 
performance practice that combines and binds together continuity and ephemerality.  
Herein, the supposed opposition between continuity and ephemerality as a way to 
understand the nature of performance gives way to an understanding of performance as a 
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becoming, which unfolds continuously and ephemerally (not just via live human bodies 
but moreover through relational encounter with others that continue to be a part of one’s 
own living and dying). 
 I would like to introduce these three performances through three images that 
consolidate an image of a wayfinding/following practice with/in landscapes.  The first 
image comes from The Caravan Project and materializes an image of nomadic 
movement necessary for wayfinding/following for performance as a becoming.  The 
second image comes from Naked and materializes the question of how the nature of 
performance is caught up in the question of reality that works to oppose cultural 
performance from natural reality—highlighting the importance of thinking performance 
practice as following relation.  The third image comes from River and materializes the 
passage necessary for the binding together of continuity and ephemerality in 
wayfinding/following.  The three photos draw together an image of performance as a 
becoming in which wayfinding operates as a continuous-ephemeral following within 
relational landscapes.   
 
 
Coming and going in The Caravan Project.  Photo by Kate Gibson. 
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“Are they real?”  Following a landscape with/in an art gallery.   
Photo by Anna Lee Campbell. 
 
 
 
Following a landscape into the dark night in River.  Photo by Anna Lee Campbell. 
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In Chapter Four, I work to open up the following questions through performance 
analyses that specifically look at phenomena unfolding in performance at the nexus of 
human-landscape encounter: 
 How are human bodies and performance immersed in and emerge from 
landscapes?  What quality of movement does a landscape nurture? 
 How do landscapes engage synaesthesic modalities and wayfinding practices of 
adjustment or attunement?  How do these modes shape a way—a process of 
finding one’s way—in an unfolding much more than human world, which might 
inform how we can theorize and understand performance as a becoming? 
 
It is at these many crossroads where the inquiry will have already begun and 
through which a relational understanding of performance might be thought—in which I 
work to pay attention to the complexities and contradictions in thinking performance 
beyond live human embodiment and beyond relationality as an aesthetic formation that 
repairs or fastens together inter-human sociability.  
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Chapter One: 
“Holding Animals” 
  
 
In Chapter One, I take up the question of how a relational practice of theatre and 
performance might be thought and made from the perspective of encounter with 
nonhuman animals in performance.  The questions that I work to open up are: how is a 
relational practice of performance entwined in the determination and identification of 
subjects and a relational unfolding of indistinct bodies and subjectivities; what are the 
stakes of subjectivity and abandoning subject positionality in exposure; how does 
relationality operate prior to, rupture, and complicate seemingly distinct terms and bodies 
in performance; how does a focus on the relational think beyond performance (and “the” 
body) as a live human centered representational practice and product?  I begin with 
Eduardo Kac’s ongoing social event GFP Bunny as way to think through the manner in 
which subjectivity—operating within paradigms of domestication and discovery and 
naturalized evolution—might function as the ground and stakes of defining the human 
being.  I pair Kac’s project with Derrida’s theorization of his own engagement of being 
seen by an animal (an unnamed cat) because the two unfolding scenarios provide a way 
to think through the difficulties and implications of understanding human-animal 
engagement in terms of the satisfaction of often competing subjective interests and as an 
unfolding and ongoing relation with others.  I argue that beyond the paradigms of 
domestication and discovery, relation in performance is not a factor of a body’s 
subjective (in)abilities in a natural domestication or an unnatural genetic manipulation 
but that relation entails the generation of affect, which unfolds through a mobile 
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exposure, openness, and listening between continually emerging bodies and uncertain 
subjectivities that do not only or always act for the satisfaction of their own interests.  
GFP Bunny provides an important avenue to investigate relationality precisely because 
the performance draws together transgenic art, public social event, and the private “real” 
lives of (not just human) people in a performance that emerges from human-animal 
encounter.  The image of Eduardo Kac holding Alba—the transgenic, chimerical, 
domesticated, invented, and affect animal—in the performance is a phenomenological 
image that draws together questions and practices that relationally resonate in and beyond 
performance. 
 
The GFP Bunny Project 
On April 29
th
 2000 in Jouy-en-Josas, France, Eduardo Kac first held Alba, a 
rabbit who Kac genetically altered to glow fluorescent green under the right light.
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  The 
image marks a particularly potent consolidation of resonances for thinking how 
performance operates relationally (as a becoming).  While Eduardo Kac coined the term 
“BioArt” in 1997, a diverse range of techniques and analyses characterize and situate 
differently the artworks that appear to fall under the purview of the BioArt genre.  Early 
forms of BioArt that rely on “algorithms, visualizing data, [and] aestheticising computer 
simulations of biological processes” increasingly gave way to materializations of genetic 
manipulations in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries.
36
  The range of biotechnological 
materialized modifications in BioArt are made possible through a diverse range of 
scientific processes such as cloning, hybridization, genotype and phenotype 
reprogramming, and genetic and tissue culture engineering.   BioArt not only includes the 
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manipulation of animal genetic material through technologies found in the biological 
sciences but also the manipulation of plant material through technologies in the plant 
sciences.  As a subgenre, transgenic art entails the introduction of synthetic genes into an 
organism or the transference of “naturally” occurring genetic material from one organism 
to another.  The transgenic GFP Bunny project that I take up in this chapter for example 
involves the introduction of jellyfish DNA into the genetic make-up of a rabbit—thereby 
creating an animal that has two distinctively different genetic codes within one body.  As 
example of a transgenic procedure performed outside the subgenre of transgenic art, 
embryos from a goat and a sheep were combined in 1984 to produce a “geep.”37 
In particular, Eduardo Kac’s alteration of a rabbit’s genetic make-up draws into 
question human artistic and scientific involvement with nonhuman animals.  Moreover, 
transgenic artworks call into question stable definitions of the body and of life while also 
challenging the political, cultural, and ethical contexts and implications of human 
involvement with other species.  While much of traditionally considered performance art 
has a history of challenging the boundaries and identifications of the human body, 
transgenic art such as GFP Bunny—along with the diversity of work occurring in 
BioArt—expands these investigations into genetic and more-than-human realms in part 
confronting conceptions of the body not just in terms of conceptions of identity but also 
in terms of its humanity and biology.   
Transgenic art and BioArt taps into and draws attention to the potential for 
biomaterials to be reused and reconfigured in endless politically and ethically weighted 
biotechnologically enabled manipulations of living organisms, tissues, and genetic 
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structures.  While some BioArt projects convey a particular and more explicit political 
message tied to specific techno-scientific practices, other works take a more ambiguous 
approach in their political activity.  Political messaging in BioArt comments on 
contemporary issues such as the use of reproductive technologies to preserve embryos, 
the use of nonhuman animals in research, or agricultural practices used in the production 
of plants and animals for food.  As example, SymbioticA’s artwork Victimless Leather 
(2004 – 2013) raises questions concerning human use of nonhuman animals—directing 
attention and discourse to the nonhuman animal at the foundation of consumer products.  
SymbioticA also facilitates a diversity of collaborations between scientists and artists, 
some of which have an explicit political activism while others do not.  In particular, many 
of TC&A’s artworks—the Tissue Culture & Art Project housed within the SymbioticA 
organization—carry no apparent outright political message but are still politically 
engaged.
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  For TC&A, the political import of their body of work rests in: 
for the non-scientist, the ‘wet’ experience in the laboratory…[where] some degree 
of life manipulation can be seen not only as an ethical conduct but also as a 
political act.  A political act that goes beyond the democratization of technology, 
to the act of breaking down dominant discourses, dogmas and metaphors to reveal 
new understandings of life and the power structure it operates within.
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The affinity between the wet experience of the artist in the lab and the scientist in the lab 
draws the conduct of both more visibly into political and ethical discourse.  The power 
structures that legislate and classify life into taxonomies and hierarchies—often operating 
invisibly—are potentially subjected to critique and to forces of transformation.  Of 
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course, there is no guarantee that BioArt works to promote a critical impulse beyond the 
domain of scholars and artists.  However, this does not negate the import of the critique 
that the work provokes or the contradictions in the practice.   
The potential that BioArt demonstrates for rupturing and commenting on power 
structures that order life and society also exhibits a limitation for generating new 
understandings of life.  When living DNA becomes determined as and reduced to an 
informational code and when living tissues become “mere” tissue—both of which can be 
endlessly and easily manipulated—the potential new understandings of life that BioArt 
gestures towards are reduced to one understanding.  Herein, the “understanding of life” is 
not a proliferation of new and ungraspable understandings but a delimitation of life as 
informational code.  Even if intentioned as sociopolitical critique and awareness—the 
manipulation, reading, and breaking of a reductive code (living materials) for human ends 
does not necessarily operate against power structures but in fact can reinforce and 
normatize power structures in a form of techno-scientific domination that operates 
through the manipulation of another’s life considered as genetic material.  Of course, my 
ascription of life and genetic material to “another” rather than as a code that might be 
manipulated gestures towards the entanglement of BioArt in the domain of rights of 
ownership, of equitability, and of self-determination.  In other words, tissues, embryos, 
genes, and other biomaterials come from somewhere and/or someone.  They have a 
history inasmuch as they have a code.    
One of the more known cases of wide use of biomaterials in laboratory 
experiments is that of Henrietta Lacks, an African American woman whose cells were 
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extracted and kept without permission in the 1950s.  HeLa cells have been reproduced 
and used for profit in numerous laboratories.  In addition to work in science, HeLa cells 
have been used in BioArt.  Stelarc’s Partial Head (2006)—made in collaboration with 
TC&A and SymbioticA—used a combination of primate and HeLa cells to create a living 
growing tissue seeded over a plastic composite mold of a hominid skull and a human face 
kept alive in a bioreactor-incubator-circulatory system.  While the combination of cells 
from two different organisms and their “life” outside conventional bodies disrupts the 
notion of a body and a species as stable and contained, the cells also come from human 
and nohuman animal individuals with histories.  Moreover, the histories that these 
particular individuals embody are in part a history of marginalization and exploitation.  
Cells and other biomaterials extracted from a body do not become “mere” objects 
emptied of history and memory made ready for use.  The tie to “where they came from” 
is not just an issue of rights and permission but also of maintaining the resonances that 
are carried in the biomaterials.   
Removed and detached from histories, lives, and experiences beyond the walls of 
the laboratories and galleries—we do not fully understand the value of biomaterials in 
our biotechnological culture.  Andrews and Nelkin argue that, “Definitions of the body 
that reduce and decontextualize it, are what allow scientists or biotechnology firms to 
extract, use, and patent body tissue without reference to the individual or consideration of 
his or her personal desires and social needs.”40  The value that biomaterials have in 
BioArt and transgenic art does not just have to do with profit and social progress but also 
with how we can come to practice an ethically motivated relation with others and an 
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ethical formation of our selves.  Of course, the question remains—and continues to 
generate disagreement—whether BioArt is itself an ethically not just politically 
motivated practice.  In the midst of disagreement, BioArt provokes a necessary discourse 
on the use of marginalized bodies in medical and pharmacological experimentation, on 
the procurement of biomaterials for research, on the genetic modification of living 
materials, on the “ownership” of one’s own biology and biomaterials, and on the 
normatization and regulation of bodies.   
Made possible in part through biotechnological procedures and genetic 
manipulations, GFP Bunny is a performance project that continues beyond the parameters 
of a live event in embodiment and dialogue.  In Telepresence & Bio Art Networking 
Humans, Rabbits, & Robots, Eduardo Kac describes GFP Bunny as an ongoing social 
event that includes the creation of the “chimerical animal,” the public dialogue 
concerning the work, and the social integration of the rabbit.  While Kac’s text and the 
public dialogue that it encourages might be considered as a frame through which the 
project might be documented or as part of an elaborate public relations campaign, the 
various aspects of the “complex social event” labor to produce the presence of a 
chimerical animal.  Unlike “face-to face” encounters with BioArt that produce a 
“presence” through sensory affects that engender a feeling of empathy in the audience 
(Hauser 2008), the presence of the chimerical animal that is produced in GFP Bunny 
hinges on the absence of face-to-face encounter and the presence of a discourse that 
forms around the work.
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  In part, the presence that GFP Bunny produces is a transgenic 
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discourse that relies on the absence of what we generally think is present—namely Alba.  
Herein, Alba is both discursively and also corporeally produced. 
In combining two or more different genetic codes in one organism, transgenic art 
at its root is involved in the production of a chimerical organism.  A chimera such as 
Alba is a single organism that is comprised of two or more genetically distinct cellular 
compositions that thereby present a problem for DNA testing.  A chimerical organism is 
not a hybrid, which has a genetic make-up that derives from a cellular fusion between the 
parent organisms.  In contrast, a chimera maintains two or more sets of DNA with cells 
from either of the parents.  Human chimeras can naturally occur as in the case of Lydia 
Fairchild who was found in 2002 to have two sets of DNA—after being presented with a 
set of DNA evidence that showed that she was not related to her children.
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Technologically produced chimeras are made through familiar procedures such as organ 
transplant and more controversial procedures such as the selective transplantation of 
embryonic cells from one organism onto the embryo of another.  In 2007, the University 
of Nevada School of Medicine technologically produced a chimera with human and 
nonhuman DNA—a sheep with 15% human cells and 85% sheep cells.43 The growth of 
human DNA within the body of a nonhuman animal raises questions concerning the use 
of nonhuman animals for the production of human organs. 
As with Alba in the GFP Bunny project, many chimerical organisms cannot be 
visibly detected or identified without genetic testing.  Chimeras are not only out of place 
in terms of systems of species classification and identification but also more often than 
not literally out of sight.  While the strange productions resultant from tissue engineering 
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procedures in BioArt rely on the visibility of the living organism created, a chimera such 
as Alba in transgenic art undermines classifications in a non-visible way.  Therefore, how 
the chimerical animal is made visible and intelligible complicates any provocation to 
reevaluate and reconsider taxonomies and hierarchies of life that transgenic art might 
engender.  Transgenic art therefore begs the questions: how does a chimerical 
organism—an organism that is out of place and out of sight—become present and make a 
presence in discourse and embodiment, how does the out of classification and sight 
“presence” of a chimerical organism shape and participate in discourse, how does a 
chimerical organism form and reform subjectivities, and what does an technologically 
produced chimerical organism indicate about the role of biotechnology in reshaping 
bodies and subjectivities?  Questions concerned with an organism’s rights alongside the 
political ethical concerns of using modern biotechnology to manipulate living materials 
are prompted as well.  
My initial encounter with the GFP Bunny project occurred through reading Kac’s 
GFP Bunny chapter in Telepresence.  Insofar as GFP Bunny is an ongoing event, there is 
no single and distinct live event that marks the beginning and end of the artwork.  The 
artwork considered relationally disrupts the division between what might be considered 
the “live event” of GFP Bunny—difficult to ascertain, possibly the scientific procedure or 
the public presentation of the “thing” created, or the socialization process—and the 
apparent documentation of the artwork.  Encountering an artwork relationally indicates 
that one does not encounter in liveness and beyond liveness but rather is taken up in the 
ongoing liveliness—making and re-making—of the work.  I begin with Eduardo Kac’s 
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text as it is rooted in the ongoing social event GFP Bunny rather than as its 
documentation.   
Kac’s GFP Bunny chapter provides an account of human-animal relations in 
terms of practical and philosophical traditions that make distinctions between humans 
and nonhuman animals in ways that explicitly or implicitly reinforce a subjection of the 
animal to the human.  However, while this account performs a type of normatizing 
discourse in positioning the terms human and rabbit via discourses of domestication and 
discovery, the project is weighted with the ungraspable relationality from which these 
bodies emerge.  The GFP Bunny chapter begins with an image and narrative of Eduardo 
Kac holding Alba.  In order to better articulate the implications of, tensions between, and 
co-functioning of positionality and relationality in performance practice—I argue that the 
modifying (relational) processes at work in the project, not made explicit in the chapter 
but active in the image of holding, cannot be limited to scientific procedures and 
calculations made upon rabbit biology.  
I pair Kac’s project with Derrida’s theorization of his own engagement with an 
animal in The Animal That Therefore I Am because the two unfolding scenarios—
Eduardo Kac creating, holding, and caring for this rabbit and this cat seeing Jacques 
Derrida standing naked—unfold relational and phenomenological images of holding and 
beholding others.  Each scenario in its own way confronts questions of animal response 
and suffering—which are rooted in Cartesian traditions outlined by Derrida that deny a 
wide range of (human) capabilities to nonhuman animals.  The denial hinges on an 
ontological determination of and relation with an animal—or the animal—in terms of  
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“being able to” in which human-animal relations are organized around and through the 
specific (in)abilities of animals (e.g. the ability to reason or to possess language) and the 
abilities of humans.  The unfolding scenario of holding and beholding—put concisely as 
Alba with Eduardo Kac with Jacques Derrida with this unnamed cat among others—
provides a way to think through the difficulties and implications of human-animal 
encounter in a relationally thought performance practice.  
 
Determining Human-Animal Relation in Performance 
Intersubjectivity and Rabbit Agency 
In Telepresence & Bio Art, Eduardo Kac outlines Alba’s social relation as one 
realized with rabbit agency, intersubjectivity, and dialogic interaction—extensively 
noting theories from scholars such as Buber, Benveniste, and Habermas.  Kac provides an 
ambiguous indication of Alba’s agency and subjectivity in the performance by 
articulating a dialogic and intersubjective social sphere—in which Alba participates—in a 
journey through Western philosophy and through a paradigm of care-infused 
domestication and discovery.  Of course—agency, intersubjectivity, and dialogic 
exchange might help to create a relation infused with care.  But how might it be possible 
to say that Alba, as a rabbit, is a social agent and a social subject within and beyond a 
transgencic artwork?  The question is at best hard to contend with and hinges on the 
phrase “as a rabbit.”  The capacity to think it relies in part on thinking subjectivity and 
agency without recourse to configurations of human subjectivity and agency based upon 
human capabilities.  Therefore, in order to rethink how subjectivity operates beyond the 
naturalized human subject, the locus of subjectivity must be challenged.  The challenge 
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then is not necessarily to ascribe to the rabbit a determinate subject position that provides 
access to and delimits reality but to understand how bodies including rabbit bodies 
pluralize and produce subjectivity revitalizing their mobility and quality of living. 
In the GFP Bunny project, Eduardo Kac emphasizes that Alba is involved in an 
intersubjective social relation and relies on Èmile Benveniste’s “Subjectivity in 
Language” to make assertions for Alba’s position as a subject.44  I take up Benveniste’s 
linguistic explication of subjectivity not only because Kac employs it to substantiate 
Alba’s subjectivity but also to tie together the question of subjectivity with a historical 
and philosophical ontological anthropocentrism that bears upon understanding 
performance beyond a human subject orientation.  As Kac explicates, Benveniste—a 
structural linguist building on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure—theorizes that a person 
takes his place in an intersubjective community in language in the moment of saying 
“I.”45  At that moment, the “I” takes a subject position in discourse.  Benveniste states in 
Problems in General Linguistics: 
It is a speaking man whom we find in the world, a man speaking to another man, 
and language provides the very definition of man….  It is in and through language 
that man constitutes himself as a subject, because language alone establishes the 
concept of ‘ego’ in reality, in its reality which is that of the being.46  
Benveniste describes a unique to man I-you “polarity of persons,” a particularly 
discursive subjectivity, that while emphasizing a mode of address inherent in discourse, 
also determines intersubjectivity by the standard of human language and the very 
definition of man.   
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The concept of discursive subjectivity for Benveniste binds subjectivity to the 
human subject constituted in language and gives to the human subject a privileged access 
to reality through an ontology that prioritizes the subject over the multiple ways in which 
subjectivity is formed and reformed.  The reflexivity through which the subject is 
constituted in a mode of saying “I” in language becomes a method for determining the 
self and defining man’s being—establishing the limits by which the formation of 
subjectivity occurs and affirming that the subject in its reality is the foundation for 
reflecting on the self.  However, if GFP Bunny operates within a more-than-human 
intersubjective realm, what kind of subjectivity does GFP Bunny enable with what kind 
of reflexivity?  What subjectivities with what kinds of reflexivity does a chimera—an 
animal that resists classification—gesture towards?  How does the conceptualization of 
the subject as a speaking man indicate a normatized formation of the subject and 
foreclose other forms of subjectivity and reflexivity unhinged from the speaking man that 
says “I”?   
Benveniste shows that in his thinking animals are not capable of saying “I” as 
humans are able to—that they do not possess the faculty of language and therefore are 
not able to be constituted as subjects.  Even though Benveniste emphasizes 
intersubjectivity, his concept of intersubjectivity is firmly grounded in a discursive 
subjectivity that defines man—a speaking man that has the capacity to say “I” in an 
address to a “you,” another man.  Benveniste’s reflexive “I” is a speaking man that has 
the power to appropriate language in order to know his own being and reality, who 
cannot be conceptualized in the same way that a nonman—such as a tree or horse—can 
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be conceptualized.  In another chapter of Problems in General Linguistics, titled “Animal 
Communication and Human Language,” Benveniste explicates the differences between 
human language, which “has the capacity to express everything,” and the “signal code” 
of bee communication.
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  The opposition between human language and the signal code of 
the bee glosses over the diversity in bees (not the least of which can be expressed through 
a range of over 20,000 species) and marks an inseparable division between subjective 
beings who have the capacity for mediation (that can express everything) and organisms 
that operate on the level of a machine acting through a limited set of codes that govern 
behavior.  Moreover, the being of the subject—the language in which man makes himself 
known—in its capacity to express everything is rooted in the notion that subjectivity does 
not operate outside the human subject and therefore implicitly carries little political and 
ethical impetus for reworking the self not in terms of normatized and standardized human 
characteristics of being but in response to mobile and non-conceptual formations of 
subjectivity.    
The productions of Alba in the GFP Bunny project in terms of a human-oriented 
discursive subject in a reality of domestication and naturalized mutual evolution indicates 
knowledge as determined in the human subject constituted in its subjective and 
ontological reality.  However, the image of Eduardo Kac holding Alba cannot be 
encapsulated as an image of domestication or mutual evolution through which either 
“subject” might be made known.  As a phenomenal image of exposure, the image 
resonates with the idea that subjectivity is not constituted in the reflexivity of saying “I” 
but in saying “we” not necessarily in words and with the idea that subjectivity is not 
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constituted as a comprehensible unity such as Eduardo and Alba but as a plurality that 
ruptures the individual—casting the self toward questioning and reformation.  The 
chimera that escapes classification embodies self-questioning—to what order do “we” 
belong—which the formation of subjectivity depends upon. 
Intersubjectivity in the GFP Bunny project points towards a possibility of 
overcoming the implications of domination in subject-object configurations.  However, 
Kac’s desire “to enjoy her [Alba’s] company as an individual…appreciated for her own 
intrinsic virtues, in dialogical interaction” does not explain what kind of subject Alba is 
or is not capable of being in society.
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  In this consideration, we face the problem of 
thinking the human-animal relation through a structure of ability.  How does Alba say, 
“I”? The question is not meant to suggest that Alba can or cannot say “I” but to 
foreground the importance and difficulties of dealing with questions concerning the 
capabilities of another at all not to mention beyond a historical philosophical tradition 
marked by an unwillingness to rupture the singularity of human language and that would 
ardently deny any rabbit’s ability to say “I” even within an intersubjective frame.  I 
purposefully state the question in an anthropocentric way—framing the question in terms 
of what I might or might not determine as Alba’s abilities—in order to draw attention to 
the inherent failure of such a question in addressing the challenges of understanding how 
human and nonhuman animal bodies emerge through encounter in performance.  GFP 
Bunny prompts these questions.  However, we must also ask how does a chimerical 
animal—an organism that is out of place and out of sight—become present and make a 
presence in discourse and embodiment; how does the out of classification and out of sight 
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“presence” produce subjectivities, shape engagements, and participate in a performance; 
and what does an artificially produced chimerical organism indicate about the role of the 
human practice of biotechnology in reshaping bodies and subjectivities?  
In the GFP Bunny chapter, Kac frames the bunny’s participation in terms of rabbit 
agency.  Rabbit agency is one of many complex material conceptual constructions that 
entangle with the image of embedded togetherness embodied in the performance.  Even 
taken within a field of ongoing relationality, understanding what rabbit agency entails—
as Kac directs us to do—is difficult and does not necessarily undo the social order that 
enables its conceptualization.  Kac articulates that he constructs the GFP Bunny project 
indeterminately so that:  
what human and nonhuman participants think, perceive, and do when they 
experience the work matters in a significant way.  My answer is to make a 
concerted effort to remain truly open to the participant’s choices and behaviors, to 
give up a substantial portion of control over the experience of the work.
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From this statement, rabbit agency might mean participation in the project in the form of 
choices and behaviors.  There are several points of difficulty in the seemingly simple and 
straightforward way in which the project was constructed.  How might Alba as a rabbit 
agent make choices?  How might Kac remain open to these choices when there is likely a 
gap in understanding of how these choices are made and made possible?  Control of 
whose experience is given over and how is that control given up?  And, how are choices 
and behaviors distinguished?  The experiences and articulations of a human cannot 
encompass the experiences and articulations of a rabbit in performance.  Of this, I think 
 53 
that Eduardo Kac would agree and that is perhaps part of the reason for his desire to 
remain open.  Attempts to understand and articulate how nonhuman animals make 
choices in performance are wrought with difficulty.  The difficulty increases when 
understanding relies on anthropocentric constructions of the subject, the individual, and 
the agent.  These constructions risk becoming a way in which the subject is policed, 
produced, and regularized.  Therefore, the concepts of rabbit agency and intersubjectivty 
further beg the questions: what are the strategies and discourses used to situate GFP 
Bunny in a regime of truth and practice?  What is at stake in these strategies and 
discourses?  How do they form Alba as a subject and object of study in a practice of 
normatization?  Additionally, how do the gestures that I make in understanding GFP 
Bunny create meaning and are themselves involved in subject and object formation? 
Of course, a rabbit’s choice might be re-framed as a behavioral action—a sort of 
chosen behavior—that rises out of and is always rooted in engagement with others and 
one’s surroundings.  However, thinking beyond choice as an action taken for the 
fulfillment of one’s interests—choice as a ability to act in one’s interests set against a 
reactive mode of behavior—is still difficult.  This dichotomy between reactive behaviors 
and responsive choices—that are rooted in the freedom and rights of the human subject—
permeates not only philosophical distinctions between humans and animals but also 
understandings of how a human and an animal might participate in performance as 
evident in the notion that human creators (actors, directors, writers, etc.) shape 
performance while the more-than-human is subservient to what human creators think and 
do.   
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In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Jacques Derrida draws on and creates an 
image of his nakedness before the embodied and penetrating gaze of a cat in order to 
explicate the passive nature of ability while tracing a hegemonic Cartesianism through 
the philosophical discourses of Heidegger, Kant, Lacan, and Levinas.
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  I bring in 
Derrida’s critique in order to infuse my analysis of the GFP Bunny project—as a site that 
draws together tensions between relationality and positionality in performance—with 
historical philosophical questions concerning human-animal relation and ontology, which 
take up the notion of agency.  Herein, I situate the stakes of the inquiry not only in a 
practice of performance making but also in a philosophical practice in which the 
nonhuman can be made subservient to the human through constructions of agency.  
Derrida argues that the question “can the animal respond?” and its denials are at the root 
of a philosophical Cartesianism.  In René Descartes’ philosophy concerning human and 
animal capabilities, animals are capable of emitting signs but are not capable of 
responding.  Descartes argues that animals like machines cannot use words like a human 
being—who produces different arrangements of words according to his thoughts in order 
to convey a particular meaning to another human being.
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  Derrida articulates that this 
understanding of “the animal” hinges on how response is defined in Western 
philosophical traditions.  Herein, Derrida takes up a particular vein of Western 
philosophical thought through which he grounds the question concerning the agency of 
the subject in the ability to respond or react.  This enables Derrida to critique 
philosophical framing of “the animal” without more broadly addressing the problem of 
the subject throughout philosophical discourse. 
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In particular, Derrida marks Descartes’ distinction between reaction initiating 
from a law of nature and response from a law of freedom.  In Derrida’s explication, the 
division between reaction and response marks out the realm of culture in which the 
human being freely acts through a mode of response-ability.  In contrast, reaction is an 
attribute of the nonhuman being—brute animals as machines in the natural domain—
occurring as automated behavior characteristic of an entire species, in which they have no 
choice to act in any other way.  The opposition in Derrida’s critique between reaction and 
response is a construction that prioritizes ontological characteristics of types of beings 
over their potential for variation and change.  One trajectory in Western philosophy that 
Derrida does not take up in his study that emphasizes variation and change is Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s theorization of the formation of subjectivity through a web of power that 
continually fluctuates according to competing interests and the resistances that it 
generates.   
In an investigation of the human, Friedrich Nietzsche proposes that there can be 
no universal account of humanity or of human history since there is no human essence 
that can be located in principles such as subjectivity, liberty, and equality that align and 
consolidate across all human societies.
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  Nietzsche argues that humanity should be 
understood as “an inextricable multiplicity of ascending and descending life-
processes…[in which] the strata are twisted and entwined together.”53  Nietzsche 
theorizes that the constitution of subjects occurs in a web of power wherein different 
societies have different manifestations of normative subjects and resistances.  In 
Nietzsche’s theorization, society imposes prescriptions that constitute and regulate the 
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normative subject—which is an expression of the power relations in society.  In this 
social paradigm, power is not the possession of an individual agent but an ongoing 
negotiation in a social order where power continually shifts amongst continually forming 
subjectivities.  For Nietzsche, relations of force rather than abilities constitute domains of 
subjectivity.  Therefore, subjectivity is not the ground of agency or the subject but is 
formed and reformed through fluctuations in power. 
In a further critique of subjectivity, Michel Foucault takes up Nietzsche’s 
theorization of power and the normative subject and theorizes the formation of 
subjectivity in order to unlink subjectivity from the subject and ground it more directly in 
a political framework.  For Foucault, power relations confine and entrap individuated 
subjects by defining them as such.
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  As in Nietszche’s theorization, subjectivity is a 
product of power rather than the ground of human agency.  Agents do not simply 
produce, possess, or manipulate power.  Instead, agents are made and re-made what they 
are by it.  Importantly—in the process of constituting and regularizing social subjects and 
social relations—power also generates subject positions that resist processes of 
normatization and regulation.  In struggles of resistance, competing interests differentiate 
and play out.  In particular, Foucault critiques regulating structures such as prisons and 
schools that materialize power over and definition of subjects and further promotes the 
liberation of subjectivity as a means of decentering power relations.
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  Moreover, 
Foucault interprets modernity as characterized by a process in which discourses of 
knowledge increasingly police subjects.  Foucault states,  
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I think the modern age of the history of truth begins when knowledge itself and 
knowledge alone gives access to the truth.  That is to say, it is when the 
philosopher (or the scientist, or simply someone who seeks the truth) can 
recognize the truth and have access to it in himself and solely through his activity 
of knowing, without anything else being demanded of him and without him 
having to change or alter his being as subject.
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Modernity thereby indicates a socio-historical situation in which knowledge takes over as 
the ultimate and only source of truth.  Therefore, power over bodies can be attained more 
effectively and efficiently if a subject is constituted as a subject of knowledge.  Herein, 
various forms of knowledge aim to constitute and define bodies through an exercise of 
power over them.  Power then is not just a matter of domination or oppression but is 
productive of discourses of truth, which are open to critique.  The stakes then shift from 
explicit concerns with equality and rights to the economic, political, institutional regime 
of the production of truth and the ethical formation of the self.
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The GFP Bunny project operates in at least two registers—as a testing of the self 
and social order that Foucault directs our attention to, which is necessary for decentering 
power relations, and as a knowledge formation that constructs a regime of truth and 
practice in which it might be situated.  The GFP Bunny project animates social relations 
of power not just in the use of biotechnology to manipulate biomaterials but also in the 
discourses that it promotes and foregrounds in the performance and in the discourses that 
it provokes through the performance.  In transgenic art, it matters how bodies are 
augmented, shaped, embedded within, and interact through modern technologies.  How 
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the performance challenges or normatizes modes of thought concerning human-animal 
relation impacts how a reconfiguration and redistribution of agency and subjectivity 
might be made possible—not whether agency (and the subject) is called “human” or 
“rabbit” but that it emerges in a multiplicity of bodies in relation, becoming both and 
neither at the same time.  Performance as a relational process and practice emphasizes the 
continuous emergence of bodies from relation rather than the emergence of relation from 
the capabilities and actions of determined beings.   
The phrase more-than-human derives in part from the Deleuzian project of 
problematizing all manner of knowledge, modes of thought, and practical capacities 
associated with the “human” whether they are rooted in social, artistic, economic, or 
scientific frames and from a broader new materialist renouncement of the omnipotence of 
the human subject and knowledge formations bound to the human.  Therefore, the phrase 
“more-than-human” in part indicates an ongoing inquiry into and questioning of the 
“human.”  Even though the more-than-human has often been taken as inconsequential to 
human dramas, relationally a myriad of bodies are rooted in and inextricable from 
performance.  The plethora and perhaps infinite number of questions in human thought 
concerning what an other is able to do—such as I have purposefully anthropocentrically 
asked (e.g. how is Alba able to act as an agent)—feed on the theorized and lived 
opposition between reactive and responsive modes of engagement that oppose humans 
not just to animals but also to other “non-organisms” as well in disregard for the 
multiplicity of life-processes that Nietzsche theorizes.  
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Gesturing beyond a Cartesianism that denies animal response, Eduardo Kac 
points towards Alba’s responsiveness.  Kac states, “GFP Bunny…makes clear that a 
profound concept of interaction is anchored in the notion of personal responsibility (as 
both care and possibility of response).”58  However, the framing of Alba as a subject and 
an agent through philosophies that deny “the animal” access to language implicitly if not 
explicitly emphasizes understanding the relation between a human and a nonhuman 
animal in terms of their ontological capabilities or inabilities.  The insistence on 
nonhuman animals as subjects and agents—while also working to create a more equal 
and responsible exchange—in part situates the relation within a philosophical and ethical 
structure that depends on the determination of capabilities or a being’s “being able,” 
which is problematic and limits understanding the relation in terms of the satisfaction of 
interests.  The satisfaction of interests thereby becomes the limit by which activity might 
be understood and motivated.  Understanding human-animal relation as deriving from 
differences in capabilities and depending on the commonality or competition of their 
interests ignores "the abyssal rupture" between humans and other animals and between 
different nonhuman animals as well.  For Derrida, this rupture is evident insofar as there 
is no homogeneous continuity between what calls itself man and what man calls the 
animal.
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  The capabilities attributed to humans and denied nonhuman animals—
subjectivity, language, death, imagination, reason, responsibility, consciousness, and so 
forth—are worked and reworked still and always with a complete inability on the part of 
the human to understand what the world is for a nonhuman animal.
60
  Derrida claims that 
questioning whether one can free the relation of the essence of being to beings “from 
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every living, utilitarian, perspective-making project…such that man himself could ‘let the 
being be’?” radically concerns the entire question of being.61  I also argue that freeing 
relation in performance from and as a project of mastery concerns a willingness to expose 
oneself to radical mobility and the mobility of others, which wrenches activity from the 
domain of following one’s own interests.  At stake in performance ontology is not giving 
back to the animal what has been denied it by the human but overhauling the entire 
question of relational being-becoming such that ontological inquiries no longer take a 
vantage point external to ongoing relations and no longer undertake the measurement and 
identification of the being of a being as if a being could remain static and contained.  
With this comes the recognition that there is no static individual being as such or simple 
relation to or subjective mediation of a being as such in performance—and moreover that 
activity in performance cannot be delimited as only dependent on the coordination and 
confliction between interests.  
While neither I nor Kac can tell any reader anything at all concerning Alba “as 
such,”—as if the chimerical animal or the rabbit could be extracted from ongoing 
relation—it is necessary to question the strategies that bind beings into manageable 
categories that tend towards defining the “as such” or essence of a human or nonhuman 
being through their capabilities and attributes.  “As such” or essence does not define a 
distinct term comprised as a collection of attributes but rather is experienced directly in 
and emerges from and cannot be extracted from unfolding relation.  Therefore, “Alba as 
such” is not an individuated term made distinct and identified but an individuated 
indication in words of a relation on the move, which unfolds with many others—a gesture 
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towards emerging bodies.  Performance and other practices of embodiment depend on 
this multiplicity and continuously mobile unfolding.  The word phrases “Alba as such” or 
“this Alba” do not indicate an already constituted or determined subjectivity but an 
incrementally and imperceptibly oscillating unsteady subjectivity emerging continually 
momentarily in and out of relational flux.  The intersubjective positioning indicated in 
GFP Bunny is not less authentic than relational flux but operates within and emerges 
from it.  
Relation in performance thought as an engagement between distinct subjects and 
agents as derived from capabilities—whether linked to a thinking mind or transcendent 
soul or not—contrasts relation in performance thought as encountering unfolding bodies 
and subjectivities becoming with movement and purpose—improvising a more-than-
human relational existence within ongoing relation.  The embodied mobility materialized 
in Alba’s genetic modification—in her unique individuality—does not answer the 
problem of subjectivity but is in tension with the (able and identified) subject who acts 
and makes choices according to his or her own capabilities and interests and who 
therefore can be delimited as a subject of rights that might be included in moral 
considerations.  From this—from the domain of rights—follows whether an attitude of 
care or domination is supposedly justified.  In the GFP Bunny chapter, care is 
articulated—in particular Kac’s care for Alba—primarily under the rubric of a domestic 
relation.  
 
Mutual Evolution and Domestication 
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The discourses of domestication, discovery, and mutual evolution operate as 
constructions that appear to provide access to the truth of the human-animal relation.  
While the manner of Alba’s socialization and intersubjectivity remains ambiguously 
critiqued, her domesticity is a primary point throughout Kac’s chapter and in its 
headings—Welcome, Alba and Glow in the Family.  Eduardo Kac provides a short 
exposition on the domestication and breeding of rabbits, tracing the species to their 
“discovery” by Phoenician seafarers.  He states, “Transgenic art acknowledges the human 
role in rabbit evolution as a natural element, as a chapter in the natural history of both 
humans and rabbits, for domestication is always a bidirectional experience.”62  The 
discovery and domestication of rabbits—as a natural element and natural involvement—
precludes examining human-animal involvement and history more critically.  While 
domestication in part develops from the satisfaction of shared interests in a mutually 
domesticating process, understanding domestication simply and only as a natural process 
of evolution from which humans and animals have benefited is to ignore that not all 
domestic animals might reap the benefits of domestication.  Not all domestic rabbits have 
it as good as Alba.  While likely many human and nonhuman animals have benefited 
from domestication, many healthy nonhuman animals are killed—and many unhealthy 
animals in the processes of agricultural meat production—every year because there is no 
home for them or no human to take care of them.  Or perhaps, the human practice of 
taking care of domesticated animals inheres a notion of expendability, which thereby 
challenges and problematizes the truth of its practice.  While I might enjoy the benefits 
and satisfactions of domestication in taking care of an animal or in the conveniences of 
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eating animals, domestication is also the (over)growth, marketing, and selling of  animals 
that are poorly cared for and a practice of selective breeding for the suitability to and 
satisfaction of human interests.  Any animal that appears in performance carries the 
weight of this historical relation.   
In arguing for the equality of moral consideration for the relation between humans 
and nonhuman animals, Peter Singer states in Writings on an Ethical Life: 
Practices that were previously regarded as natural and inevitable come to be seen 
as the result of an unjustifiable prejudice.  Who can say with any confidence that 
none of his or her attitudes and practices can legitimately be questioned?  If we 
wish to avoid being numbered among the oppressors, we must be prepared to 
rethink all our attitudes to other groups.
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Following Singer’s ethical challenge, the history and practice of discovery and 
domestication can no longer be understood as natural processes that demonstrate a 
justified and ethical involvement with another animal.  The argument—that humans 
engage in and have engaged in domestication and breeding for the mutual benefits and 
interests of nonhuman animals and humans—is difficult to make.  For Peter Singer, the 
human oppression and cruel treatment of nonhuman animals is propagated by a speciesist 
attitude that sacrifices the interests of other than human species to the interests of 
humans.
64
  Importantly, Singer marks this attitude as an institutionalized mentality.  The 
institutionalized mentality not only makes it possible to disregard concerns of how 
someone of another species should be treated while still being aware of their suffering in 
or beyond a performance; it is also a mechanism for the easy transition from affection to 
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aggression.  The questions of what is careful, what is harmful, and what is justifiable—
for the GFP Bunny project—are therefore situated within a context that is already skewed 
by a bias—an institutionalized mentality—that labors to protect humans from doubt 
concerning how suffering occurs in one’s engagements and practices with others.  The 
institutionalized mentality is made possible through social structures that govern and 
regulate the visibility and intelligibility of concrete practices (e.g. agricultural, labor, 
financial, and warfare practices), through structures of knowledge that in Foucault’s 
terms require no test of the self that alters one’s being as a subject, through social 
ordering that normatizes particular forms of relation and of the subject (e.g. heterosexual, 
patriarchal, Western, democratic, and human), and through the confinement of ethics to 
the domain of interests. 
Even though domestication impacts the evolution of humans and nonhuman 
animals, a domestically determined relation is one where the power dynamic often is 
heavily weighted and regularized in favor of human interests.  In other words, within the 
domestic paradigm—within which Kac situates the GFP Bunny project—most often it is 
the human (in opposition to the animal) that is served, sanctioned, standardized, and 
sustained.  Kac maintains the uniqueness of humans while pointing at the proximity of 
humans to nonhumans by stating, “Our daily coexistence and interaction with members 
of other species remind us of our uniqueness as humans,” revealing how close we really 
are to nonhumans.
65
  However, framing the relation as primarily and only domestic 
unwittingly risks reinforcing the human standard upon which the nonhuman might be 
measured and delimiting the domestic relation as only concerning the valuation and 
 65 
measurement of competing or common interests.  What must be included in rethinking a 
so-called naturalized or conventionalized human practice—such as domestication or 
performance—is a rethinking of the ethical relation as only determined by and realized 
through competing and common interests that bear upon one’s interactions with others.  
Delimiting ethical involvement as the give-and-take of interests alone feeds the desire to 
rework and establish another’s being and capabilities in opposition to one’s own.  This 
ethical construction also delimits care as the consideration of interests.  Herein, care 
comes to be constituted through and as the satisfaction of interests rather than as a way of 
living with others—relationally in and beyond performance.  I would like to propose 
that—rather than only realized in the expression of particular interests—ethical concerns 
considerably belong to and operate through the expression of care and exposure.  The 
GFP Bunny project materializes in part through technologies of exposure that have 
affinity across domestically configured human-animal relations.    
 
Indeterminate Human-Animal Relation in Performance 
Exposure: Love and Care 
Under the paradigm of a domestically configured relation, Kac writes at great 
length concerning the responsibility and care with which he proceeded in the project.  He 
proclaims in part: 
Transgenic art…is a new art form based on the use of genetic engineering to 
create unique living beings.  This must be done with great care; with 
acknowledgment of the complex issues thus raised; and, above all, with a 
commitment to respect, nurture, and love the life thus created.
66
  
 66 
Kac’s sense of responsibility for Alba was “awakened” once he held her in his arms with 
“joy and excitement.”  The persistent verification of the care undertaken on the project 
and in ensuring that Alba, the rabbit, was not harmed might be understood as an 
anticipatory gesture aimed at curbing potential backlash and protestations that might arise 
concerning any genetic engineering project.  However, the potential successes, fears, and 
threats of genetic engineering and transgenic art beyond a declaration of personal 
responsibility give great weight to human-animal encounter and the love and care that 
emerges from the engagement between Alba and Kac (and others).  
It appears that Eduardo Kac loves Alba and considered the interests of the rabbit 
when developing and going ahead with the project. Love between an animal and a human 
can reach far beyond any domestic or performance paradigm.  Love might be understood 
as an emotion felt in certain kinds of relation such as between lovers, parents and 
children, and husbands and wives.  Qualifying love through types of relationships 
disregards the affective force of love that paralyzes all orientations.  Anyone who loves 
an animal is most likely a fool but what a joyous and mad fool indeed.  Love fascinates 
and enchants in the oscillations of moving bodies—in incremental and uncertain ways of 
doing and living.  In these continuous relational unfoldings, love and care cannot be 
domesticated or legislated.  Love between a human and an animal does not guarantee 
ending the subjection of animals to the human but points towards a feral relationality in 
which care and love operate beyond domesticity and beyond performance as a human 
product.  In understanding how bodies emerge in relation in performance with each other, 
love matters because loves challenges the notion that our activity is rooted only in our 
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own interests.  In a very important way, love wrenches oneself outside of one’s own 
interests—operating as a gaping rupture in power relations.  This concept and practice of 
love ensures that the struggles rooted in power relations are not just a factor of an 
aggressive and defensive egoism but moreover a factor of the displacement and alteration 
of one’s self—which displaces value from one’s own interests and reinvests value in 
relational formations.  Herein, love is not an emotion but a test—not a test that you pass 
in getting the right answers or a challenge overcome in good performance but a test of the 
very ethical formation of your self.  I care about how love operates and materializes in 
performance because love gestures towards a practice of performance and inquiry as a 
practice of caring questioning.  In terms of the GFP Bunny project, love between a 
human and a nonhuman animal ruptures normatizing and policing structures that define 
love relations as occurring between humans.
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In the articulations of his care and love for Alba, Kac distances himself from the 
figure of a scientific experimenter to favor the role of caretaker and inventor.  Kac states: 
I have paid close attention and given careful consideration to any potential harm 
that might be caused.  I decided to proceed with the project because it became 
clear that it was safe […] green fluorescent protein is harmless to the rabbit. […] 
the GFP Bunny project breaks no social rule: humans have played a direct role in 
the evolution of rabbits for at least fourteen hundred years.
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Jeremy Bentham’s statement—“The question is not, Can they reason?  nor Can they talk? 
but, Can they suffer?”—is implicitly introduced in the GFP Bunny chapter/project insofar 
as Kac asserts that he does not want to cause any harm to the rabbit.
69
  The reader is left 
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to rely on a familiar understanding of Kac’s encounter with Alba the chimerical animal in 
terms of domestication.  Potential suffering, care, and love might characterize a domestic 
relationship but in what ways do care, love, and potential suffering exceed the distinct 
roles that humans and animals perform? 
While human-animal engagement in a paradigm of interacting interests has the 
capacity for a more conscientious exchange, it also makes a gesture of mastery by means 
of a knowledge that does not acknowledge the difficulty in ascertaining interests and in 
ascertaining the capabilities that are required to meet these interests in and beyond a 
performance.  The consideration of interests can motivate care, responsibility, and 
obligation.  However, when care takes on the weight of suffering, it is no longer just 
“taking care of” an animal—or an animal’s interests—but is rather a vulnerability with 
another.  Care is not only the consideration of interests but also a vulnerability infused 
with doubt—always in relation with others.  In contrast to paradigms of domestication 
and discovery that work to alleviate doubt concerning human-animal relation, human-
animal relation considered in vulnerability is wrought with doubt.  Therefore, 
performance also considered relationally is a practice rooted in vulnerability with others 
that generates considerable doubt that bears upon not only how we modify others through 
technological procedures but moreover how we modify ourselves—in and beyond the 
human. 
While Peter Singer derives from Jeremy Bentham’s “can they suffer?” an ethics 
dependent on a moral consideration of the interests of animals, Derrida indicates that 
Bentham’s “can they suffer?” poses the question of the animal in a fundamentally 
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different way than philosophies—from Aristotle to Descartes and those persisting in a 
Cartesian tradition—that pose the question in terms of “power or capability [pouvoirs] 
and attributes [avoirs]: being able, having the power or capability to give, to die, to bury 
one’s dead, to dress, to work…a power that consists in having such and such a faculty, 
thus such and such a capability, as an essential attribute.”70  For Derrida, “can they 
suffer?” marks a fundamental shift from considering the power to possess—to have a 
manner of being or a capability—to a power of vulnerability.  He writes that Bentham’s 
question has a certain passivity, stating: 
It bears witness, manifesting already, as question, the response that testifies to a 
sufferance, a passion, a not-being-able.  The word can [pouvoir] changes sense 
and sign here once one asks, ‘Can they suffer?’….[which] amounts to asking ‘Can 
they not be able?’  And what of this inability [impouvoir]?  What of the 
vulnerability felt on the basis of this inability?  What is this nonpower at the heart 
of power?
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For Derrida, the philosophical framework—within which animal rights awakens and 
stipulates our obligations and responsibilities in and beyond performance—must change 
with the experience of compassion in the shared vulnerability that humans have with 
nonhuman animals.  After all, how can the rights—and the life—of a rabbit in a 
performance be protected when the rabbit is not a citizen of the state and will likely never 
exhibit the capabilities of being a citizen of the state?  However, the shared vulnerability 
gestures toward a domain and practice of care that is essential for understanding 
performance relationally.  
 70 
Significantly, I do not care for Alba in the domestic way that Kac does.  The 
project negotiates between the “private realm of the family” and “the public dimension of 
genetic engineering and public opinion.”  Kac calls for public respect for the life of the 
individual rabbit.  Respect and care are necessary not just because Alba is an individual 
but also because there is no essential divide between the public and the private—between 
my writing and the rabbit.  The negotiation of public and private does not just concern the 
ambiguity of Alba’s genetic modification but also the ambiguity of Alba and others in a 
relational performance—continually caught up in ongoing unfolding relation that exceeds 
knowledge and perception.     
I have used many names for Alba, the rabbit, the chimerical animal, GFP Bunny 
as a way to point out the ease and arbitrariness with which I can name the glowing bunny 
but also to reinforce the presence and absence of this who, this irreplaceable and 
sufferable being-becoming.  The uncertainty of how suffering occurs—paired with the 
certainty of suffering—draws even a stone (not to mention a scarce jellyfish) into ethical 
considerations because in consideration of suffering one must not only consider the 
interests of an animal but also the affective force—a surplus of effects without 
causality—that relationally exceeds distinct conditions in a determined relation and the 
rippling effects (excessive causality) of one’s actions.72  The question of suffering that 
beckons care in and beyond performance cannot be dealt with through understanding 
relation in terms of interests or determined positions.  Suffering is not only or primarily 
the lack of fulfillment of one’s interests or the inability to fulfill one’s interests.  Rather, 
the question “can they suffer?” attests to a painful finitude and continuity that permeates 
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performance—an endurance in the midst of continuous exposure, not an effect but a 
weight to be carried.
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The philosophical and ethical relevance of Bentham’s “can they suffer” set 
alongside a history of human practices of exploitation and brutality in theory and practice 
shows that it is not enough to acknowledge that an animal can suffer but that in our 
considerations in performance and performance research we have the power to create 
suffering and a power to endure suffering with another.  Naming and subjecting another 
to the authority of one’s knowledge and performance practices carries with it the risk of 
reinforcing all nonhuman animals as the indiscriminate animal and the risk of thinking 
relation as “for me”—or more particularly for the human.  Insofar as the GFP Bunny 
project subjects the lively mobility of relation to un-criticized paradigms of being-human 
and domesticated human interests in performance, there is no rabbit.  The insecurities, 
uncertainties, and flux of strange and unfolding embodiments are foregone.  Although 
Kac and Alba are close domestically and even though Kac mentions that molecular 
biology “shows the human genome to be nothing special,” Kac’s proximity to Alba 
remains coded by a discourse of discovery and domesticity through which control as 
much as collaboration weighs on relation.  Only in the ruptures of distinct embodiment—
not just rabbit genetic modification—do the transformative potentials of the project come 
to the forefront.  In framing human-animal relation by emphasizing discovery, breeding, 
and domestication—the transformative possibilities that the project points towards are 
limited by an investment in scientific and cultural practices that appear to stabilize the 
hierarchical limits between humans and nonhuman animals.  However, I see in the image 
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of Kac holding Alba, Alba holding Eduardo, acute and tangible vulnerability.  The living 
relation between this rabbit and this man—not a correspondence but a mortal and living 
vulnerability—ensures that a life always depends on many others.  Derrida suggests that 
the bond between a human and an animal resides in the awareness and actuality of their 
mortality.  He writes of this suffering with—this compassion:      
Mortality resides there, as the most radical means of thinking the finitude that we 
share with animals, the mortality that belongs to the very finitude of life, to the 
experience of compassion, to the possibility of sharing the possibility of this 
nonpower, the possibility of this impossibility, the anguish of this vulnerability, 
and the vulnerability of this anguish.
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Significantly, the anguish of vulnerability is not just in that man and animal suffer 
mortality.  Rather, the anguish of vulnerability is experienced in the mortality of a loved 
one—more particularly this loved one—and in the mortality of all life.  Anguish rises up 
not just in personalized experience but also in the impermanence and continuation of all 
life.  Therefore, performance as a relational practice acknowledges embeddedness or 
immersion in living processes—with the more-than-human—that unfold through 
ephemerality and continuity.   
The recognition of the responsibility that humans have to and with others 
generates both from an awareness of another’s needs (or rights) and also from relationally 
rooted compassion in the sufferance of vulnerability.  In the GFP Bunny project: 
one must be open to understanding the rabbit mind, and more specifically to 
Alba’s unique spirit as an individual. […] Understanding how the rabbit sees the 
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world is certainly not enough to appreciate its consciousness, but it allows us to 
gain insights about its behavior, which leads us to adapt our own to make life 
more comfortable and pleasant for everyone.
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The statement that understanding rabbit biology is not enough to understand rabbit 
consciousness is an important step that must go further because encounter understood as 
an openness—infused with vulnerability and compassion—is not just about making life 
more comfortable and pleasant for everyone through the satisfaction of competing and 
common interests.  Performance relationally thought makes a gesture in vulnerability 
across the abyssal rupture between different experiences and embodiments that unfold 
through a movement in consciousness—rupturing your distinct self, your perceptibility, 
your discernability, your personality, what you think you know—in order to participate 
with others.  The GFP Bunny project exhibits a tension between relation dependent on 
what a human knows of animal interests and what cannot be known or what might be 
wondered in ungraspable relationality.  Relationally thought and practiced performance is 
not made through the skill of human actors that manipulate nonhuman nonactors but 
through a shared vulnerability—of everything that continues to relationally unfold or 
become—realized in the compassion and passion of encounter. 
 
Exposure: Affect and Listening 
Even though the GFP Bunny project occurs with and within the implications and 
frameworks of domestication not just biotechnological modification, no animal can be 
strictly determined and identified in knowledge formations as domesticated, agricultural, 
wild, or affect.  The domestically framed nonhuman animals with which we engage in 
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performance move amongst these categories—drawing them into question—while also 
activating a modality of exposure that ruptures the framework of domestication while 
being positioned within it.  I could do right by Alba without allowing her to resonate 
within or rupture me—constricting Alba to a truth of normatized domestication.  For a 
modality of exposure to materialize, my in/corporeal being would have to break open for 
another to inhabit my body—like a jellyfish inside a rabbit—forcing my words and 
understanding to come unhinged.  Risking potential harm.  Not to destabilize, redeploy, 
or recuperate subjectivity in terms of a still human-centric intersubjectivity, but to be 
brought to the very threshold of subjectivity itself.  Here, relation vitalizes a with others 
that points out the tension between the hierarchical competition of interests and the 
unfolding of deeply engaged and intertwined affecting and affected embodiments.  This 
shared—carved up—with an animal is a becoming other that does not erase differences 
and is never reducible to stable social roles and genetic modifications.  Rather, the 
relation is of becoming of flows of light and sound and gestural residues.
76
  An 
alchemical and affective rather than inventive operation rooted in an ordeal of exposure.  
Eduardo Kac’s intentions in his open approach in the project are “to accept the 
experience as-it-happens as a transformative field of possibilities, to learn from it, to 
grow with it, to be transformed along the way.”77  But how are affective variations 
mobilized in Eduardo Kac?  What are those transformative potentials?  What are the 
implications of Kac injecting himself with rabbit DNA?  Might there be in any way a 
becoming-rabbit of Eduardo Kac?  I catch a glimpse of Kac-becoming in the image of 
holding that permeates the project.  The transformation of course does not occur in terms 
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of a scientifically enabled genetic modification made in the domain of “discovery” and 
thereby challenges the notion that the individual is formed in a mode of discovery 
through varying combinations of DNA rather than relational encounter.  The conception 
of the individual as a formation that can be known and determined through DNA 
structures eliminates a vast array of processes that impact the formation of the individual 
including reproduction, the contingencies of relation, and the complexities and mobility 
of difference that cannot be simply located in codes.  Understanding the transformation of 
the individual primarily in terms of genetic differences limits how we come to understand 
the complexities of relation—as if the individual is only and primarily a scientifically and 
technologically produced entity. 
The image of Kac holding Alba materializes a sense of transformation that does 
not indicate or display any genetic modification but resonates with a capacity for and 
exposure to affect.
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  In a technology of exposure, affect operates as a way in which the 
individual body is caught up in processes of transformation and relational flux—as if the 
rabbit could say, “I am the jellyfish” and the dirt could say, “I am the sky” and Kac could 
say, “I am the rabbit”—each becoming less or more another.  Affect makes the “more” of 
liveliness in performance—in continuity, ephemerality, liveness, and recording—vaguely 
and yet substantially tangible.  In part, what a body is capable of doing in performance is 
not a factor of its being or its attributable capabilities—or its genetic make-up—but of 
this and this and this and this becoming in an exposure to being affected.
79
  The 
transference of the jellyfish DNA in the GFP Bunny project is perhaps the most 
im/perceivable and yet evident (scientific and affective) transformation in the project.  
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The procedure is infused with an uncertainty of how green fluorescent protein is obtained 
or manufactured and with an uncertainty surrounding the affective implications of genetic 
transference.  The project begs the question: how does a jellyfish emerge from and 
participate in ongoing relation and/or domestically determined relation?  It should not go 
unnoticed that a jellyfish is far more difficult to convey and display compassion for—a 
jellyfish is far more difficult to enter into a domestic relation with.  A jellyfish would not 
have made a good social subject or subject to care for within the domestic domain.  In 
performance, green fluorescent protein gestures towards a real jellyfish participating in 
and emerging from the realm of ongoing relation—not just a bit of engineered DNA or 
manufactured protein as a representative characteristic of all jellyfish.  Herein, Alba and 
this jellyfish are beings that refuse to be conceptualized—or reduced to genetic code—in 
the same way that this cat seeing Derrida cannot be conceptualized or reduced to a 
genetically determined and identified individual.  The refusal of the individual to be 
conceptualized revitalizes the capacity of art in critiquing social, technological, and 
subject-object organizations.  The relation between art and reality in the GFP Bunny 
project is not a simple conflation of the public art project with the private domestic reality 
but rather a complicated entanglement, which reinvests art with its political and ethical 
character. 
In describing the exposure Derrida felt at being stared at naked by an unnamed 
cat, he explicates that this cat—not my cat—does not represent the entire species cat but 
appears as a living being with “unsubstitutable singularity.”80  This cat, this rabbit, this 
jellyfish mark mobile limits with which and by which one might be stripped naked, 
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profoundly interrogated and effaced—in performance.  Derrida suggests that the gaze and 
the classification called “animal" offer the abyssal limit of the human, which he describes 
as the “border crossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself.”81  
In these moments of exposure in performance, naked under the gaze of an animal 
anything can happen.  The apocalyptic encounter with “the animal” that Derrida 
describes conveys an ethics of exposure rather than a set of rules for proper conduct or 
the balancing of competing interests for mutual benefit.  Derrida gestures towards where 
he elsewhere outlines “the ordeal of the undecidable” that must be endured—a sufferance 
of exposure, responsibility, and a permanent and relentless condition of rupture.
82
  
Derrida’s theorization of undecidability articulates the disruption of binary structures that 
attempt to define the limits of relation.  Moments in which one finds or follows oneself 
naked under the gaze of—in the flow of relation with—another, subject-object identities 
and distinctions are continuously displaced.   
The problem—of how affect can be drawn into discourse if it cannot be 
recognized—might be dealt with by a strategy of examining corporeal-emotional 
responses where a rupture of the experiential state or embodiment becomes apparent.  
Kathleen Stewart states that her book Ordinary Affects resists the initial pull of 
representational thinking and interpretive critique in order that—using Derrida’s term—
the undecidable objects that fascinate, consume, strike, and otherwise so deeply affect us 
might be approached through a different methodology.  Stewart’s book draws to light the 
difficulty of adequately addressing affect.  Stewart emphasizes that the labor of writing 
ordinary affects is not an effort to construct meaning—to make an adequate 
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representation and knowledge of what’s happening—but rather to make an address that is 
adequate to affect.
83
  The slowing of representational thought—for a relationally thought 
performance—in order to perform some of the “intensity and texture” that makes affect 
animate bodies recognizes that Eduardo Kac holding Alba is not primarily about simple 
physical contact but about the capacity to affect and to be affected—the capacity to touch 
and to be touched in the most subtle, the most striking, and the most unspeakable ways.  
Representational practices—in performance and performance research—can 
attempt to capture a subject matter in representation and knowledge formations as if from 
an outside vantage point or can undergo an ordeal of exposure in the process of relational 
encounter.  In a relationally thought performance, the work of a practitioner-scholar is to 
listen and pay attention—to engage with listening with other bodies.  Listening to and 
with others—not just analyzing them or using them for one’s own purpose—indicates 
stretching in embodiment and thought.  In Listening, Jean-Luc Nancy articulates the 
(human) body as a resonance chamber from which the subject might be seen as the part 
of the body that is listening or vibrates with listening to or with the echo of beyond-
meaning.
84
  Nancy argues that, “To listen is tender l’oreille—literally, to stretch the 
ear…it is an intensification and concern, a curiosity or an anxiety.”85  To stretch the ear 
intensely—to stretch the very skin and viscera of the entire body—is to become awake 
with curiosity or anxiety and concern and “to be straining toward a possible meaning, and 
consequently one that is not immediately accessible” (italics added).86  Relation between 
bodies in performance is enlivened in the vigilance of attending and adjusting to 
something that is not immediately accessible and that unfolds with vague perceptions.
87
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The continuous and ephemeral, live and recorded relationality in performance resonates 
through listening bodies.  Listening in performance is ultimately not about 
comprehensive and stable perception of another but about stretching towards the 
inaccessible. 
Perhaps I did not strain enough to listen for the affective transformations 
occurring in the GFP Bunny project.  Sometimes a human excessively talks so as not to 
listen.  Some nonhuman animals, such as a rabbit, seem to be always listening—
becoming all ears so-to-speak, always on the aural lookout, always (at)tuning themselves 
to their surroundings.  While Alba’s aberrance appears in part as a code or a 
characteristic, the individuality of this animal must be listened to and for in the midst of 
unfolding relation.  Whether performance functions relationally and/or attempts to 
capture the living heart of a rabbit or any other being—no other can be reduced to one’s 
own orientation.  In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Luce Irigaray defines ethics as a 
commitment to preserving the other’s difference from oneself.88  For Irigaray, the ethical 
relation rises out of the question “who art thou,” which recognizes the irreducibility of 
another to one’s own orientation.  Irigaray emphasizes that the ethical relation is crafted 
through receptive sensual contact, which does not stabilize and delimit the parameters of 
difference but supports and—with the added challenge—pluralizes them.  The sensual 
contact in holding another such as Alba materializes an awareness of inhalation and 
exhalation that is not limited to organisms that “breathe” scientifically.  The inhalations 
and exhalations of life unfolding can be felt in a rock in as much as a human or a rabbit.  
Herein, relational performance and performance research in cultivating openness requires 
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patience, attention, generosity, learning, respect, and humility.  Relational performance is 
a conversation of proposals—a conversation between bodies-becoming where any affect 
or breath might pierce a body because it is exposed.
89
  For a relationally thought 
performance (as a becoming), listening in the midst of movement—rabbits becoming 
jellyfish becoming images becoming mist becoming humans becoming ghosts—is of the 
utmost importance.  
 
Conclusion: Exposure in Performance 
I began with the GFP Bunny project paired with Jacques Derrida’s scenario with 
this unnamed cat as way to think through the manner in which the determination of 
subjectivity and the mobility of relationality weigh upon human-animal encounter in 
performance.  I emphasized that subjective determination—operating within paradigms 
of domestication and discovery—risks making a normatizing gesture that is caught up 
with the ethical imperative to consider the interests of the subjective-other and 
ontological suppositions about the animal.  I paid particular attention to the manner in 
which subjectivity emerges out of and flows back into ongoing relationality in the GFP 
Bunny project.  I indicated that encounter as a quality of openness—beyond the 
paradigms of domestication and discovery—disrupts the opposition human-animal not 
because Alba is a unique individual with jellyfish DNA but because this irreplaceable 
being unfolds relationally beyond naturalized domestication and unnatural genetic 
manipulation within an unbound relational world and with a power of affect.
90
  While 
Alba upsets rabbit filiations and classifications, an emphasis on the transgenic 
characteristic in Alba reduces human-animal relation to a science of genetic 
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manipulation and genetic structure.  The performance as a relational unfolding has more 
to do with affect than scientific coding and recoding.  I argued that a relationally thought 
performance practice is rooted in exposure and therefore entails the circulation of affect, 
listening, and a conversation of proposals.  I argued that affect, listening, and proposal—
over and above the manipulations and novel combinations of science and art at the nexus 
of human-animal encounter—is a force that grounds performance in ongoing 
relationality.  In Chapter Two, I take up performance at the nexus of human-object 
encounter in order to further think through how performance operates with a relational 
ontology of becoming.  I examine the activity of objects in two performances in order to 
a focus on liveliness in performance.  I argue that objects emerging relationally through 
historical and collecting modalities in performance indicate that performance as a 
becoming operates with continuous liveliness rather than ephemeral human liveness. 
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Chapter Two: 
“Materializing Objects” 
 
 
In Chapter One, I began with Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny project in order to 
understand how performance operates as a becoming—an embedded relationality—at the 
nexus of human-animal encounter.  I examined the manner in which representational 
practices are entwined with the determination and identification of subjects and unfolding 
relationality.  I emphasized that relation is not a factor of the (in)abilities of a distinct and 
identified subject but of affect and argued that—for performance as a becoming—
listening and proposal grounds unfolding bodies in an affective relationality and an ordeal 
of exposure, which impacts the formation of subjectivities.  In Chapter Two, I continue to 
take up the primary question of performance ontology—what is the nature of 
performance—via the question of how performance operates as a relational process with 
others at the nexus of human-object encounter.  In this chapter, I examine how 
historically and materially rooted liveliness—rather than “liveness”—operates in 
performance.  I take up two sites—the Iranian performance-film Home is in Our Past 
(2003/2005) and a 2007 production of Heiner Müller’s Explosion of a 
Memory/Description of a Picture (1984). 
 
Fragments in History  
The devised performance Home is in Our Past was first performed at the City 
Theatre in Tehran, Iran in 2003.  While I did not attend a live performance, I viewed 
Home is in Our Past on film, which was produced by the “Black Narcissus” Group and 
directed by Hamed Mohamadtaheri and Mojtaba Mirtahmasb in 2005.
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  The 
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performance-film Home is in Our Past documents, stages, and records a performance in 
which an audience attends a live theatrical event where the actors Atefeh Tehrani and 
Majid Bahrami perform amidst an auditory recitation of recognizable historical events, 
and cultural phenomena.  In the performance, the female actor clothed in a black dress 
and headscarf stands desolately on a small elevated-stage in a bright white spotlight 
emitting and affirming her own powerful voice—a gut-wrenching cry—that contrasts the 
even-toned and matter-of-fact recitation that intermittently overlays the performance.  
The male actor emerges from—yet remains in—a large vat of watery silt and makes 
disjointed gestures and sounds with and without objects that had been previously 
submerged along with his own body.  In a confused and apparently random manner, the 
performer in the tank of silt repeats representational and residual gestures that are 
personal—ironing, eating, and drinking—and civic—the saluting and fighting gestures of 
a soldier—with objects such as a work boot, silverware, and a metal pipe.  Even though 
the actor in the pool takes up and repeats recognizable gestures with objects, the gestures 
and objects do not provide a stable and recognizable articulation of who he is and what 
their instrumental purpose might be as part of any familiar cultural or historical 
narrative.
92
  The relationally constituted objects and gestures—churned up and 
completely covered in brown silt like the actor—have become useless for conventional 
purposes and for the verification of historical and cultural progress. 
During the performance, a male voiceover speaks historical and personal object-
phrases—fragments of narratives of political and ethical import, of culture and nature, of 
science and art, of things and people—in an exchange with a repetitively and flatly 
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spoken response—“no”—of a female voiceover.  The recitation—from which I draw a 
small selection—is ongoing:93  
There was evening and there was morning, a third ghetto  no 
June 28, 1914 Serbia       no 
Snow White        no 
Antimatter        no 
The handsome Che Guevera      no 
Killing by pressing a button      no 
The historical-material objects such as these in the performance-film unfold in a 
constellation that makes a gesture towards Walter Benjamin’s theorization of objects.94  
Benjamin asserts that objects resonate histories in constellations of the now and hold in 
their material structure multiple histories that cannot be reified into a continuous and 
linear history of progress within capitalist systems of production and consumption.
95
  In 
Benjamin’s constellation, an object is not as much an index or record of a past event, 
culture, or epoch but an ongoing pulsation of histories.  “What has been” or the past event 
can be made intelligible through stable images and sound bites that quiet uncertainties 
surrounding the event; these images and objects can be further recycled and re-employed 
to articulate and promote seemingly stable narratives of present situations and conditions 
as well.
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  However, unmitigated disruptions, disturbances, and entanglements (islands of 
garbage)—strange and unfamiliar juxtapositions between Snow White and antimatter—
resurface to undermine normatized structures of intelligibility in an ongoing living and 
lively history and relationality.   
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 Benjamin’s conceptualization of a constellation emerges from a materialist 
historiography that in his understanding does not make an arbitrary choice and 
juxtaposition of objects but enacts a critical moment in breaking apart “[the] historical 
continuity with which the historical object first constitutes itself.”97  For Benjamin, the 
constellation—as a critical and constructive practice—is embodied in the non-narrative 
dialectical image or dialectics at a standstill which he most explicitly and extensively 
takes up utilizing techniques of juxtaposition in his work on The Arcades Project, 
understood as a “theory of the consciousness of history.”98  In The Arcades Project, 
Benjamin takes up the ruins of commodity production through a montage of 19
th
 century 
objects in order to make visible the constitution of the object in a dialectical present.  
However, as evidenced in Theodor Adorno’s response in 1938 to an excerpt from 
Benjamin’s The Arcades Project, understanding the dialectical image as a critical 
modality is debatable.   
 Adorno reacts adversely to Benjamin’s Baudelaire submission for publication to 
the Frankfurt School—claiming that Benjamin’s "ascetic refusal of interpretation” allows 
historical materials to appear on the page unmediated by theory.
99
  In aligning the 
“unmediated” juxtapositions of The Arcades Project with the phantasmagoria that 
Benjamin sought to critique, Adorno’s critique draws attention to the metaphysical and 
historical aspects of Benjamin’s theory of dialectical images.  In particular, Adorno's 
doubts over Benjamin's practice of the dialectical image are tied to his own understanding 
of a practice of constellation as immanent critique.  For Adorno, the constellation is not a 
set of mere juxtapositions but is meant to take up diverse historical fragments in a 
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cognitive critical constellation undomesticated by familiar and habituated thought and 
ideological presuppositions that convert the new into the same commodified and reified 
objects.  As Adorno argues, “congealed” ideological and ontological thought “must be 
reliquified, its validity traced, so to speak, in repetition” through the work of immanent 
critique.
100
  Herein, the constellation is a device that might provoke a new consciousness 
of the ideological condition in which we are entrapped—a condition in which the 
commodity form is the structuring principle of society and in which barbarism continues 
to permeate society and history.
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  In Adorno’s immanent critique, the historical image 
takes on a critical force for estrangement and de-familiarization through a mediation that 
exposes contradictions.  The constellation serves this purpose by bringing diverse 
historical phenomena together for a critical consideration that disallows identity thinking.  
In contrast to the apparent stasis of Benjamin’s dialectical image, Adorno emphasizes a 
“reliquification” that occurs with the repetition of what has been congealed and 
abstracted in identity thinking and in historical progress.  Therefore, the question of 
performance ontology that concerns itself with how performance operates as a becoming 
is bound up in the historical materialist concern with how we make meaning out of the 
fragments of historical materiality—and with a reliquification of ontological 
suppositions—by way of a critical consideration of performance-in-the-making not as an 
essential ontological identification of performance but as a concern with how 
performance relationally constellates at the nexus of encounter with others.  
 The exchange between Benjamin and Adorno introduces a tension between 
“dialectics at a standstill” as the ideological condition of capitalist modernity or as a 
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critical force that is especially suited to the circumstances of capitalism—the 
constellation as an object of critique and a subject of critique.  In The Dialectics of 
Seeing, Susan Buck-Morss explicates Benjamin’s dialectical image as a mode of thinking 
in coordinates in which questions are raised as to whether Benjamin’s dialectical images 
are not subjective enough or too subjective.
102
  On one hand, in the dialectical image the 
subject disappears and the construction of meaning becomes uprooted from subjectively 
mediated historical processes.  On the other, the subject becomes the sole mediator of 
historical objects and constructions of meaning.  In close analysis of Benjamin’s project, 
Buck-Morss marks the distinction between the dialectical image as an arbitrary 
expression of subjective intention and the allegorical image, which is objective in part in 
a “mystico-theological sense.”103  Buck-Morss argues that in The Arcades Project 
Benjamin’s dialectical images of phenomena of decaying objects are redeemed in a 
“code” that is the “ur-old, theological myth of worldly utopia as the origin and goal of 
history,” which registers empirical history and Messianic history.104  The focus on 
empirical and Messianic history shows “industrial nature’s utopian potential and, 
simultaneously, the betrayal of that potential,” which leads for Buck-Morss to a mistrust 
of history’s continuum of progress and political mobilization.105  Therefore, Benjamin’s 
theological take on historical materialism is not a factor of religion or religious ideology 
but an “axis of philosophical experience” that informs his practice of constellation in the 
dialectical image.
106
     
The constellation of historical-material object fragments in Home is in Our Past 
particularly challenges proofs of human progress and identity.  Identity can be sought out 
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in History and in historical-material objects in historical narratives, but an object and a 
subject are always already taken up in processes of ongoing relations that disturb these 
identities and proofs. The discourse of history that Home is in Our Past points towards is 
one in which the conditions of the lived event cannot be reified into a causal continuum 
of history.  While photography, museum exhibitions, documentary films and other 
“objective evidence” have the power to formulate objects that gain prestige in their 
capacity to produce a narrative of what happened, the performance-film and the 
performance-film’s historical-material objects evoke the violences of history and 
participate in a constellation of history that does not verify historical progress or make a 
past reality stable and completely intelligible.
107
  Therefore, the objects in the film 
resurface and recycle as critical and unanswerable questions.  The historical recitation is 
not meant to recognize and determine something—June 28, 1914 Serbia—as it really 
occurred or a person as they really were—The handsome Che Guevera.  Rather, the 
relational mobility of historical-material objects threatens the definition of progress as the 
inevitable and automatic progression of perfecting mankind that can be traced along an 
infinite, normative, and linear course of socio-historical and technological 
development.
108
  This historical debris—while deeply connected with actual and 
unfolding events and peoples—cannot be utilized to turn vibrant and chaotic living 
historical relation into ordered and easily communicable experience. 
In Home is in Our Past, The gut-wrenching embodiments of the objects and 
performers along with the voiceovers unsettle accounts of seemingly recognizable and 
stable representations.  Robin Hood is no longer a familiar story of a hero stealing from 
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the rich to give to the poor because Robin Hood is with Vietnam and Ash Wednesday and 
Your husband acted in King Lear in the War and…and…and.  “And” is the operative 
conjunction that flexibly binds the constellation together—connecting thought with 
unfolding present, past, future, and ongoing relationality.  The historical-material objects 
in the performance-film are disjoined from their familiar narratives and come to reside in 
a new assemblage, a new juxtaposition, a newly constituted and constituting relationship, 
not only with a coat of mud but also with others in the constellation.  The recitation and 
negation is ongoing: 
Liberalism        no 
Vatican        no 
KGB         no 
Mass graves        no 
CNN         no 
Soup of prostitutes’ bones      no 
Soup of worker’s eyes      no 
The listing of fragments materializes an ongoing unfolding spatial proximity that 
encourages a sort of thigmotropism—a movement of growth in response to physical 
contact with a surface.  This type of growth unfolds in processes of collage, which in 
particular became important for painters and sculptors in the modern era.  The 
manipulation and conjugation of significant historical and cultural fragments in the 
process of assemblage in the performance-film—like the critical approaches of collage in 
modern art—confronts questions regarding reorienting and adhering things to a surface.  
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In the performance-film, the directors work with the problems of flatness and 
ephemerality—but unlike the collaged paintings and sculptures of modern art, the 
directors grapple with these issues in relation to historical processes and with things that 
disrupt the integrity of the picture-plane of History. 
Objects—including the live performance recorded in the film—persist into the 
present providing a “long experience’” with historical materiality.  Benjamin describes 
long experience [Erfahrung] as the “prolonging of the past into the present” and 
subsequent preparation for the future.
109
  In a durational flux, an object’s past combines 
with present constellations of memory and are linked to future encounters.  Henri 
Bergson theorizes that duration—a continually varying spatio-temporal rhythm or flow of 
states (affect)—is the basis of matter, revealed in a depth perception as a present that is 
always beginning again.
110
  Prolonging the past into the present and thereby preparing the 
future, encounter with an object is always beginning again in each moment.  In durational 
encounter with an object, voluntary and involuntary memory is active and responsive.  
The flow of affect that circulates through encounter with an object can undermine human 
mechanisms that attempt to isolate experience and prevent the shock of the past erupting 
into the present.
111
  The durational materiality of encounter provides a way to continue 
engaging with things that have supposedly passed-away—to keep the involuntary 
memory close—without the danger of succumbing to a continual shock of every passing 
moment. 
 Benjamin takes up Bergson’s conceptualization of duration in “On some motifs 
in Baudelaire” as a way to understand the experience—or perhaps better stated the loss of 
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experience—that presented itself to Baudelaire under the conditions of modernity in the 
19
th
 century.  From Bergson’s Matter and Memory, Benjamin sees in Proust the figure of 
the poet and storyteller that becomes for the Benjamin the subject that “synthetically” 
produces experience under the conditions in which experience can no longer “naturally” 
occur.  However, Benjamin marks a distinction between Baudelaire—who takes up 
fragments of historical experience—and Bergson’s conception of duration, which “has 
become estranged from history.”  Benjamin argues that Bergson avoids the experience—
“the inhospitable, blinding age of big-scale industrialism”—from which his philosophy 
emerges by rejecting “any historical determination of memory” while preserving “links 
with empirical research.”112  Even though in Benjamin’s estimation Bergson manages to 
avoid confronting historical tradition (and death), Benjamin also asserts that the 
involuntary memory is marked by the historical situation that gives rise to it—combining 
the contents of an individual past with a collective past.   
 In working to theorize the historical situation that gives rise to the involuntary 
memory, Benjamin takes up the “aura” of the object as “the associations which, at home 
in the mémoire involontaire, tend to cluster around the object of perception.”113  
Benjamin argues that the experience of the aura of an object—which he claims to be in 
decline due to the new technology of the camera and photography—relies on: 
the transposition of a response common in human relationships to the relationship 
between the inanimate or natural object and man.  The person we look at, or who 
feels he is being looked at, looks at us in turn.  To perceive the aura of an object 
we look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return.
114
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For Benjamin, the perception of the aura of an object corresponds to the accumulated 
“data”—which are not a set of facts but material contents—of the involuntary memory.  
What Benjamin perhaps does not explicitly take into consideration in the notion that a 
camera or photograph does not return our gaze—is that the durational materiality of 
encounter permeates the material contents of memory even and perhaps especially in a 
“deathly” or “inanimate” historical modality that permeates even the photograph and the 
recorded image.  Even though Benjamin’s conception of aura and Bergson’s conception 
of duration might both be seen as rooted in metaphysical foundations estranged from 
history, the experience of duration or the aura of an object—whether synthetically or 
naturally produced—cannot be extricated from historical materiality.  Therefore, 
capitalism’s abstractions come to bear upon how Bergson’s “long experience” or 
Benjamin’s “aura” might be understood and experienced in encounter with objects.  In 
other words, how do we invest or not objects with the ability to look at us and how do we 
invest or not objects with the capacity to hold in their structure a historical and/or 
metaphysical world order?   
In Home is in Our Past, disrupting the integrity of an ephemeral continuum of 
History—and of the “live” ephemerality of performance—the directors stage a particular 
recyclability of objects in remnants that bubble up from a pool of mud and in spoken 
citations of personal, cultural, and historical figures and events in a critical constellation 
in which these particular fragments of the past find themselves in a present moment in 
which enlightenment values such as freedom and equality remain historically unfulfilled.  
The collaged listing—of human history, acts and events of war, intimate and 
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marginalized bodies, figures of culture and revolution, personal and communal images—
breaks with and de-stabilizes linear and narrative historical chronology by listing 
fragments outside of conventional associations and conventional narratives.  The listing 
exposes a movement of the recyclable that grows out of uncommon juxtapositions and 
the capacity of objects to collage in unexpected and critical ways.  The recycling activity 
that the directors take up in an encounter with objects and history operates with a 
combinatory principle that attends to the obscurity of the specific and unique lived 
contexts and meanings of an event’s realization or occurrence without aiming to 
reconstitute those lived contexts within a continuum of history that is invested in the 
apparent inevitable perfectibility of mankind through man’s work of mastering history 
and himself (and others).  The quality of listing with which the directors situate objects—
and with which I have typed some of these things on the page—is more like a to-do list 
than a lineage of things in a hierarchical or chronological order.  A to-do list is an 
ongoing and ever-changing constellation of fragments where the things listed are linked 
but not teleologically situated together.  The recitation does not list a mass of historical 
and cultural data in an accumulative fashion for representing a sequence of events in a 
universal history—or a live performance that progresses to its documentation.  In contrast 
to a list that might establish a causal link between diverse historical moments, the 
performance-film builds its list with a constructive approach.  This list is a constellation 
that is wrought with tensions. 
In placing singular catastrophes such as Dachau, the Hiroshima bombing, and 
October 1917 gulag in the same constellation with pop culture and political figures—the 
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directors challenge the idea that historical-material objects are just materializations of 
current images and a current reality.  Instead, as Benjamin claims, “They [phenomena] 
are saved through the exhibition of the fissure within them.”115  The ongoing negation 
and recitation works as an exposure of fissures in history, identity, historical discourse, 
and documentation of an ephemeral “live” event.  The work of negation that the 
performance-film does in the response of “no” to each and every statement and question 
is not to deny that an event occurred or that a cultural form does not exist or that a 
marginalized group of people do not have a unique community and history but is an 
increase that adds “more” to a living historical ephemeral-continuing relation between 
objects, peoples, events, and histories that persist.  An object from the past on one hand 
might be made to speak a vision of history that is bound to certain stable intelligibilities 
that limit the possibilities of thought.  On the other hand, an object might be the very 
materiality that exposes the fissures in phenomena and history and historical narratives, 
expanding the possibilities of thought. 
The recitation of a multifarious selection of fragments—including events and 
figures of capitalism, communism, revolution, and human progress and enlightenment—
has the capacity to continually rework politically and ethically without answering the 
question of what it means to be human—immersed in an ungraspable and historically 
rooted relationality with (more-than-human) others.  The directors are involved in and 
diverge from a modernist critique that in part envisions the past as a landscape of 
receding thresholds that cannot be passed through again.  Therefore, Home is in Our Past 
participates in modernism’s distaste for meaning based on historical narratives and norms 
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that participate in systems and traditions of control.
116
  The historical-material objects in 
the performance-film are presented as fragments not to disregard context but to enliven 
the inexplicable connection between multiple spatial and temporal lived and living 
contexts in a perhaps bastard Modernist way that aims to look beyond hegemonic 
traditions that might even include commitments to objective science and autonomous art.  
Herein, the performance-film states numerous familiar and unfamiliar cultural and 
historical objects as fissures in perspective.  Notably, the disjunctive principles associated 
with Modernism and its foregrounding of a nonperspective space informs a space that has 
multiple and mobile (non)perspectives manifesting as and reorienting in fissures in 
perspective.  These fissures are in part realized in scattered cultures dislodged from 
specific locations—people and things out of cultural place and historical continuity.  In 
these fissures, unexpected juxtapositions can be made and relationality emphasized.  The 
work of moving through constellation grows through a critical experimentation that 
connects things beyond classification and causality.  This is not to say that anything goes 
or that everything is relative.  Instead, the construction gestures toward the unpresentable 
in experimental presentation and the unpresentable relational liveliness in encounter that 
exceeds distinctly knowable lived experience.   
Home is in Our Past is a staging of a pool of historical leftovers that can be 
experimentally and vitally juxtaposed however briefly against another pool of object 
remnants—an oceanic garbage patch.  In 1997, Charles Moore came across a high-
density area of plastic now called the Great Pacific Garbage Patch.  In contrast to the 
historical-material remnants of Home is in Our Past, the remnants of the Great Pacific 
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Garbage Patch mark not just that objects participate in and emerge from relation beyond a 
linear and intelligible history of humanity in ways that disrupt the continuity of history 
but also in ways that more simply deny the human capacity to be rid of—to be outside of 
relation with—anything.  Relatively low winds and ocean currents contribute to the 
coalescence of neuston plastics in particularly “stagnant” areas of the Pacific Ocean.  
While these areas are not truly stagnant, their relative calm allows a glimpse of the 
floating, fluid, and free-forming spatiality of neuston plastic-objects that have become 
nearly invisible to the human eye.  This high-density plastic island that mostly churns 
about and degrades below the water’s surface attests that an object—even one that is 
perhaps most forgotten and thrown away—might resurface as an active and powerful 
fragment that releases and breathes (toxic) chemicals and acts as (pollution) food in 
chains of consumption and in historical relationality.  Neuston plastics not only resurface, 
but these fragments also retain unknown traces of other lives having gone through long 
and arduous processes of travel and degradation.
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Each garbage pool or patch is an actualization of having not been spared the worst 
but are not—if not just for their sheer size, murky depth, and mobility—easily recycled 
back into an ordered system either to produce an account of historical progress or to 
produce stable and safe identities for human consumers.  A garbage pool resurfaces while 
being submerged—remotely beyond and intimately with social networks—and fragments 
and remobilizes meaning production.  Islands of garbage—whether they are Neuston 
plastics or dislocated objects in a performance-film production—pool together and collect 
beyond anthropocentrically configured use, needs, and purposes.  The leftover objects 
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that comprise the performance-film’s pool and the garbage patch in many ways are no 
longer “ours” even as they are taken up in constructive constellations.118  Instead, they are 
continually relationally and historically entwined with others making meaning fluid, 
tactile, and contentious—not alleviating doubt but resurfacing in the midst of uncertainty.  
Herein, objects do not define and stabilize an ordered system but participate in fluid 
relation—not in the distribution of current simulations and pre-formed identities but in 
the activation of nearness and distance where ongoing movement, even in apparent 
stillness, in the now has the capacity to continually enliven and reorient relation.  
An object is hard to get rid of.  Not only do we easily become attached to things; 
the things that we recycle come back in other forms and as other things, which enables a 
practice of constellation that critically reaches beyond the currents of history and the 
“liveness” of recognizable historical events.  The performance-film’s pool of historical-
material objects and the garbage patch do not demonstrate that things go in and out of 
fashion but that the (ocean) current (of history) continually re-constellates—and can be 
critically constellated—in a now that keeps on going.  In an eerie modality—in an 
exceptionally moving fluid and fluctuating way—time “stills” in a garbage patch-pool of 
histories and leftovers.   
This exceptional and paradoxical movement—which can hardly be seen by the 
human eye—emphasizes that ways of seeing are not limited to vision but expand through 
growing physical contact.  Amongst other debris, the fragmented objects of history rise 
up and pile up on the bones of workers, on the monuments of revolutions, on the 
scientific classifications of time and space.  Benjamin’s articulation of the Angelus Novus 
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in Paul Klee’s painting indicates a tension between looking at history as a linear stream 
of progressive events and looking-bodily-relationally immersed in the ongoing storm with 
the debris.  The angel of history faces the past in which he sees a single catastrophe piling 
up wreckage before him.  While the angel of history sees the piling-up and wants to 
intervene, humans see only a chain of events proceeding along a continuum—such as in 
the linearity from “liveness” to “documentation.”  A storm—what humans call 
progress—prevents the angel’s intervention and forces him into the future that lies behind 
him.  Importantly, Benjamin points out that the angel’s eyes and mouth are open wide 
and his wings are spread.  The angel’s bodily way of seeing through immersion and 
movement contrasts humanity’s way of seeing in proving itself linearly through 
destruction and events that are done in the name of progress—and perhaps for the 
performance-film, in the name of justice.  In disrupting the storm of progress, ways of 
seeing are wrested from exploitative traditions providing—in Benjamin’s words—a 
“unique experience with the past” rather than an “eternal image of the past.”119  The 
unique experience is a relationally bodily—and critically—rooted experience rather than 
a documentation of a “live” past event. 
The directors of Home is in Our Past strive to cultivate a unique embodied and 
critical experience through the enunciations and negations of seemingly recognizable 
historical objects and with the repeated and distressed physicalities and guttural 
vocalizations of the two “live” performers that create a relentless, uncertain, and 
distressed atmosphere along with the male and female voiceovers.  Interspersed with the 
listing of events and figures of history, pop culture, and science—as part of the 
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constellation—fragments of a fragmentary narrative of interrogation unfolds.  The 
scenario in part articulates: 
Would you marry me       no 
Would you make love to me      no 
Would you like a cigarette      no 
Your husband’s taken cyanide in the war    no  
By interspersing personal questions and statements with historical and cultural events and 
figures, the directors place an intimate human-human relation in constellation with 
historical-material objects.  The uniformity of the woman’s response both asserts a 
negative response to the man’s phrases and questions and also affirms her own voice.  
The individualized responses in the unfolding experience implies a different but not 
unrelated weight between her responses to the personal questions and her responses to the 
broader cultural and historical objects.  The experience of interrogation is distinct from 
and yet connected to the historical-material objects.  The negation—which is not a 
negation of the singularity of each fragment but a negation of the capacity to reduce that 
singularity into a stable narrative—in response to more personal propositions and 
questions makes relations with history and historical-material objects extremely intimate.  
And extremely and subtly violent, as the voiceovers speak: 
Is the blinding light okay      no 
Are you happy with the worms in your wounds   no 
Would you ask for god’s forgiveness     no 
Would you ask for my forgiveness     no 
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Are you a virgin        
Are you a virgin       yes 
The unfolding interrogation in a seemingly present moment in the performance-film—
unfolding simultaneously with the live performance—is a moment of occurrence in the 
present that is recognizable in violences of the past.  Not only does this fragment of a 
lived experience of interrogation call forth the intimacy of historical relations, it also 
vocalizes and evokes an experience of violence that might be traced through and 
witnessed in history.  The voiceovers articulate the violence in an ambiguous scene in the 
present in which the viewer cannot see or understand the entirety and basis of the 
interrogation.  
At the end of the interrogation, everything in the live performance is set aflame—
burning with an eerie blue light; the male voice punctuates the image:  
I was kind to her….She is a virgin.  She’ll go to heaven if she dies a virgin.  So in 
the name of justice I will rape her nineteen times fearing that her presence might 
pollute heaven.  I’ll execute her by shooting afterwards in the name of justice.  
You can also watch these films to testify that justice has been done.  May god have 
mercy on you and I and may he punish the girl who would become a woman in 
the arms of justice (italics added). 
As the directors call into question ways of seeing and testifying to what has happened—
emphasizing the tension and intimate connection between experience and narrative that 
testifies to a past event—an unknown woman becomes the penultimate recycled object, 
whose voice affirms a negative answer to all questions except one.  It is a fragment that 
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coats the entire performance and history like mud and sweat but instead with the filth of 
the traffic in women—as if the male voiceover might have spoken the irresolvable and 
beyond meaning object-phrase fragment “The traffic in women” in his ongoing recitation 
and constellation.
120
 
Home is in Our Past ends with a recorded clip from Tadeusz Kantor’s The Dead 
Class (1975).
121
  In the clip, the Old People enter the performance space with the wax 
bodies of children carried on their backs and slowly encircle an arrangement of school 
desks while a waltz plays in the background.  The Old People take a seat at the desks and 
then individually place the children in a heap.  In the article Tadeusz Kantor and Hamed 
Taheri Of Political Theatre/Performance, Michal Kobialka directs our attention to the 
importance of this imagery.  Kobialka asserts that the barrier constructed between the 
actor and spectator in Kantor’s image—a barrier by which the Old people exist beyond 
the gaze of the spectators—refuses to provide the spectators with a nostalgic 
reconstruction of the past or a consoling or pleasurable construction of the future.
122
  
Kobialka marks the influence of Kantor’s work on Taheri’s directing practice and 
political approach to theatre that is critically “in reality but not of it.”  Herein, Taheri’s 
directing practice—and Kantor’s—is aligned with the historical materialist modality that 
Benjamin explicates in Eduard Fuchs: Collector and Historian.  In contrast to the 
dialectical image, Benjamin explains that the historical materialist abandons the epic 
element in history in a renouncement of a contemplative attitude and instead takes up 
history with a constructive modality that attends to the specificity in historical 
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constitution.  For Benjamin, historical materialism in this essay hinges on “a 
consciousness of the present which explodes the continuum of history.”123   
Home is In Our Past is woven into the present not as a set of recovered facts but 
as a work that remains uncompleted.  The performance-film also lays bare a certain 
rationalization made for the social and historical exchange, rape, and murder of an other 
in the final moments of the performance with a fragment of a young girl who “becomes a 
woman in the arms of justice” not despite documentary evidence of the horrific event but 
in cooperation with processes of documentation.  The directors do not offer any 
resolution or new rationalizations for any violent but justified treatment of others.  
Instead, the performance-film articulates a detached—not realistic or hermetically 
sealed—horrific articulation of the wrenching pain of an unnamed singular other-woman 
affected by a barrage of historical-material objects and questions posed to her.  Rather, 
the directors critique processes of transmitting, witnessing, and justifying history that 
reenact the exploitative violences of history.  The audience is left with no simple concrete 
message or story through which a systematic resolution to the problems of historical 
progress might be deployed.  The directors encourage instead a critical and constructive 
approach to ways of seeing and documenting historical objects that continue recycling 
through the cracks of history.  The approach takes up detachment that does not entail a 
way of seeing configured in terms of the objective observer but instead involvement in 
constructive and relational processes that do not re-forge exploitation. 
I began this chapter with the performance-film Home is in Our Past in order to 
examine how historical-material objects participate in ongoing historical relations 
 103 
through encounter and activity that gives rise to a tension between the capacity of objects 
to verify human progress, history, and identity and the proliferation of objects that 
fragments histories and identities.  Historical materialism is a particular critical modality 
in which an object engages the limits of historical sensibility.  Through layering of film 
and live performance and its assembled juxtapositions of historical-material objects—the 
historical materiality unfolding in the performance-film affirms that “pastness” is not a 
certification of a universal collective memory but a questioning of how what has taken 
place resurges in the now through historical and relational processes that disrupt the 
linearity between ephemeral “liveness” and recorded documentation.  I continue thinking 
through how performance operate relationally at the nexus of human-object encounter 
through a practice of collecting that unfolds in a 2007 Explosion of a 
Memory/Description of a Picture performance.  I argue that a practice of collecting in 
performance does not indicate a repurposing of objects by human actors for making 
performance recognizable but a living dynamism and magnetism that helps inform how 
performance operates as a becoming.  
 
A Practice of Collecting 
If the historical-material objects in Home is in Our Past rupture a continuum of 
historical significations—in the 2007 performance of Heiner Müller’s Explosion of a 
Memory/Description of a Picture, which I directed for the University of Minnesota 
Xperimental Theatre—objects create constantly unfolding lively images that are not 
about stable interpretations but moment-to-moment materially embedded sensations.
124
  
German playwright and director Heiner Müller wrote Explosion of a Memory/Description 
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of a Picture in 1984—a seven-page text of ongoing movement containing no commas or 
character indications.  I directed the play and chose to write about this performance in a 
chapter on objects because—like Home is in Our Past—Müller’s text of transitioning 
pictures articulates a speculation on “what happened” in a constellation of occurrences.  
However, in contrast to the performance-film, the text situates its questioning of pastness 
in relation to memory rather than a continuum of history—and in unfolding strange and 
unrecognizable material images with objects rather than objects that are connected to 
recognizable historical events.  The visceral descriptions of images or pictures are 
entwined in the ruptures and fissures of memory.  The text troubles the seamlessness of 
memory through highly mobile images and objects disjoined from a logical narrative.  
The text attracts me as a director, visual artist, and junk collector in part because of its 
refusal to organize objects and materiality in a stable and coherent manner. 
In the performance in the Xperimental Theatre on entering the black box, 
audience members slowly realize that they must walk down and through the performance 
space, which is saturated with bizarre and discomfiting things—including four human 
actors as still as the other objects in the space.  Many audience members are visibly 
uncomfortable walking through and so close to strange and discarded things.  They might 
have wondered how odd the objects seem—asking, why are these bizarre things together?  
The audience in part sees and comes close to—some daring to touch:  
a metal washtub filled with black dirt and dried vines; a tree of wire, branches, 
and plastic hovering above the floor; a six-foot bundle of prefabricated sticks 
planted in a basket of ash; a wooden table split along its length; a staircase leading 
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to nowhere; a rope hanging nothing; overfilled boxes and crates; plastic legs and 
arms; a white cage with a white bird and white goblet inside; an old doll with 
empty eyes sitting in a metal baby carriage; yellow, burgundy, and blue plastic 
sun and wild flowers; an IV cart draped with a white sheet; four human actors in 
stillness; blue Stryofoam clouds hanging on red plastic tubing; four child size 
chairs; a cracked and peeling painted backdrop; multiple shelves and pedestals 
holding among other things a deer with glassy eyes, plastic dishes, a teapot, 
crayons, odd containers and bottles, a wash basin, tattered cloth, a small white 
puppet with large feet, animal bones, and more.   
The audience views at first from above and passes through the material-image, which is 
framed with a maze of interconnected pieces of metal unistrut attached to the stage floor 
that had been stripped down to its old wooden floorboards.  The rough wood floor forms 
a fluid and permeable border that the audience is required to pass through—encountering 
the objects closely—on the way to their seats.  Each passage changes the image and 
highlights the mobile and uncertain relation that everything in the space has with each 
other. 
The stage space overflows with sensuous and rich heterogeneous material objects 
that paint a collage of images with the mobility of a memory and a dream, disallowing 
the audience to form a stable idea or vision of the picture.  The objects are not mere 
context for human action but demand the full sensory involvement—the intimate 
relational sensitivity—of human others.  As a director, I do not simply use or manipulate 
an object but rather wait and respond to how an object takes up space and moves 
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perceptibly and imperceptibly within the surroundings and with other elements and 
movements.  In other words, I encounter an object with emphasis on an object as already 
animate and relationally embedded prior to anything I might do to the object.  Herein, 
directing intentionality is not just internal to subjectivity intending towards the object but 
rather is “immanent in the activity itself, in the gestural synergy” of environmental 
conditions—in relational processes of living.125  Working with objects as a director in 
processes of collecting and assembling highlights the tension between making 
performance as an authoritarian manipulation and making performance as embedded 
encounter that includes the human and the more-than-human.  
In the performance of Explosion of a Memory/Description of a Picture, the human 
actors intertwine with objects in their stillness, in the mechanized and vehicular quality of 
their movements, and in their absence of distinct character and emotion.  In one unfolding 
image and moment in the picture—faintly with growing intensity—the twisted melody of 
the carnivalesque incarnates the human bodies as animate objects.  The human actors 
transform: a grim soldier reminiscent of plastic toy soldiers purchased in mass, a 
clownish puppet whose arms and legs swing in unison, a jewelry-box ballerina 
awkwardly graceful, and finally a disorganized body whose movement contains no logic.  
In this moment and others, the actors take on the quality of objects not just because of 
their acting style.  Against the backdrop of the space where so many objects are collected 
and stored, static and yet mobile, up on shelves and in baskets, the actors have the quality 
of objects—like traces of something remembered and forgotten—in a collection.  The 
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boundaries between an object and a human are confused in a movement that gives life to 
people and things.   
The relational domain from which humans and objects emerge grows with the 
uncertainty of animacy—of whether a supposedly living organism is in fact inanimate 
and of whether a supposedly inanimate object is in fact alive.  The mobilization of 
personhood and objecthood directs the senses towards an object’s relational liveliness 
rooted in encounter rather than coherent usefulness.  In other words, through the 
fluctuating limits where personhood and objecthood cannot be determined, an object no 
longer can be relegated to a role determined through human use and manipulation.  Junk 
things like those in the performance in particular emerge and live beyond commodity 
production insofar as they do not function as tools for manufacture, branding tools for 
identities, or historical tools for progress.  In a relationally understood performance, 
objects do not produce a delimited and definable product for human consumption, 
coherent and stabilized human identities, or a unified reality for the coherence of human 
society and knowledge but rather are continually constituted in and emerging from 
relational encounter. 
While Müller’s text speculates on what had happened, what might happen, and 
what is happening—the performance and objects in the performance likewise move 
incrementally and speculatively moment-to-moment prohibiting the formation of a 
coherent narrative represented in what materializes onstage.  Instead of forming a stable 
vision of a distinct and recognizable reality, the objects realize a heightened sense of 
unfolding reality-relationality in their fragmentary and mobile montage.  The 
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performance moves uninhibitedly and sensuously—through multiple perceptual 
orientations in which objects pass amongst shifting figures and images.  The odd 
unfolding objects and moments in the performance—which include a flower offering, a 
spit ball war, a dance between puppets, a sacrifice, a dinner for children, a walk on the 
grid, a bath, multiple transformations of bodies, and the falling movements of ash, a 
woman, a cup, a doll, blood, and shadows—makes for a complex relational unfolding 
that renders a seamless picture and memory impotent for the determination of a 
simplified narrative or meaning.   
The excessive creation and destruction of stage pictures in the performance rejects 
the idea that a theatrical performance—and a memory—is grounded in a cohesive and 
organized content.  Instead, the performance materializes a relationally adaptable 
movement in images and creative potential in encounter with objects—seen with multiple 
I/eyes—that have the power to disturb and haunt bodies and structures of meaning.  The 
performance does not test the boundedness of a frame—as a seamless divide between 
inside and outside—but one’s capacity for perception in a mode of collecting where 
every object and thing is living-dying, animate, and generative.
126
  
Walter Benjamin explicates the work of the collector—in his/her consciousness of 
an object in the present—as a way to rupture the continuity of and render the work of 
history incomplete.
127
  Objects hold in their material structure multiple histories that 
cannot be reified into a continuous and linear history of production and consumption.  
Benjamin’s explication of the work of the collector contrasts in part Susan Stewart’s 
argument that, “The collection replaces history with classification, with order beyond the 
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realm of temporality.”128  While Stewart’s work aligns with Benjamin in terms of the 
removal of an object from its original context and use, Stewart argues that the 
recontextualization of objects in the collection occurs via classification and an object’s 
seriality, which constructs an order that metaphorically stands in for everyday reality.  
Stewart states, “The collection is not constructed by its elements; rather, it comes to exist 
by means of its principle of organization.”129  The process of collecting—that Benjamin 
articulates as a practice that sheds objects of their use value and ruptures the linearity of 
history—is in Stewart’s explication the complete aestheticization of use value and the 
replacement of historical narrative with the “narrative of the individual subject—that is, 
the collector himself.”130  Significantly, Benjamin’s collected object does not order a 
stable narrative of individual subjectivity any more than it is capable of ordering a linear 
historical narrative.   
The contrast between these figurations of collecting outlines the difference 
between a museal practice of collecting, by either an individual or an institution—that 
orders its objects for a seemingly coherent representation of the subject, the world, and its 
history—and the collecting behavior of—what Stewart calls—packrats.131  Even though 
Stewart mentions nonhuman packrat behavior to articulate what should not be considered 
“collection,” human packrats do indeed collect.  The difference is that packrats, hoarders, 
and the like collect based on sensuality not seriality.  Moreover, we must acknowledge 
the negative connotations that such terms (packrat, hoarder, miser) carry and realize that 
a compulsive collector might have a sensual love and infatuation with things that implies 
no psychological malfunction in their character.  In referencing Jean Baudrillard’s 
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distinction between collection and accumulation, Stewart claims that a collection for its 
own sake and for its own movement is an insane collection born of a gesture of 
compulsion.
132
  Whether insane or not—these collections no longer rely on the mode of 
containment found in systems of classification.  They are no longer the antithesis to 
creation situated in an order where an object has value only in terms of their serial 
position in reference to other objects.  These “insane” objects have value in their 
mobility—sensually and relationally rather than serially and positionally.  In a few words, 
Stewart recognizes that collections of ephemera and disposable items—that in my 
understanding relationally continue and constellate—might be formed based upon the 
intrinsic qualities of an object rather than a principle of order evident in a museum’s 
attempt at coherent representation.
133
   
Benjamin points out in his essay on Fuchs that there are many kinds of collectors 
that are motivated by a variety of differing impulses.  The range includes the historian 
such as Fuchs, the exhibitionist who displays souvenirs from his travels, the packrat who 
delights in quantities, the bibliophile who does not completely detach the object from use, 
the bourgeois collector who adorns the interior of his home, and even ants, birds, and 
children as collectors.  The various figures and impulses of the collector encounter a 
diverse array of objects through differing approaches.  In terms of objects like those in 
the Explosion performance that as junk no longer carry value as a commodity for 
commodity exchange and for a collector as an artist-director, the objects in the collection 
have been severed from original use not only by “falling” out of the circulation of 
commodities but also by being taken up in a collection that hinges on quantity as much as 
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quality.
134
  Even though spare few words are spoken throughout the performance—giving 
way to the priority of materiality—every word and every moving object carries the power 
of evocation.  Objects emerging in the performance negotiate in a visible depth of 
sensuous expressivity where what is belongs to the visible bleeds into spoken words and 
tactile movement.  The performance space vibrates with a complex and evasive tracing of 
in/corporeal activity: objects amassing on the floor, repeating gestures, and returning to 
previously occupied positions; movements and vague whisperings permeating and 
transforming images; and every thing and every one casting a shadow that generates a 
surplus of lively living effects in materiality.  The performance is a sensual movement of 
things in a materialization of a possible unfolding memory and imagination in an image 
that cannot be determinately solved or mastered. 
In Benjamin’s words, the collector enacts “the deepest enchantment” enclosing 
particular items within a “magic circle” by placing objects in the “closest conceivable 
relation to things of the same kind.”135  In fact, Benjamin emphasizes that, “the world is 
present, and indeed ordered, in each of his objects.  Ordered, however, according to a 
surprising and, for the profane understanding, incomprehensible connection” (italics 
added).
136
  In Benjamin’s writings, we find a contradiction between the “mere” or 
“irrational” presence of an object that on one hand cannot be resolved and on the other is 
sought to be overcome through the collection as a “historical system.”  The artist as a 
collector emphasizes the incomprehensibility of objects and collections, which provide a 
way to think through how an object relationally “steps into our lives” as a singular and 
unfolding world rooted in the materiality of encounter rather than the production of the 
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commodity form.  In a collection, an object is wrested from its useful functions to inhabit 
the dynamic and fluid space of material relations in newly and ongoing forming 
juxtapositions.  An artist as a collector plays with—or perhaps better stated, assembles 
with—an ongoing multiplicity of singular objects, however incomprehensible or 
inaccessible they might remain.   
In the performance of Explosion of a Memory/Description of a Picture, the lack of 
a coherently ordered perspective from which the collection of objects might be 
understood as fitting together realizes a creative force where the continuous and 
unexpected changes in the picture occur through moment-to-moment movements of 
objects in the space.  The movement of the objects occupies a ground that constantly 
shifts directions causing the close and tactile observer to see without any stable 
perspective for a complete and only optically oriented picture.  Tactility not only refers to 
a sense of touch via the most obvious tangibility of actual contact but also refers to touch 
that is visual and aural as well—where all senses work together in synaesthetic 
participation.  The tactile shifts in the performance’s ongoing movement releases the 
audience from an organizing role and asks the audience to pay attention or adjust to 
infinite (too large) and minute (too small) sensual shifts occurring beyond their 
perception.  With constant reorientation and without landmarks, audience members are 
drawn into the relationally unfolding image.  A relational performance practice includes 
the audience in the performance along with the performers, objects, lighting, etc. as part 
of the sensuous circulation of activity—not exactly positioning the audience as passive 
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onlookers or active participants but somewhere beyond those distinct positions in tactile 
encounter.  
Likewise, a collector looks to an object antitaxonomically as he/she handles 
objects with tireless care—attending to their unique rhythms and becoming enveloped by 
the sensual qualities, dynamics, and magnetic pull of an object.  A collector feels near to 
objects—while looking into their distance—as if in a dream.137  In this dream—which is 
not opposed to reality but woven into the same fabric—anything and everything is of 
concern to, can take a hold of, and has the potential to possess a collector.  The collector 
encounters, experiences, and perceives things as if in a dream where every thing is of 
concern and has the capacity to strike him or her in a “rhythm of perception” that shows 
his life in constant flux.
138
  Even the most banal or broken down objects have the power 
to halt a collector in his/her tracks.  Insofar as the objects and the images in the 
performance generate a rhythm of perception in an unceasing tactile movement until the 
performance obtusely ends, the audience cannot fully interpret the ways in which 
significations are formed and reformed through object images.  Instead, the audience 
might only fleetingly locate empty or messy significations as they are pulled into and 
along the cycle of imagistic transformations.  Where picture frames amputate and sparse 
words are spoken like carcasses—the audience’s habit for narrative coherency must give 
in to a visceral undulation between what is materially there and what is immaterially not 
there—and more importantly what is immaterially there and what is materially not there.  
In this obscurity, every object punctures and punctuates the image and human 
sensibility—as if in a memory but moreover in the openness of encounter. 
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The constantly shifting images of Explosion of a Memory/Description of a 
Picture—both in the text and the performance—materialize a force of encounter with 
objects and a force of mobile consciousness that pricks the viewer in practice and 
ongoing relationality.  The performance in particular emphasizes that encounter with an 
object is not about seeking and finding the distinct object but sensing the wound, the 
prick, and the disturbance.
139
  In the performance, every object participates in the 
emergence and puncturing of the images—including the audience before the “ distinct 
performance” began, during, and after it abruptly ended.  The performance’s object-
images most explicitly do not fit together to make a contained and containable picture or 
a memorial of any recognizable event.  Rather, the audience is engaged in a process of 
juggling the pieces not in a narrativizing strategy but in a process of making and re-
making that requires the audience to wrestle with not knowing—with being struck with 
what do I make of this (object) and what does it make of me?  In a moment-to-moment 
reorientation, the performance does not follow along a linear progression resulting in a 
resolution but instead is more like the sonorous movements of music resonating in the 
very fabric of its expressive collected objects.  The performance emphasizes the sonority 
of objects in an odd collection in which the audience might come to think of human-
object encounter in a way that is not about careless use and consumption, masterful 
construction of a hermetically sealed human reality in an anthropocentrically normatizing 
system, or even sentimental attachment—all operating within capitalist modernity with 
the fetishization of the commodity form. 
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The relationship between the collector and collected objects is a relation of 
possession.  However, a collector’s possession—his/her motivation to have—is again not 
determined by an object’s use or exchange value but instead in terms of an object’s 
knowledge, tactility, rhythm, and flux.  The collector browses through the confusion of 
the world and selects objects with a tactile sensibility that—in contrast to an optical 
sensibility—acknowledges that, “every single thing in this system [collection] becomes 
an [magic] encyclopedia of all knowledge of the epoch, the landscape, the industry, and 
the owner from which it comes.”140  A collector is driven by an irrepressible passion to 
seek out and find the perfect objects for the collection.  Yet, a collector’s selection is as 
much driven by chance as it is by passion—even finding a sought after object in the 
middle of the street.
141
  The collector always seeks out objects to add to the collection, 
but this seeking—in contrast to how it might appear—is not just enacted by the collector.  
Rather, an object draws a collector in.  An object possesses the collector as much as 
he/she possesses an object.
142
  However, this “as much as” does not indicate an identity 
between the subject and the object but a qualitative irreducibility of encounter.  
Adorno’s immanent critique with its emphasis on mediation in confrontation of 
all forms of identity thinking presupposes the “non-identity” between the subject and the 
object.  The confrontation of identity thinking through negative dialectics is for Adorno 
tied to a confrontation with an instrumental rationality—in capitalist modernity—that in 
part transforms the producing subject into an object of production and the object of 
production into its subject.  Adorno argues, “The word alienation…acknowledges by the 
very tenacity with which it views the alien external world as institutionally opposed to the 
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subject—in spite of all its protestations of reconciliation—the continuing irreconcilability 
of subject and object, which constitutes the theme of dialectical criticism.”143  The 
impoverishment of the subject occurs with the externalization, objectification, and 
abstraction of subjectivity—in the conflation of subject and object and the technological 
subordination of nature.  However, Adorno asserts that subjectivity breaks from social 
and historical forces of objectification and gestures towards an emancipatory modality 
that combats a capitalist mode of production in a “determinate negation” that can never 
take on any concrete determination.  For Adorno, art is the domain in which a critique of 
history—and capitalism’s real abstractions—might be carried out.144  Adorno writes, “In 
the modern administered world the only adequate way to appropriate art works is one 
where the uncommunicable is communicated and where the hold of reified consciousness 
is thus broken.”145  The seemingly indeterminate critique of reality materialized in 
aesthetic illusion becomes determinate because it realizes that “the whole is false.”  
Therefore, the “totality” must cease all conceptual attempts at the determination of the 
subject but rather must take up its creative materialization in the debris of historical 
materiality.  For Adorno, the constellation operates as a de-regulated and critical 
confrontational approach to reality that might be manifest in art as well as “non-
identitarian” thinking in which the subject most explicitly is not identified with anything 
external to it.
146
  
Even though in the Explosion performance it is difficult to demarcate a 
conventionally construed opposition between human subjects and inanimate objects, 
meaning making in the performance emphasizes the processes of making (together) 
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rather than the identitarian project of stabilized and coherent meaning rooted in a pre-
formed and impermeable Subject.  In the performance, the overabundance of objects 
shapes and animates the space as the space shapes and animates the objects.  In the 
primordial mud and ash that comes to coat the landscape through the course of the 
performance: an exhumed doll peers out, incarnated puppets sustaining recently broken 
limbs overlap each other in a mound, a hand with three-inch steel nails at the finger tips 
severs a surface.  Woman, man, animal, plastic dishes intertwine in the material image.  
The space is neither a frame nor a stage that contains the objects but rather is bound up 
with the objects.  As Maurice Merleau-Ponty claims, “Space is not the setting (real or 
logical) in which things are arranged, but the means whereby the position of things 
becomes possible.”147  Significantly, the position of things emerges from an unfolding 
embedded relationality where space, objects, actors, sound, audience, etc. move—acting 
with, in, and on each other.   
Perhaps the most visible and tactile way in which an object and the surroundings 
unfold with others is in the doubling of everything by shadows.  Every thing within the 
stage-image either has a shadow or the possibility of a shadow.  Herein, the lighting 
serves to materialize the relational participation of an object and a space in a mutual 
mutation that creates doubts as to whether supposedly alive beings are inanimately 
mobile and whether supposedly lifeless objects are in fact alive.  In a disarming and 
mobile lighting, the performance manifests shadows and objects-bodies playing between 
the corporeal and incorporeal—the substantial and insubstantial.  Two hand-held shop 
lights are used to light the show with the exception of one scene.  A lighting operator—
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who is elevated above and behind the audience—creates the lighting with the movement 
in the performance by moving as the performance unfolds.  Therefore, the lighting is 
different for each night and follows along with the creative unfolding of the action and 
embodied energy in the show.   
The night before the performance “opened” I cut my lighting design—which I had 
been told was quite beautiful—and decided to light the show with mobile manually 
operated clamp lights.  While there was nothing wrong with the more traditional lighting 
design—and in some ways I lamented dispensing with the traditional lighting because the 
hanging lamps provided a nice quality of light—the space, the performance, the objects, 
and the shadows live emerging in the spontaneous and responsive lighting of the clamp 
lights.  The impromptu lighting creates a moving stillness on stage and in the space.  
Often, the light and shadows move but the objects apparently do not.  As a colleague 
noted, the lighting creates an effect like “the sun moving around a sunflower, thus 
changing the sunflower’s shadow but not its stillness.”  The audience also enters and 
exits like shadows. 
With so many incredibly mobile shadows in the production, even though shadows 
supposedly cannot be severed from what they double, these shadows appear detachable—
not as an effect of objects or events but as apparitions capable of their own doubling, 
capable of their own activity and an overabundance of effects that affectively modulates 
awareness.  In writing about the new technology of a camera, William Henry Fox Talbot 
claims a shadow—being the most transitory of things—might be magically fixed in a 
position, which it only previously could occupy momentarily.
148
  Even though the 
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performance attempts to partake in the creation of marvelous images, its shadows are 
anything but fixed or fleeting.  Shadows—even photographic shadows—are open and 
continue to unfold.  The shadows in the production are persistent—transitioning but not 
transitory.   Here, the encounter in the performance space in relationality is a shadow 
generator.  As a generator of shadow objects and images, the performance creates an 
uncanny world emerging from an always-moving haunted relationality, preparing the 
audience to see but never allowing them to see definitively.  The shadowed and 
shadowing space activates the imagination and arouses concern-fear in bodies and objects 
become unfamiliar twice over—once in the displacement of their familiarity and again in 
shadowing.  These shadows are an exceptionally eerie multiplication because they 
shadow already uncanny and animate inanimate objects.   
With a moving collection of objects and shadows in the performance, each image 
vacillates-wavers with presence and absence, touching on moments when something 
ceases to exist.
149
  The audience moves with uncertainty through the image and the 
shadowy movements double every body—creating a sense and rhythm of time passing in 
a continual and persistent relational shape-shifting.  The continually shifting in/corporeal 
objects in the performance emerge in a flux of continual change that enacts continuity 
and impermanence.  Uncertain passage places a body in contact with the unrepresentable 
and an un/certain death.  This mobile sensibility and modulating awareness reveals that 
an object cannot be mastered by an “I” or the eyes.  Herein, the eyes have not lost their 
ability to see but instead are overwhelmed and saturated in their in/ability to see too 
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much.  The eyes then are not a tool for vision but rather are a threshold for uncertainty 
and monstrous perceptions. 
The I/eye negotiations and performances of objects, bodies, social relations, 
memories, and experiences are rooted in uncertainty.  Herein, the collected objects 
produce—and perhaps are a machine for—a fear of being robbed of one’s eyes. The 
audience in the performance is required to feel their way through the performance as 
much as see their way through—or perhaps better stated feel their way through with their 
eyes.  In becoming wide-eyed and at all junctures—in all moments—the audience is 
threatened with and brought to the brink of loosing its own human eyes as masters of 
rational knowledge in the construction of objects and images.  However, to sense, to 
really see, in an ongoing relationality from which the performance emerges is to be 
immersed in blurry meaning and uncertainty—seeing by seeing less and more, knowing 
by knowing less and more.   
Müller’s text states:  
who OR WHAT inquires about the picture, TO LIVE IN A MIRROR, is the man 
doing the dance step: I, my grave his face, I: the woman with the wound at her 
throat, right and left in her hands the split bird, blood on the mouth, I: the bird 
who with the script of his beak shows the murderer the way into the night, I: the 
frozen storm.
150
 
I cannot tell you what these words exactly mean.  I do not know the coherent story they 
tell.  The words provoke me like a snowflake provokes me, or the carcass of a dead bird 
provokes me, or a pristine (or well-worn) mass-produced Barbie doll provokes me.  As an 
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artist-director and a collector, the text provokes me to assemble or better yet to participate 
in relational processes of assemblage with others.  What do these words provoke me to 
animate?  Well, that is the question, who OR WHAT?  The question is also the answer, 
who OR WHAT?  The provocation is the animation.  The animation is the relation.  
Performance thought relationally engages with living already animate and animating 
things continually unfolding in a zone of uncertainty.   
Moments before this selection of Müller’s text is spoken in the performance, a 
human actor assembles a circle of plastic doll heads, legs, and arms around her.  A bird-
woman deteriorates to the floor of a platform releasing her statuesque shadow.  A slight 
movement in one actor triggers another actor-object to once again move on a grid 
returning to an altered version of the picture that the audience views as they enter the 
theatre and the image.  The objects and the final image gesture to the ungraspable 
embedded relationality with others.  The surface and the air are thick with ash, plastic, 
dirt, and a blood-red liquid.  It is not quite that the objects and image have transformed 
into something that they were not previously but that they unfold in their ongoing activity 
something unknown and uncertain.  The last image is not an act of completion—a finality 
where the ungraspable has been revealed and everything can be seen—but rather an 
opening into a depth where shadows always prevail.  In the final ongoing image: a human 
body brushes slightly against a Barbie doll and a Ken doll suspended on clear fishing 
line.  The brush sends the two bodies swaying—away, toward, and against each other, 
sometimes getting caught in each other’s rigidity.  The intertwined swaying bodies casts a 
moving shadow against the backdrop, creating a fourth body—larger, opaque and 
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transparent, moving like memories that are always escaping.  The audience realizes that 
they must leave through the mess of objects, tracing their own passage visibly and 
strategically on the canvassed floor and through the sensuous image.  As they pass 
through, silence and a shudder that physicalizes the act of passing through once again. 
These shudders are visible in the bodies of some audience members and I am reminded 
that shuddering things move an uncertain life. 
The transitioning picture and objects express a flow of the in/corporeal and 
in/animate.  Each shift has a reality that is enlivened through sudden stops, turns, and 
changes in rhythm and speed.  The streaming flow in the performance—eyes unfurling, 
creeking floorboards rupturing flower petals shadowing, arms reaching disintegrating dirt 
and ash—is generative in a sensuous variation that releases a power of life that a human 
cannot coherently grasp and that cannot be contained within living organisms.  Herein, 
performance operating as a becoming irreducibly unfolds with a capacity to evoke the 
unpresentable—which can produce anxiety.151 
Now as my writing risks becoming too sure of its own authority.  Before my 
memory becomes mastery.  An object escapes into the recesses of unfolding time and 
space, which require every effort to (what)…become-fluid.  To imagine and to play.  In 
many ways, the objects in the performance are junk.  Junk collects and collages.  Our 
imaginations are roused and we become aware of the liveliness of things in junk piles, 
junk yards, junk drawers, junk food, and junk shops.  Junk things refuse to declare what 
they are or were with or without other junk.
152
  It is impossible to mark a strict division 
between engaging with an object in general and engaging with an object in the paradigm 
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of performance.  While performance as a distinct and conventionalized paradigm might 
indicate a more creative or more sensitive encounter with an object than in the general 
everyday world, performance and “reality” are not mutually exclusive but are bound 
together relationally.  The difference between encounter with an object in a 
performance—or in a collection—and an object in the everyday environment is not an 
excluded opposition but a fragmentary framing that emerges out of and cannot be 
extracted from ongoing relation.   
Perhaps the plethora—the absolutely anything and everything—of collected 
objects such as those in the Explosion of Memory/Description of a Picture performance 
that do not disappear behind their names and uses reveals the monstrous nature of 
collecting.  A collection—for the artist-junk-collector—does not coherently and stably 
organize the world but rather enlivens obscure and ungraspable relation.  Therefore, 
collecting is in part a non-anthropocentric creative modality.  A “broken-down” object 
does not make the past or any other stable reality distinct but rather offers a continuing 
engagement with histories and realities that are fluid not fixed.  A collector—in the mode 
of an artist or perhaps a historian like Fuchs—engages with a thing as an enticement to 
assemble and to expand beyond the limits of oneself.  Herein, the collected objects in the 
Explosion performance materialize a peephole through time and space.  Encountering an 
object I ask, what is this world that is not?  
Ah! where, where next?  
Oh night without objects 
Oh window muffled on the outside 
 124 
Oh, doors carefully closed 
Oh silence in the stair-well
153
  
Images that pass through peepholes cannot be completely grasped by human perception 
or stabilized in a linear vision of History.  The historical and memorial mobile images are 
in part beyond distinct perception in an undetermined and affective relational unfolding 
with others.  A peephole generates shock and astonishment.  Its subtle, fluid, and caress-
able shape encourages engorgement.  It magnifies and multiplies dispersion.  It arouses a 
sense of held breath and danger in encounters with unknown others.  What is this 
historical and imagistic excess?  “Oh” and “Ah” are peepholes that pass through the 
tender rounded lips of mouths.  Oh and Ah embody immersion—making a gesture 
towards performance operating as a becoming—not positioned on either side of a 
correspondence or identity but operating as a continuous mobility. 
 
Conclusion: Liveliness in Performance 
 In this chapter, I engaged with a collection of objects in two performances in 
order to think through the manner in which encounter with objects might inform an 
understanding of how performance operates as an embedded relationality.  I examined 
how historical-material objects shape ways of seeing and narrating history—crossing 
time and context to participate in ongoing relation—in particular through a modality that 
gives rise to a tension between the capacity of objects to verify history and identity and 
the proliferation of objects that fragments histories and identities.  I argued that the 
reconfiguration of historical narrative from a linear narrative of human progress to a 
mutable and ongoing living encounter—taken up in a critical constructive practice—with 
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objects emphasizes relational process with over instrumental use of objects.  I further 
argued that a practice of collecting is an activity in which obscure junk-objects exceed 
structures of intelligibility and create excess liveliness in encounter with others.   
In the next chapter, I continue to examine how performance operates as a 
becoming—an ongoing relationality—through an examination of performances at the 
nexus of human involvement with machines and technology.  I take up the experimental 
theatre production machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines (2008), and the 2006/2007 rehearsal-performance processes for Heiner 
Müller’s Die Hamletmaschine (1977).  I examine these early 21st century experimental 
performances in order to focus the inquiry on questions concerning how human 
involvement with machines and technology help inform my theorization of performance 
as a relational becoming.  In Chapter Three, I engage with the problem of domination and 
the implications and relevance of domination in thinking performance as a becoming—as 
an unfolding relationality—which envisions webs of relational complexity and 
involvement in instrumental industrial productivity. 
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Chapter Three: 
“Moving Machines” 
 
 
In Chapter One—in order to examine how performance operates as a becoming—
I began with questions concerning how performance is involved in the determination of 
subjectivity and ungraspable relationality.  I took up Eduardo Kac’s GFP Bunny project 
in order to examine the tension between subject positionality and relationality that 
permeates human-animal encounter.  I argued in part that the relationality from which 
performance emerges is not just a factor of a body’s subjective (in)abilities but of affect 
and argued that—for performance as a becoming—listening and proposal grounds 
emerging bodies and subjectivities in an affective relationality and an ordeal of exposure.  
In Chapter Two, Home is in Our Past (2003/2005) and a 2007 performance of Explosion 
of a Memory/Description of a Picture (1984) provided avenues by which to think through 
the question of how performance unfolds relationally—as a becoming—in terms of 
human-object encounter.  I argued that a relationally embedded object creates fissures in 
historical and representational perspectives and an excess of living and lively—critical 
and material—impacts in performance.  In Chapter Three, I build on the argument for 
how performance might be understood as relational through an examination of sites that 
confront the implications of human involvement with machines and technology.  The two 
sites in this chapter enable a way to think through the complex operations of machines 
and technology, which are entangled in webs of complexity and structures of domination.  
I examine machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines 
(2008) and the 2006/2007 rehearsal-performance process of Die Hamletmaschine (1977) 
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in order to argue that human involvement with machines and technology indicates 
embeddedness in unfolding webs of complexity and integration into productive 
mechanisms wrought with socio-historical forces of domination.  
 
Failing Machines 
Machines Machines Everywhere 
The title of Rainpan 43’s production machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines, machines, machines (2008) suggests that machines are quite literally and 
perpetually everywhere.
154
  The company describes the performance as a clown play that 
deals with America’s obsession with security and technology.  On entering the theatre, 
the set—the kinetic junk sculpture—of machines gives the impression of an interior 
space.  The machinic set/sculpture might be a single-family home with a small 
kitchenette and the typical tattered furniture if it were not for the variety and quantity of 
strange furnishings that fill and comprise the space.  Thin ropes hang from and across the 
ceiling in seemingly arbitrary fashion; small plastic objects and stuffed animals peek 
through openings in a white lattice fence; and an old electric fan, bicycle tire, toaster, and 
more all seem to be…connected…somehow…to something else: perhaps a block of 
wood, a handle, or a thingamajig of some sort.  All on the verge of…doing something.  
Before the human actors enter, the space invites deciphering: not in the sense of what the 
space means but what the space does.   
Rube Goldberg’s comical illustrations and inventive imaginings of machines—
that are built to take the most difficult and inefficient route to achieve the most-simple 
action—inspire the production.  In the kinetic sculpture, a breakfast comprised of a bowl 
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of cereal, milk, and a banana can be had only by accurately aligning a wooden chute with 
the desired cereal box, pulling a rope to tip the box, adjusting the bowl to the chute’s 
alignment, orally siphoning the milk through a long plastic tube that descends from the 
“mammary of the sky,” and plugging in a jerry-rigged contraption—an engine, kitchen 
knife, and some bits of wire and tubing—to almost accurately slice the banana.  The 
breakfast is ready only when each mechanism achieves its purpose—of course that does 
not include the egg that must be fried, the juice that must be squeezed, and the bread that 
must be toasted by even more complex measures.  The complexity and pervasiveness of 
the machines create a habitat where materials—any materials—might operate as building 
materials with limitless mechanical possibilities.  In machines, the machines’ operations 
rather than human action fortify the foundation of the performance.  Insofar as the 
machines operate as the central force of production and performance, the technology by 
which the human actors might use machines to master their surroundings (and nature) 
gives way to a technology where machines work to master humans. 
 
Productivity and Performance  
The production raises the question of what it means to perform symbiotically in 
relation with others—in particular machines and technology—and/or via structures of 
domination in regards to others.  Even though the primary characters—The Chief 
Commander, Phinneas, and Liam—inhabit machines with a sense of paranoia over the 
surveillance capabilities of the enemy “they”—whoever “they” are—the manner in which 
the characters are intertwined in and dependent on the working of the machines proves to 
be a more formidable force for conditioning how the characters (and the actors) are able 
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to inhabit the space.  The characters’ concern over surveillance points to “them out there” 
but the small, petty, and profuse mechanisms shape the actor/character action and 
embodiment from within.  The character Liam in particular partially embodies a machine 
with a mechanized voice and a mechanical extension that operates as part of his body.  
The performance makes visually, corporeally, and ridiculously evident the levels to 
which machines and technology have the capacity to transform human embodiment.  The 
transformations of human embodiment that machines and technology are caught up in 
draw out and give weight to the question concerning how domination permeates relation.  
Herein, the effects and the felt impacts on human bodies carry as much weight as and are 
at stake in the technological machinic apparatus.  
The pacification and constraint of the characters within the machinery—a web in 
which they must respond to techno-mechanical movement and “authority”—is tied to a 
vision of a more vigilant, efficient, and effective performance even though that standard 
of performance is never achieved despite the many pressures that demand it.  In Perform 
or Else, Jon McKenzie argues that contemporary paradigms of performance—
technological, organizational, and cultural—are bound together in an “onto-historical 
formation” that creates a mandate to perform (effectively and efficiently or else).155  
Under the organizational paradigm, “perform or else” could mean perform or be fired, or 
be asked to leave a program, or—in the case of performance-based pay—perform or go 
hungry.  In the cultural paradigm, the phrase could mean perform or be socially 
normalized, socially marginalized, or allow your culture to disappear.  In the 
technological paradigm, the phrase could mean perform or be found technologically 
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incompetent or perform or else “disaster—a systems failure—will occur.  Finally, in the 
performativity of performance the phase could mean perform or else be nonexistent.  
Significantly, the threats that “perform or else” makes cannot be relegated to any single 
paradigm.  A mandate to perform is not just a straightforward demand to perform but also 
carries the underlying demand to perform according to rules or standards in a continually 
occurring performance.   
In the performance of machines, the machines do work—despite their frequent 
failures—to shape the space and the human bodies performing within it.  The machines 
act as machinery of behavioral control (and symbiosis) formed around human bodies 
making the “they” possible but unnecessary.  machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines, machines, machines points towards a condition in which human bodies are 
integrated into an all-encompassing system where the “enemy” is not likely out there but 
“in here.”  The obsession with security and technology vitalized through pervasive spatial 
contraptions that demand performance rises from in Michel Foucault’s terms an  
“integrated system” that operates as an automatic and anonymous power—“a network of 
relations which holds the whole together.”156  Insofar as relations cannot be extracted 
from negotiations of power, relationality cannot be extracted from a substrate of 
domination no matter how weak or strong that substrate might be.   
In the performance, The Chief Commander, Liam, and Phinneas are integrated 
into the larger machine—an all-encompassing contraption where the perception of an 
anonymous and powerful “they” compels action.  The characters are embedded in 
surveillance not because there actually is someone out there but because the space is 
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interiorized, mechanized, and hierarchized with an anonymous power, a chain of 
command, and a red phone to God.  Herein, power functions like one of the machines—
another ridiculously in/efficient chain of mechanisms—a weak domination—that figures 
and reconfigures plans for total annihilation, gives history to the greatness of “that day,” 
and eulogizes the fallen and dead Patrick integrating his severed body parts into the 
kinetic junk sculpture.  While the production invites us to consider the implications of an 
American obsession with security and surveillance that leads to anxiety over how 
technology and machines might be used to guarantee a way life made impenetrable to 
outside forces, the entanglement of domination and relation that I propose offers no 
guarantees of bodily or national impenetrability that might in turn—finally or 
provisionally—guarantee safety or freedom from domination. 
 
Automation 
The operations of machines’ kinetic embodiments gesture toward and physicalize 
immersion in relationality not apart from but entangled in forces of domination that are 
rooted in the socio-historical challenge not just to perform but to master through efficient 
and effective—automated rather than relational—performance.  Automation is wrought 
with contradictory demands for an automated networked body—framed as a better and 
more efficient body—and for immersion within a relation that cannot be networked or 
circuited.  The operations of machines and technology as forces of automation are 
invested in mastering inefficient and improper performance and in materializing a 
complex intertwining of internality and externality.  In other words, automation is 
paradoxically invested in proper—more efficient and effective—function and in an 
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immersive relationality that doesn’t always unfold “properly.”  For example, social media 
formations place a demand on bodies to efficiently and effectively perform their social 
engagement—in mastering a proper “profile” or brand name—that apparently 
automatically engenders a complex sociality, which is both subject to forces of 
normatization and also resistance.  In the machines’ performance, automation 
materializes in part in complexly intertwined exterior and interior forces in a relationally 
unfolding web.  The characters emphasize a ruptured exterior-interior space in glances 
through the blinds and windows and in their odd entrances made from and into the 
sculpture.  The characters do not seem to enter from an “outside” set apart from but rather 
from an outside inside the space-contraption itself—through hidden doors and 
passageways.  Herein, the characters co-function with the machines embedded 
relationally rather than connect and disconnect from a circuited network.  With network 
connectivity, a body plugs into or unplugs from a network of connections; with 
immersive relationality a continually mobile body negotiates conditions of embeddedness 
where the uncertainty and un-circuited mobility of connections is primary.  
The residential machine that encompasses all the other petty machines in the 
performance gives the impression of a gigantic encasing that includes everything 
outside—everything in the open air.  To inhabit this interior is to be automatically 
integrated in a thick mechanical web from which it takes great effort to stir.  The 
architecture of a mechanical web is not built to be seen from an outside onto an inside but 
to be experienced automatically, corporeally, and relationally.  From an interiorized 
exterior vantage point, the audience watches and enjoys the absurd mechanical web of 
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machines that extends beyond the set with or without the awareness that the architecture 
is also built in part to permit internal control, which understood through Foucault’s 
disciplinary power is a network of relations that “acts on those it shelters” and operates to 
know and transform behavior.
157
  The sheltering that a network of mechanisms performs 
has the capacity to obscure relations of control in an integrated system or completely 
technologized or automated existence.  The capacity of mechanization to integrate—to 
automate—all forms of bodies and to achieve status as a way of being is in part what 
“enables the disciplinary power to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere 
and always alert…and absolutely ‘discreet’, for it functions permanently and largely in 
silence.”158  The Chief Commander, Phinneas, and Liam anxiously try to catch sight of 
the combative advance of a discreet power in the indiscreet “they” and in the in/discreet 
and suspicious behaviors of others while working towards an albeit ineffective sense of 
readiness and vigilance. 
In the performance, vigilance—an automatic behavior that the characters 
continually perform—depends on the invisibility of the voice on the telephone and the 
“they” inside-outside the machine.  Herein, the characters are also immersed in 
circulations of information.  They receive and discuss the merits of information on what 
is going on in order to perform more effectively and efficiently.  The information 
motivates and creates a challenge for their best performance.  The red phone to God 
guarantees that there are concrete material effects on bodies that reach well beyond the 
information that the phone signifies.  The remote stimulus via the phone reconfigures 
how the characters sense their spatial temporal situation as part of an automated 
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involuntary circuit.  The involuntary aspect calls attention to an appeal to freedom 
opposed to domination that supposedly comes with plugging in and unplugging—
connecting and disconnecting—fluctuating between immersion and domination.  This 
fluctuation highlights that concerns over involuntary movement are rooted in an 
automatism that condemns a body to a systematized and hollow reality.  Herein, 
automatism in structures of domination entangles with automation in immersion that 
works to materialize an un/reality—a charming and disturbing awakening and adaptation 
of the “sleeping being lost in its automatisms.”159  The entanglement of automatism and 
automation—and domination and relationality—makes it difficult to determine who is in 
control but necessary to ask how domination permeates human involvement with 
machines and technology. 
The crux of automation hinges on how automation alters perceptions of reality 
and sensation and whether automation is meant to correct “improper” functioning in a 
systematized network of domination.  The sense of automation that comes with being 
plugged-in is often pleasurable—in a charming unreality and in a reality of domination.  
For example, I learned first-hand the pleasure of efficiently and effectively moving with 
the mechanisms of a fast moving factory assembly line while working on meat cutting 
and processed-food assembly lines in agricultural food production.  Once the rhythm of 
my body learned to function properly—matching the rhythm of the machine—time 
passed unnoticed and my body performed appropriately in a pleasurable synchronicity 
with the machine.  However—when a break bell sounded and my body punched out or 
unplugged—pain, stiffness, cold, and fatigue came to the forefront of the senses.  In the 
 135 
case of the assembly line worker or the highly trained athlete, automatic movement 
delimits and alters a body’s experience and appears to promise excellent performance that 
in part conceals suffering and pain.  Automation appears to physicalize complete and 
successful immersion in the mechanisms of relation; however, embodied excesses and 
failing interruptions are also sensed beyond the paradigm of a human body’s so-called 
automatic and enhanced functioning. 
Although the machines performance ends in a strange and humorous apocalyptic 
climax, machines’ inexpedient interior gestures toward a haptic-optic, corporeal, and 
mechanical dream—operating according to the play of spaces—rather than a future 
technologically enhanced utopia or technologically caused apocalypse.  The glance inside 
the unfolding performance reveals a mechanically rich dream.  machines’ technologies do 
not create furnishings of taste or decoration but rather the mobile liveliness of dreams.  In 
the machines’ dream, the performance could go further—perhaps neurotically.  I want 
more…more machines and mechanisms…more lively mobility—a compulsive 
integration of human bodies into the overly complex inefficient jerry-rigged reality.  The 
machines performance just begins to incorporate human bodies in systems of pulleys, 
levers, catapults, engines, and weights and in spaces where things seem to operate—as 
one character ironically states—“as if by magic.”  
 
Magic and Mastery  
The scientific and technological developments via machines in the 19
th
 century 
that brought enhanced capabilities for human work in mass-production and mass-
consumption also brought a renewed emphasis on spectacle and machine-enabled 
 136 
operations of magic in performance.  Scientific demonstrations were often staged as 
magical performances and theatrical performance utilized technological engineering to 
create magnificent dreamscapes for audiences.  The investment of science and art in 
technological development points towards the dialectic of enlightenment that Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno elucidate in the Dialectic of Enlightenment 
Philosophical Fragments.  Horkheimer and Adorno argue that myth—as a rational 
attempt to control nature rooted in mimetic and metaphysical practices of magic—is 
already enlightenment and that enlightenment—“the advance of thought…aimed at 
liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters”—reverts to myth 
because it is open to criticism as mere belief.
160
  In the dialectic of enlightenment, 
rational thought is subject to criticism as mere belief because it operates in a relationship 
between the subject that bestows meaning and the meaningless object—a relationship 
that comes to replace the many affinities between things that characterizes the world of 
myth and magic.
161
   
The dialectic of enlightenment demonstrates that both science and mimesis are 
invested in calculation and utility and therefore are also entangled in power and 
disciplinary forces.  Horkheimer and Adorno emphasize that human beings acquire their 
positions of power through a distancing of thought from relations with objects and stated 
that in the enlightened world, “objects are not accessible individually to our cognition in 
an imperfect and accidental way but are attained by a rational, systematically unified 
method which finally apprehends each object.”162  Whether under the rubric of art or 
science, thought therefore becomes a “mathematical apparatus” in which the in-itself 
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object becomes entrenched in a “substrate of domination.”  For Horkheimer and Adorno, 
the substrate of domination is pervasive even though the authors indicate that mimesis 
does not function with a distancing from the object that is integral to scientific 
methodology.  Significantly, art becomes science through a representationalist 
methodology that attempts to capture, identify, and classify an object of study and 
science becomes art situated as a journey of the imagination.   
Enlightenment—rather than a distinct historical era—indicates a set of operations 
indicative of a form of rationality that classifies and disenchants mythical 
“representation” of the world.  Horkheimer and Adorno argue that identification (a 
classification of the object in thought) replaces mimesis (a cognitive attempt to become 
like the object).  Herein, the conversion of nature into a malleable, manipulable, and 
classifiable material is bound up with a cognitive conversion in which nature is taken up 
in terms of representative examples that might be mastered rather than concrete affinities.  
In a reading of Homer’s The Odyssey, Horkheimer and Adorno critique the similarities 
and differences between ancient and modern rationality—suspending the conventional 
distinction between pre-capitalist and capitalist societies—in order to explicate the 
manner in which rationality is entangled in social domination and the domination of 
nature.
163
  The entanglement of domination and sociality—in which mastery over nature 
is bound to self-mastery and mastery over other humans—marks the capitalist mode of 
production and the “administered life” of late capitalism.  In the sociality of late 
capitalism, social life becomes more and more commodified and rationality more 
instrumental and identity driven—giving rise to a society in which domination and 
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capitalist production are inextricably intertwined despite social upheaval and significant 
resistances to domination. 
 The commodity form therefore becomes the structuring principle of society in late 
capitalism.
164
  The unceasing conversion of concrete into abstract labor perpetuates the 
production of exchange value—an abstract identification between non-identical objects 
that mediates access to needs and continually creates false needs.  In capitalist 
production, disparate and concrete use-values are abstracted as identical exchange-values 
that appear as a property of the commodity rather than human labor.  Alfred Sohn-Rethel 
explains that the separation of exchange-value from use-value situates exchange-value in 
an abstract physicality devoid of sensual qualities (in a quantitative differentiation and a 
conversion that occurs as a performance in people’s minds) that nonetheless arises from 
the real activity of exchange.  In a real abstraction, the negation of material physicality 
constitutes “the positive reality of the abstract social physicality of the exchange 
processes from which the network of society is woven.”165  Therefore, capitalism’s real 
abstractions constitute material forces that shape sociality and are tied to historical modes 
of production and exchange.  
Since domination concerns how the materials of life are abstracted, managed, 
produced, and consumed and how knowledge identifies, classifies, and reveals and 
conceals the concealing of the world—the manner in which any body is remapped and 
reconfigured cannot be construed as either participating in an autonomous symbiotic 
relational machine or participating in structures of domination, which decide whether a 
body is an accurate, appropriate, or a more complex achievement.
166
  Human-machine 
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relation will always be much more than the purported progress that is unduly assigned to 
mechanical and technological structures and mechanisms.  It is only through examining 
how machines are more than productive automations—engines of advancement—that it 
becomes possible to interface with and through machines and technologies in more 
thoughtful ways.  If new technologies become the new normal by which a human body 
might be represented as and engineered for optimum aptitude to the “fabrication of 
cellular, organic, genetic, and combinatory individuality,” what are the new procedures of 
control—the new ways of revealing—that get entangled in relations with others?167  If it 
is not possible to separate images of better more effective—fast and durable—
performance offered through and historically bound to machines and technology from the 
images in the machines performance of inefficient and inexpedient machines and 
technologies, then the question becomes how does scientific imagery and artistic imagery 
entangle and function together?   
While the machine mechanisms in 19
th
 century theatrical spectacles were hidden 
from view and aimed to create staging “as if by magic,” the performance of machines 
creates a spectacle out of the workings (or not workings) of the mechanisms and their 
movement.  Significantly, the spectacle of machines’ visible mechanisms does not bleed 
the “magic” from the machinery but heightens the sense of magic that the machines 
embody.  While magic in 19
th
 century spectacle hinges on the audience not knowing how 
the illusion works (but knowing that there is an illusion), magic in the 21
st
 century 
machines performance hinges on no one truly knowing how the mechanisms work 
despite their visibility and their status as real and illusory.  In foregrounding the kinetics 
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of the machinery, machines generates a sense of magic through an exposure that—rather 
than rendering everything knowable—reveals that the lively workings of machines 
cannot be completely and scientifically known, depended on, or engineered.  Whether a 
theatrical performance is invested in an illusion of reality enabled by machines and 
technology or in staging the mechanical in/corporeality of machinery—magic, machines, 
and technology are bound together in knowledge formations that mathematically 
construct the world as a fully identifiable and classifiable picture.  Therefore, the 
operations that produce magic can also produce a substrate of domination. 
The mechanisms in the machines performance incorporate human bodies into the 
contraption-sculpture and expand the contraption to the level of temporal-spatial 
residency.  Self-operating and trap doors along with secret passageways (one that 
apparently runs from the abyssal depths of a weathered couch to the cavity of a dated 
yellow oven) replace the “old simple schema of confinement and enclosure—thick walls, 
a heavy gate that prevents entering or leaving—[with] the calculation of openings, of 
filled and empty spaces, passages and transparencies.”168  On one hand, the dream of 
mechanical immersion might be a militarized dream of subordinated cogs in a machine 
subject to limitless forms of training.
169
  However, it might also be a dream of wonder at 
the intimacy and sensibility of invisible forces.  In this dream, I wonder—what if a 
human body finds gets stuck in the secrete chute that passes from the couch to the oven?  
What kind of mayhem might ensue? 
While the machines in the performance incorporate human action and behavior 
into step-by-step mechanisms, the machines are obviously and definitely not flawless.  
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They do not easily fall under the category of industrial-productive machinery nor do they 
always work appropriately.  The machines’ capacity to produce a substrate of domination 
is bound up with the production of excess and unpredictable movement and with 
knowledge as practice rather than product.  The Goldbergian machines are important not 
just for their capacity to ensure vigilance and security but also because they can never be 
forgotten—operating in a way that requires constantly figuring them out.  In fact, there 
are contraptions where a single character is the “only one who knows how it does what it 
does” if he actually can be said to know how it does what it does.  Even though each 
small machine appears to serve some kind of (sometimes quotidian) purpose—brushing 
one’s teeth, shaving, petting the cat, or torture (I mean investigative questioning with the 
aid of an electrical device)—the machines do not achieve the standards of efficient 
usefulness.  
The ridiculous embedding of performative actions such as shaving and petting the 
cat in petty yet complex mechanisms materializes actions that are emptied of or perhaps 
heightened in their conventionally prescribed utilitarian function.  These everyday actions 
drawn into the domain of art make a gesture towards performance art practices that have 
worked to keep the line between art and life fluid.  In particular, in the mid-to-late 20
th
 
century Happenings and Fluxus events along with new experiments in dance took up 
everyday actions as material for and in performance.  Responding in part to the 
increasingly abstract quality of modern experience, performance artists took up elements 
of everyday reality in order to subject them to operations that reinvest them in their own 
autonomous and concrete individual reality.  The performative actions in Fluxus events 
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and Happenings—often meant to be performed only once—confronted the loss of 
experience characteristic of capitalist society and performed a renouncement of all 
attempts to replicate and represent experience in favor of disrupting the recognizable 
order of reality that depended on a framework of instrumental utility and abstraction.  In 
the machines performance, the machines are not meant for efficient instrumental use that 
might order reality or for the pleasure of convenience.  They do however engage in 
purposeful action for a pleasure and knowledge that might be better described in terms of 
reaching new levels of the ridiculous while gesturing towards new levels of domination. 
While relational immersion operates outside the threat of Jon McKenzie’s “or 
else” as a threat of extraction that accompanies the challenge to perform, relational 
immersion does not operate outside the challenge of domination.  In other words, the 
threat of extraction carries no weight for a relational ontology but the threat of 
domination does.  If as Michel Foucault claims bio-power is indispensable to capitalism, 
in what way does the technology of bio-power achieve the insertion of human bodies into 
the machinery of domination?  Foucault explicates the technology of power over life as 
“centered on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, 
the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its 
integration into systems of efficient and economic controls.”170  In order to consider that 
bio-power impacts relational ontology it must be acknowledged that machines and 
technology help produce reality, which for Foucault is in fact an operation of power.  
Therefore, if bio-power is a power “to designate what brought life and its mechanisms 
into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of 
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transformation of human life,” art must not only deny utility it must also reject the 
distribution and transformation of life via explicit calculation and knowledge.
171
 
Although the characters in machines live in and inhabit a mechanized home that 
might be understood as a way of life—they are not comfortably “at home.”  In this type 
of vigilant waiting space, the restraining power gives itself up to the characters only 
insofar as they give their blood, sweat, and bodies to the machines.  “Such a dwelling can 
never feel like home, a place where [a character] might at last exclaim, ‘Here I am at 
home!’”172  However, while the characters wait and most likely have given their blood 
and sweat to the contraptions, their dwelling is not and is at home.  The characters belong 
and do not belong comfortably in the relational web.  Through inconvenience and 
discomfort, the characters (and actors) are and are not at home with machines and 
technology.
173
  In the production, the mode of habitation in the kinetic sculpture indicates 
a sort of specialized training.  While the specialized training required by the machines’ 
structure is both zealous and incompetent, the characters must have an embodied 
knowledge—a tinkering knowledge—in the planning and the physical operation of the 
space.  The surveying power of the production might be akin to Foucault’s explication of 
factory surveillance that accounts for the individual behavior of a worker through agents 
that detect “the slightest incompetence, [that] if left unnoticed and therefore repeated 
each day, may prove fatal to the enterprise.”174  However, I propose that the role of the 
surveying agent—in control, supervision, and inspection—fails to ensure that there is no 
productive loss in or fatality of the dominating enterprise. 
 
Failure 
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Machines and technology in part help fulfill promises of—usually human 
centered—progress and advancement.  While not inherent in machines and technology, 
the vision of a better world and a better body is achieved through an objective science 
that has the capacity to reveal the entirety of the world set on a historical and continuous 
trajectory of human advancement that disregards historical and epistemological 
domination.  Machines and technology can participate in and promote systems of 
domination under the rubric of a science that methodologically renders every thing 
knowable in human terms.  In fulfilling this role, machines and technology are heralded 
as the crux of human progress and are promoted for their supposedly inherent and 
increasing productivity and performance.  Technological alterations do not guarantee 
improved conditions—just different and adapted conditions.  Since even a dry metal 
substrate is subject to toxin build up, deterioration, and failure—“corrective” 
technological measures likely replace one malfunctioning system or part with another.  In 
other words, failure is inevitable and relationally rooted. 
The machines’ machines persistently malfunction and fail.  Even though as 
Benjamin writes, “[p]ractice is eliminated from the productive process by machinery”—
failure reinstalls and revitalizes it.
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 As The Chief Commander, Phinneas, and Liam 
practice and play with machines, the audience garners simple pleasures from minor 
machinic accomplishments and boisterous amusements in their reoccurring failures.  
When some thing is not quite appropriately aligned, when a thing weighs too much or too 
little, when an angle needs to be oblique or perhaps is too narrow, or when a movement 
does not occur in a timely manner—adjustments must be made.  In the machines’ web, 
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there is no fail-safe—no stop that allows production to get back up and running with little 
consequence.  Phinneas must aim the bottle of juice and pull the rope again and again and 
again and again…and again—and with a little bit of help from Liam—before landing the 
clear plastic bottle in the bin.  Improper performance is a value in this mechanical 
system.  There is no distinction between being on-line and going off-line.  Everything is 
process—no fail-safe, no quality assurance, no diagnoses made, no safety procedures.  
machines works as an assemblage—functioning, doing, and creating with and in the 
midst of failure.  There are no fail-safe mechanisms to protect timely and effective 
production.  Here, value does not rest in minimizing damaging deviations but rather in 
continuous adjustments in the process of deviation.  Evaluating performance as either a 
“proper success” or an “improper failure” is to disregard the complex and tiny 
imperceptible un-circuited ongoing adjustments that (human and more-than-human) 
bodies make according to continually changing conditions in complex environments—or 
in other words in an unfolding embedded relation with others.   
Machines—whether they are run by skilled machinists or constructed by 
Goldbergian enthusiasts—are entangled in notions of in/efficient and in/convenient 
automation and productivity.  How machines and technology generate and embody 
automation and productivity depends in part on how machines and technology work to 
produce a common object and are impelled by hierarchizing, centralizing, and negotiating 
powers.  Even though the machines performance stages an all-encompassing interiority 
and mechanical organism, the machines do not operate in an uninterrupted production of 
a commodified object.
176
  If a human actor immersed with machines and technology 
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makes adjustments without trying to avert the conflicts and the anxieties of things-not-
working, the value and principle of negotiation—which requires practical application of 
creativity—is affirmed.   The moments of negotiation necessitated by things-not-
working—whether humorous, frustrating, cruel, or boring—reveal the affective capacity 
of mechanical assemblages (and of performance as a becoming rather than a distinct 
anthropocentrically defined commodity object).  These moments—of negotiation and 
creativity—occur in part when “our machines [and knowledge formations] don’t work” 
in conditions where “mechanical failure is not a matter of if but of when.”177  These 
failures often become the biggest human inconvenience and fear.  Convenience is the 
engine not of machines but of the capitalist structuring of relation as commodity.  One of 
the more subtle questions that the performance and machines raise is how in/convenience 
permeates relation with others.  The convenient—and conspicuous—capacity to tweet, 
poke, and post via the Internet as evidence of a distinctly identifiable relation contrasts 
the operations in the performance that inconveniently circulate mis/information 
concerning the other “them out there,” which gestures towards relation as the often 
inconvenient occurring that keeps happening between and heterogeneous to us.   
Through Rainpan 43’s clown play machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines, machines, machines—I examined the entanglement of domination and 
relation.  I argued that the performance’s kinetic junk sculpture stages a lively immersion 
of human embodiment with machines and technology that despite being bound up in a 
substrate of domination generates wonder and a sense of magic.  I further argued that the 
ridiculous contraptions require a tinkering knowledge—a knowledge “formation” that is 
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ongoing practice—and that failure mobilizes and revitalizes knowledge as practice rather 
than product.  I further take up the relation-domination entanglement with the 2006/2007 
rehearsal-performance processes of Heiner Müller’s Die Hamletmaschine (1977).  In 
contrast to taking up the question of how performance operates relationally at the nexus 
of human-machine involvement through the machines performance that I attended as an 
audience member, I build on the argument in the next section from the perspective as a 
director participating in the rehearsal-performance processes of Die Hamletmaschine.  I 
argue with the last site of this chapter that a relationally oriented director emphasizes 
practice and unfolding ungraspable relation with others over and above product and 
authoritarian domination.  Herein, the in/distinct relations unfolding in making 
performance—not oriented towards product but as embodied process—are rooted in risk, 
conflict, care, vulnerability, and failure.  I also argue that performance as a making with 
others that is relationally rooted and unfolding cannot be synthesized into a generally 
applicable model because of the ungraspable and mobile quality of relation.  
 
Practicing Machine 
While machines and technology point towards industrialization and the growing 
influence of simulation, the machinic as a relational process is not limited to or originated 
from a technologized or simulated existence.
178
  New and hybrid groupings and 
fragmented subjectivities generated through capitalist and machinic modes of 
productivity animate a postmodern landscape.  Heiner Müller’s play text Die 
Hamletmaschine (1977) confronts the complexity of this landscape and breaks with the 
view of history as a continuum of continuous progress ensconced in the coherent drama 
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of a stable and masterful subject.  I interpret the play as signaling the failure of 
intellectual commitment to ineluctable progress and to prescribed social roles in a 
fragmented and discontinuous historiography that is wrought with suffering and violence 
that cannot be relegated to the past.  
Heiner Müller’s Die Hamletmaschine (1977) is a particularly difficult text to 
work with.  The text emphasizes a history of progress as a patriarchal endeavor in which 
dead fathers, dead ideologies, and dead thought are reconstituted and consumed.   On the 
landscape of a fragmented historiography, the failure of revolution and alternatives to 
capitalism become evident in ongoing and reoccurring domination, suffering, and 
violence.  The implications of destabilized subjectivity and the affects of domination on 
bodies and relations are not limited to the text but permeate the rehearsal space as well.  
In a contemporary moment, the capitalist extension of market relations to social relations 
and production of ideology ad nauseam—supporting the status quo and promoting the 
occupation of the imagination and experience by images and slogans—are familiar 
embodied experiences relevant to creative practice.  Because the play is intertwined with 
the immediate empirical world within which a performance is made, the fragmented 
landscape and terror—in particular Ophelia’s silencing and voice of terror—portrayed in 
the text magnifies the weight of the textual images carried within and through the bodies 
participating in the rehearsal-performance process.  Although it is not possible or 
desirable to fully understand the text, as part of a creative process it is important to think 
and move through it—not to resolve the questions it raises but to confront them.   
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I do not specifically take up an analysis of Müller’s text—which has been 
extensively analyzed in scholarship—but the rehearsal-performance process for the play 
in which I took on the role of a director.
179
  While I in part take up Jerzy Grotowski’s 
Towards a Poor Theatre as a lens through which I might understand the process of 
performance creation and production, I would like to suggest that the creative-relational 
practice of performance making is a practice of “the self with others” in which “others” 
indicates not just the human but moreover a whole perceptual and relational field in 
which many others are embedded.  Since capitalist modes of productivity and abstraction 
are interwoven with relational processes that proliferate in webs of complexity, a critical 
approach to history and materialist analysis—such as in evident in Müller’s work—draws 
attention to the contradictions and entanglements of capitalism and the machinic.  The 
critical modality operating within the play text in which the debris of history exposes 
historical contradictions, emphasizes the irreconcilability of the subject and object, and 
confronts all forms of identity thinking aligns with Theodor Adorno’s immanent critique 
in negative dialectics and therefore is in tension with Grotowski’s phenomenological 
approach to performance that risks reifying and abstracting performance in a 
correspondence between the actor and the spectator.
180
  However, a phenomenology 
wrought with the tensions and fragments important to historical materialism works not to 
solidify performance in a coherent and stable identity but to understand more critically 
and complexly performance-making embedded in the relational and empirical world and 
subjectivities-bodies within the world.   
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I understand relationality for my practice as a “director” as the ungraspable web 
of living relations in which art is immersed and from which art emerges.  I take up 
relationality in my practice not as a practical and theoretical device that artists utilize for 
artistic production from which the relational inter-human world comes but instead as a 
process through which art—which includes the human and the more-than-human—enacts 
its living and historical embeddedness in and emergence from the relational world.  
Therefore, I do not emphasize—as Nicholas Bourriaud does in Relational Aesthetics—
that art is primarily a product of human labor rooted in the exploration of inter-human 
social bonds.  In my understanding, art—in particular performance—does not “stitch 
together the relational fabric” as Bourriaud suggests.  I would instead emphasize that art’s 
proposals (for living in a shared world) generate to varying extents material and critical 
impacts (that emerge from the relational fabric) through a capacity for affect and 
thought—which in turn informs how I think and create.  Therefore, I would suggest that 
aesthetics and ethics—in my understanding of my “own” performance practice—are 
intimately bound together in particular as they are both rooted in thinking and affecting.  
However, I would also like to suggest that this thinking and affecting is not bound to a 
centralized human figure, director, or author—any unified and identified ontological 
category—that employs the relational as a tactic but rather is embedded in the materiality 
of encounter.  This does not absolve any particular human—and moreover myself—from 
acts of thinking and affecting but revitalizes the ethical import of proposing and 
producing social order and resistances to social order through any normatized or 
alternative artistic-material vision of social relations.  My inquiry therefore makes a 
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gesture towards new possibilities for thinking performance and performance ontology, 
which is relevant to creative and critical processes. 
Often creative processes such as in theatre and performance include an implicit 
invitation—would you like to work on a production with me?  Seemingly a simple 
question, not worthy of much attention.  Would you like to participate on a project with 
us?  The invitation is meaningful not as often thought in its capacity to establish the 
parameters and roles of participants, but rather in its foregrounding of participants 
situated within a whole field of individuals on an unfolding creative journey.  The 
invitation is not meant just to fill a role: actor, director, or set designer—where 
hierarchies of involvement will be tested and played out—but it is, perhaps more 
importantly, the acknowledgement of an ongoing and unfolding relation infused with 
intimacy, vulnerability, conflict, and care.  Shifting emphasis from audition to 
invitation—and more importantly from production to process—the many and diverse 
moments of working “with” are the enduring and activating moments of the interpersonal 
more-than-human relationality that comprise a creative process.  Cultivating, fueling, and 
caring for these ongoing and unfolding relation is paradoxically one of the fundamental 
roles of a director, a role that informs and reaches far beyond the decision of whether an 
actor should move downstage right or upstage left. 
In The Courage to Create, Rollo May explicates the creative process as a creative 
and material encounter with the world.  He claims that, “[the] world is interrelated with 
the person at every moment…one can never localize creativity as a subjective 
phenomenon, one can never study it simply in terms of what goes on within the 
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person.”181  When creativity is understood to be an encounter and participation with the 
world in which many persons—many unfolding bodies—are immersed at every moment 
and that world is in part a scripted one laden with a history of domination and violent 
imagery intertwined with a contemporary world shaped in part through capitalist 
alienation and abstraction, the choices that a director makes in guiding the process in 
making performance are weighted with ethical considerations and questions.  How far is 
too far?  How much is too much?  How much can or should a director ask of others? 
It was an unbearably hot and humid July day.  We—the (human) actors—ran, 
crossing the Washington Avenue Bridge in Minneapolis back and forth, relentlessly, 
beyond the point of exhaustion wanting a cooling rain that might ease the oppressive air.  
Two hours and forty-three minutes. There was no such reprieve.  While the intention 
during rehearsal was to experiment with what a body is capable of doing when pushed 
past its limits—to ask how a human body inhabits the text when physically and mentally 
breaking down—an unintended consequence occurred in the form of a heightened sense 
of others forming and transforming around and through the project.  We ran, pressing 
against bodily limits, alone and together—and with the surrounding landscape.182  One 
person resorted to a monotonous repetition of circling a light pole; another resisted with 
tension in the body; another dripped profusely with sweat from inexorable movement.  
Several campus security officers convened to check on what they had likely observed on 
security cameras and suspected as questionable behavior.  Others found different ways to 
move through and participate in the exercise.   
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While the security officers did not exert any physical or verbal force over us, their 
presence served to make evident a power—and the role of surveillance as a form of 
domination—that works to govern in/appropriate behavior and to control how any one is 
expected to act within a particular environment.  While our strange behavior did not go 
unnoticed by surveillance systems that attempt to determine what the relations within the 
landscape are supposed to look like and how relations are supposed to unfold, our 
relentless running engaged with the surroundings—the oppressive heat, the still air, the 
concrete circularity of the pavement, the officers imposition—in a struggle that gestures 
towards unhindered involvement with others.  Relationality for performance as process 
continually takes shape in the midst of operations of domination and through how each 
person (human and more-than-human) perceptibly and imperceptibly adjusts to a 
multitude of perceptual and ever-varying factors—in the anecdote, how an actor finds a 
way to work through an exercise, how a director finds a way not only how to shape but 
also to participate in the complexity of process, or even how the oppressively hot air on a 
July day finds a way to release its humidity. 
In Towards a Poor Theatre, Jerzy Grotowski frames theatre as a communion that 
hinges on the actor’s struggle for authenticity.  For Grotowski, via negativa—the 
stripping away of obstacles that prohibit sincerity and self-exposure—allows the 
authentic impulse to rise out of the human body in the moment of creation.  To strip-
away naturalized behavior and choices to access the impulses that enliven an intangible 
and tangible relation with the world is the aspect of art that emphasizes process over 
product.  Even though Grotowski specifically references an actor-spectator relation in 
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Towards a Poor Theatre, I would like to suggest that the complexity of relation in a 
creative practice of performance is defined less by the actor-spectator binary than by the 
immersion of many diverse human and more-than-human bodies in Grotowski’s 
perceptual direct communion.  The network of relation in this communion is so complex 
and so subject to unpredictable variables as to make simple one-to-one correspondences 
unsound.  Instead, the creative process and the relation that unfolds in process—what 
bodies are capable of doing—is open to and becomes a catalyst for a multitude of 
perceptible and imperceptible actions, thoughts, affects, personal factors, and complex 
environments.  These factors inform the ethically laden exercises and experimentations 
that a director helps shape with others in a rehearsal-performance. 
A communal creative process that is more-than-human grows—in the midst of 
existing reality—in the midst of dysfunctional social relations, industrial factories, 
capitalist exchanges, and techno-scientific developments and scientific endeavors.
183
  A 
shared creative process builds in silent knowing, in failures of knowledge, and moves in 
strange and continually unfolding embodiments and materialities that might be accepted 
and/or rejected.  The exchanges manifest in part in the material world as a bruise or 
scrape or crack in human and more-than-human bodies—sometimes as a wound with bits 
of trauma embedded in the flesh.  Alongside and with trauma, the pleasure of a shared 
creative process can in part be enjoyed in the practice of eating together.  Considering 
that the word companion comes from the root com panis (with bread), a human actor is 
not participating in a process that has at its center the human being—bread does not only 
bind together human-human relations.  Rather, the emphasis falls on the preposition 
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“with,” which is the tie that binds together and unfolds a multitude of bodies (including 
bread) in an ongoing embedded relationality.  Sharing sustenance or food during a 
creative process reinforces the companionship and care of creative work.  The act of 
breaking bread together with other humans is a sacred and ritualized act that has a 
complex history—tied to domination and mastery—that crosses many cultures and many 
religions.  In the 2006 Die Hamletmaschine rehearsal-performance process for the 
Xperimental Theatre at the University of Minnesota, most of the production team, cast, 
and crew gathered nearly weekly in a home to share a meal.  The invitational aspect of 
creative work is again reinforced—share this home, share this environment, share this 
life, help prepare food for sustenance.  Taking in food together is a consecration of a 
bond that realizes sharing in the midst of difficult work—in the midst of a complex web 
of relation.  It is also a gift that a director can offer to those who give so much in making 
a performance. 
In part, the gift that an actor makes is an embodied one.  Grotowski describes the 
human actor’s contact with himself as, “an extreme confrontation, sincere, disciplined, 
precise and total—not merely a confrontation with his thoughts, but one involving his 
whole being.”184  Pressing against the limits of physicality through an intense 
confrontation of embodiment and of being as they are entrenched in habits might bring an 
actor to the point of collapse or to the point of revelation.  The strength of an embodied 
gift that realizes and materializes the complexity and difficulty of relation can affect 
another to the point of shock.  We only come to materialize and know what a creative 
 156 
process is capable of through the embodied relations that human and more-than-human 
participants enter into, emerge from, and unfold within. 
At the end of the Die Hamletmaschine performance, the three Ophelia actors 
rested on the dirty floor, tightly and completely wrapped in bedsheets.  Duct-taped.  The 
lights came up and the sound of the industrial machine returned from the start of the 
show, signaling an invitation for the audience to exit.  One night, an audience member 
inadvertently stepped on one of the Ophelia actors: a seemingly careless—probably 
accidental gesture—tearing at the actor’s sense of belonging with the audience.  
Overcome with emotion—shaking, crying, and sobbing—she said, “It was like I wasn’t 
even there.”  The actor was deeply affected.  The erupting emotion gestures toward a 
complex and unfathomable relation that cannot be distinctly defined or constructed as a 
model for actor-audience interaction that might be characteristic of a particular kind of 
theatre or performance.  The relations that comprise a creative process are not merely a 
group of individuals determined by a given and distinctly identifiable configuration and 
quantity of human members.  Performance making beyond the boundaries of production 
and distinct roles is comprised of, and perpetually depends on, ongoing indistinct 
relations that unfold through an embodied exchange of thought and energy—and so many 
imperceptible and unknowable affects and integrated aspects. 
Machines and technology magnify the tension between product and process—
participation and domination.  While a rehearsal process is often focused on a product 
that must be shown to a public, approaching process as an ongoing relation between 
many human and more-than-human bodies not only ruptures the hierarchically organized 
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roles and the opposition between rehearsal and production it also shifts connectivity from 
the potentially alienating disconnectedness of cogs-in-a-machine to a respectful, 
discordant, and challenging relational immersion of many unfolding bodies practicing 
together.  By attending to how not just human bodies engage with each other and with the 
surrounding world in subtle and gregarious shifts, a director emphasizes everyone and 
everything as integral to and continually offering distinct and indistinct contributions to a 
rehearsal-performance making process.  The director’s role in a relationally rooted 
creative process is one of leadership in the form of service.  A relationally oriented 
director must be able to guide with responsibility, curiosity, and adaptability while being 
a negotiator and decision-maker without being a dictator.  The director must strive to 
cultivate inspiration, motivation, and an environment that nurtures the courage to risk 
new experimentation and embodiment without and with fear.   
For Grotowski, the human actor’s embodied experimentation is made in love—
more specifically a love of nothing that allows the sacrifice to extend infinitely outward 
and in ecstasy.  The work of performance making can be a painful encounter and 
exposure and therefore can also be a sacred and transforming experimentation.  For 
human actors, self-consciousness and self-doubt can hinder an un-occluded relation—
which unfolds in part through creative corporeal-emotional adjustments.  These 
adjustments can be subject to perceived inadequacies, shame, and anxieties that have 
been inflicted on and carried in embodiment—unwittingly reinforced by a view of the 
human body (and other bodies) as the contaminated, potentially destructive, opposing-
force to the human mind.  The rational and willful control exerted over a human or more-
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than-human body in order to contain its mess—its vital mess—manifests for a human 
actor as a repression of emotional-corporeal responses in containment of one’s openness 
to others, which is integral to creativity.  Oftentimes this mess permeates a human body 
in terms of trauma experienced outside the rehearsal-performance space—but which is 
nonetheless still part of the process.  The violence that is endemic in society—from actual 
physical assault to pervasive alienation tied to technology—affects the capacity to trust in 
and depend on oneself and others in a whole perceptual and relational field in a creative 
process.  In the rehearsal-performance process—where intimacy and trust is critical to the 
formation and re-formation of bonds—thoughtfully dealing with the mess of and around 
all bodies is essential for accessing the creative potential inherent in interpersonal and 
inter-body more-than-human relation.  A director can choose to reinforce shame by 
emphasizing inadequacies or choose to model empathetic care that encourages risk and 
careful open conflict and contact with others. 
The Die Hamletmaschine text articulates a history of violence and missed 
opportunities through the characters’ traumatic attempts at fulfillment of traditional social 
roles and relationships.  In trying to work and think through this particular aspect of the 
text, we struggled through an exercise that modeled repeated and unremitting physical 
domination—pitting male actors with weapons against female actors.  A male actor took 
a break to sort through the thoughts that were coming up for him in the exercise.  Upon 
return, he pulled me aside and said, “Malin, I don’t know how to deal with this.  What 
should I do?” to which I replied, “I’m sorry, I can’t help you.  I’m not here to make this 
okay for you.”  It might seem that the better response would have been to make the 
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exercise and experience easier by trying to make the actor feel better—perhaps to say that 
the weapons are just props or that the play is just a text.  That this is just a rehearsal.  That 
this is just a performance.  This is not real.  However, an empathetic “I can’t help you” in 
the right moment recognizes that struggle is a valued experience to have in the work—in 
this unfolding relationality and reality—that struggle is allowed and that the one who is 
struggling is both alone and not alone.  Embodied empathy practiced with others is one 
avenue by which encounters can be cultivated that challenge capitalist abstraction, 
alienation, and automatism.  Empathy makes possible a profound relationality that 
compels an ethics that is equal to the companionable ties that bind bodies together in the 
midst of separation. 
Just as the empathetic “I can’t help you” is integral to performance process, “I 
don’t know” is also vital.  Müller’s stage directions state in part, “The dance grows faster 
and wilder.  Laughter from the coffin.  On a swing, the Madonna with breast cancer.  
Horatio opens an umbrella, embraces Hamlet . . . The breast cancer radiates like a 
sun.”185  I do not know.  I don’t know how to stage this.  I don’t know what it means.  
Perhaps, the most vulnerable and powerful moment for a relationally oriented 
director is the moment of saying and embodying “I don’t know.”  Unfortunately, often 
this moment is pushed past, filled up, or outright denied.  As David Brooks claims, 
“Human beings are overconfidence machines.”186  Prolonging, attending to, and 
admitting I don’t know for a director goes against a common model of the director as the 
single authoritative and dominating expert in the room.  However, a director that realizes 
the importance of not knowing—of enduring uncertainty at length—shows that a 
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performance scholar and artist must be open to failure and to unexpected possibilities and 
must be willing to leave behind bias in order to wait for the “right move” to show itself.  
This approach often creates conflict because cultivating “I don’t know” challenges 
human actors to release their desire to follow a single dominant leader who commands 
with a quick decisive and rational voice.  Herein, a director is vulnerable.  The capacity to 
be vulnerable—in failing and not knowing—nurtures the dynamic and magnetic intimacy 
of ongoing relationality.  If a director is vulnerable and maintains his or her vulnerability 
as an essential aspect of the practicing and producing process, a director emphasizes the 
risk and safety of becoming vulnerable with others and with the project in an ongoing 
relation.  Paradoxically, a kind of safety is the ground upon which a human body can risk 
going past its limits—upon which a human body can risk being unsafe.  Herein, a director 
asks human actors to embrace fear in process with others—not to push past fear but to 
remain open, to embrace fear in moments where we lose hold of what we know or think 
we know, where we must risk going into the unknown with others. 
I approach this work as part of a way of living in the world with an openness to 
others (and to being affected)—which has a fundamental and artful relationship to time 
and materiality.  However, this relationship is not a model that I can outline because it is 
worked and reworked in terms of my self (with others) making—continually listening 
and adjusting to the ever-varying, contradictory, and ungraspable who or what emerging 
and becoming in encounter.  Perhaps this relationality is one in which we are all in this 
together (a flexible field of performance and inquiry rooted in the world) in which our 
roles and lives are not compartmentalized and institutionalized in a comparative and 
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hierarchical structure.  Perhaps it is a relationality in which everything and everybody 
offers something of import (and irreducible difference) to the process of thinking-making 
and living and dying.  Perhaps a relationality that opens a space for risk, critical 
respectful engagement, and conflict that is not destructive but transformative.  Perhaps a 
relationality that is not about doing a job but cultivating time, thought, and life with 
others.  Not a gesture towards a utopian future—a set of relations that we might see in the 
future—but a material encounter set within and intimately bound to an already existing 
reality, not upright nor utopian but living and complex.
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In going back over my rehearsal notes in the Die Hamletmaschine process, I 
notice that I wrote for the human actors numerous times “open to the audience.”  In 
making our performance of Die Hamletmachine, the audience—not just a live human 
audience—was always there, even when they are not supposedly physically present.  As a 
relationally embedded director, I emphasize throughout the process that a performance is 
made with a boundless audience—that the audience is a companion on a relational 
journey.  As touch, laughter, confusion, conflict, and much more unfolds—the work is 
created with an audience long before a show it opens and long after it closes.  Heiner 
Müller stated once in an interview, “A collective experience is not easy to define.  Let’s 
bring another bottle of whiskey, it will make it easier...This is a real problem and we 
should give ourselves time to address it.”188  The problems of collective embodied 
encounter, connectivity, participation, and domination in relation are not easy and are 
often addressed without resolution.  So—although I cannot offer you, the reader, any 
whiskey—there are three questions that I posed to the human actors in the Die 
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Hamletmaschine rehearsal-performance process that I will end the chapter with here—
what do you want, what do you give, how are you—an unfolding body among many 
other bodies—relationally here?189 
meanwhile  
the sounds of machines resume 
the organic gulp, gasp, and murmur of machinic amplifications 
the atmospheric ophelia-hamlet-machine, which might be 
the screams of one million monkeys, the roar of one million lions 
of one million sinners  
being dragged to hell”190 
 
Conclusion: The Entanglement of Domination and Webs of Complexity in 
Performance 
I took up the clown play machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, 
machines, machines (2008) and the 2006/2007 rehearsal-performance processes of Die 
Hamletmaschine (1977) in order to examine how performance as a relational process 
operates at the nexus of human-machine/technology encounter.  In this chapter, I argued 
that relationality in symbiotic webs of complexity cannot be disentangled from 
domination.  While a technologized existence promises the infinite potential of melding 
different technologically endowed and impacted human bodies into new and unthought 
possibilities, with technological immersion comes new and uncertain realities.  In modern 
technology’s challenge to master—notions of techno-machinic enabled automation and 
efficiency are caught up in a historical vision that appears to guarantee the certainty of 
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human progress.  However, machines and technology betray the contained, ordered, 
circuited, and engineered qualities attributed to them in a utilitarian and perfectible 
functioning.  The overly complicated Goldbergian machines that comprise the kinetic 
junk sculpture that the characters inhabit in the machines performance challenge the 
notion that machines and technology are efficient and convenient tools for human 
productivity, automation, and mastery.  I argued that the multiple, spontaneous, and 
repeated failures of complex machinery create a sense of wonder and ridiculousness that 
is in tension with a substrate of domination—a system of discipline and surveillance that 
attempts to instill a hierarchical structure of productivity and proper performance in part 
through standards of calculability and utility.  I also argued that failure mobilizes and 
revitalizes practice and knowledge as process rather than product.  Additionally, I took up 
the rehearsal-performance process of Die Hamletmaschine as a director—an embodied 
figure of the irresolvable tension between hierarchical domination and embedded 
relation.  The performance-production-process provided an opportunity to think through 
how performance emerges from relational process with others and how a director—often 
a dominating force and authority figure—can nurture the relational over conventionalized 
hierarchical structures.  I argued that a director emphasizes invitation over audition, 
process over product, vulnerability, empathy, and persistent uncertainty in process that in 
turn shapes encounter with others in moments of conflict and care.  I worked to 
demonstrate that domination is not necessarily sustained by technology and machinery 
but through the mechanization and commodification of relation in a form of automatism 
that neglects to act with care—not recognizing that the relational is the foundation for 
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(research and performance) practice and that relation is not a reified product (of practice) 
or a commodity form.
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Chapter Four:  
“Following Landscapes” 
 
 
I want to become and be a body with its eyes just 
open wide, a body tensed to the snapping point in 
response to the majestic landscape around it. 
Hijikata Tatsumi 
 
  
 In the previous chapters, I focused on the question of how performance operates 
as a becoming at the nexus of human-animal encounter in Chapter One, human-object 
encounter in Chapter Two, and human-machine/technology encounter in Chapter Three.   
In Chapter Four, I take up performances of the movement artists Eiko and Koma in order 
to further think through the complexity of how performance operates as a becoming—an 
immersive relationality that continuously unfolds—at the nexus of human-landscape 
encounter.  I examine three performances—The Caravan Project (1999 - 2013), Naked 
(2010 – 2012), and River (1995 – 2011)—in order to theorize relationally understood 
performance in terms of a practice of wayfinding/following.
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A Wayfinding Practice 
A Landscape of Belonging 
Beyond a Frame 
Questions concerning how belonging in the world impacts theatre and 
performance scholarship and practice are particularly taken up in the field of performance 
ecology.  Performance ecology emerges from an intersection between diverse fields of 
study including performance studies, theatre studies, ecology, and ecocriticism.  In 
particular, ecocritism developed primarily as literary critique in which the study of 
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literature shifted from an anthropocentric focus to a focus on nature and the 
environmental aspects of literary materials.  Performance ecology takes up ecocriticism’s 
shift towards environmental concerns in the fields of performance and theatre studies.  In 
the Introduction to Performance Ecology Theresa May and Wendy Arons call for new 
approaches for thinking about and making theatre with an ecological sensibility.  May 
and Arons describe this sensibility as a sensibility that makes community and ecological 
reciprocity the foundation for making and thinking theatre.  They outline several eco-
dramaturgical approaches that deal with eco-political issues, which include “telling 
effective stories about the earth’s environment…flesh[ing] out connections between 
resource use, economic policy, and impact on humans and land… presentation and 
representation of nonhuman animals in performance… [and] reconsidering historical 
theater texts and performance with attention to the anthropocentric ecologically hostile 
attitudes that they normatize.”193  The primary concern of my inquiry—to think 
performance as a becoming or ongoing relationality—also looks to the insights that 
performance has on embeddedness or belonging in the world and the insights that 
embededness offers for thinking performance relationally as a becoming beyond 
normatized anthropocentric framing of the nature of performance as rooted in the human 
body performing “live.”  Reconceptualizing performance as a becoming, challenges the 
notion that art divides human beings and human culture from nature.  The movement 
artists Eiko and Koma offer a body of work that does not aim at cultural interpretations of 
and separation from the natural world but demonstrates performance as immersion in and 
participation with the world.
194
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 I take up Eiko and Koma’s performance Naked in order to consider how artistic 
and cultural framing is entwined with performance that can be understood relationally.  I 
begin with Naked because the performance is in part an indoor installation within a 
gallery setting during the opening hours of a museum or art center.  Naked is a Walker 
Art Center commissioned work that was developed during a residency at the Park 
Avenue Armory in New York City during the summer and fall of 2010.
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  Eiko and 
Koma performed Naked at the Walker Art Center November 2
nd
 through the 30
th
 in 2012 
during the hours of 11am to 5pm Tuesday through Sunday and 3 to 9pm on Thursday.  I 
visited Naked on two occasions—a Thursday evening and for the entire last day of the 
performance.  The month-long living installation was set within the exhibition Event 
Horizon, which displayed works from the Walker’s collection.  The pairing marked the 
substantial 30-year history that Eiko and Koma had up to that point with the Walker Art 
Center.  
While many of Eiko and Koma’s performances take place outside, the setting of 
Naked within a gallery draws attention to the question of how placement within an indoor 
institutional setting dedicated to art presentation helps frame a performance differently 
than an outdoor setting.  While outdoor performances in public spaces are open to 
passersby and bystanders that do not necessarily expect to see an artwork performed in 
areas that are not set up or set aside for art presentation, an art center patron expects to 
view art in their visit.  However, patrons visiting the Walker unaware of Eiko and 
Koma’s installation prior to their visit would not necessarily have expected to view a 
living installation of live human bodies in a gallery that typically displays art such 
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paintings, sculptures, and multi-media works.  While an outdoor performance might 
disrupt the normal flow of traffic on a public sidewalk, Eiko and Koma’s Naked disrupts 
the typical use of a gallery for the display of artwork that does not entail live human 
performers.  Still, the institutional setting provides a frame with which any artwork 
including live performance might be understood as a representation or reflection upon the 
world that exists outside the gallery; thereby, setting up the institution of art presentation 
as outside rather than immersed within the world—a perspective that might become more 
immediately apparent in an outdoor setting.  The institutional framing in Eiko and 
Koma’s Naked is part of the landscape in which the performance unfolds.196  
In general, the indoor gallery differs significantly from an outdoor area.  Artists 
and curators construct atmospheric elements like light and sound in a gallery.  In an 
outdoor performance, the performers might add elements such as lighting and sound but 
there are no walls or doors that delimit or completely control the staging area.  In contrast 
to many outdoor performances, a gallery performance oftentimes comes with an 
admission fee that helps cover the costs of providing the artwork to the audience or 
museum visitor.  One way to think of an indoor gallery is as a construction: newly 
painted white walls, clean floors, conditioned or heated air, and written and unwritten 
rules governing the behavior expected from patrons.  This construction contrasts outdoor 
environments—which also come with a set of rules that govern human behavior—in 
which mutable qualities in a landscape such as weather, sound, and spontaneous 
movement more obviously come to bear upon how a performance unfolds.  The 
institutional support given an artwork—whether indoors or outdoors—gives artists a level 
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of support and standing within a human community.  While indoor and outdoor 
performances emerge from relationality far beyond a distinct human community, the 
contrast between an indoor institutional setting and an outdoor setting—that can also be 
institutionally framed—draws attention to the controlling and representational function 
that an institution of culture can perform in determining what qualifies as performance 
and in determining how human people interact with performance.   
Eiko and Koma’s Naked ruptures the constructive rule that a gallery space is set 
apart from real bodies for the display of representations of real bodies.  The performance 
makes the patrons of the art center reconsider their relationship to the artwork and their 
place within the gallery space.  While under normal circumstances a patron might spend 
thirty seconds viewing a painting before moving on to another artwork in the gallery, the 
placement of Eiko and Koma’s performance within the gallery questions the very notion 
of placing artwork within an institutional frame for brief and inconsiderate viewing.  
Likewise, in situating Eiko and Koma’s performance within an exhibition of the Walker’s 
permanent collection, the Walker not only draws attention to the longstanding 
relationship that the art center has with Eiko and Koma but also indicates that the art 
institution is not a fixed frame for displaying artwork but is involved in an ongoing and 
living relation with artworks and artists.  When the rules that govern how a gallery space 
is supposed to operate—outside the externally located real world—patrons (and the art 
center) are asked to rethink their relation with art and are required to adjust to unexpected 
ruptures in the normal configurations for engaging with art.  In other words, patrons must 
find a different way to consider and to engage with his/her surroundings.  Taken as rooted 
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in relation, a docent or patron might be sad to see a painting go into storage as much as 
he/she is sad to see Eiko and Koma leave the Walker.  The gallery staging of Eiko and 
Koma’s performance draws out the tension between a cultural frame that delimits art as 
representing the real world and a frame as an opening and entanglement with and within 
the world.  The manner in which the performance of Naked is framed has the potential of 
closing off and/or opening up intimacy and vulnerability that is integral to a practice of 
attuning with one’s surroundings.  On one hand, Naked is overwrought with frames.  On 
the other, Naked unfolds within a whole landscape of living relations.   
In situating landscape as a new frame for thinking on modern theatre, Una 
Chaudhuri outlines the complicated history and usage of the term landscape and its 
connection to the debate on art as empirical reality or as representation.  Chaudhuri 
indicates landscape as a new critical spatial paradigm for understanding theatre instead of 
the less grounded paradigm of space and the less environmental and imaginatively 
constituted paradigm of place.  Chaudhuri marks the division between landscape as 
environment in geography and landscape as discourse in the humanities.  In the 
humanities, landscape is a text that can be read—“communicative devices that encode 
and transmit information” that can be decoded through conventions.197  Particularly in the 
genre of landscape painting, landscape becomes a framing or staging of geography 
ushering in a division between sensuous materiality and symbolic construction that 
depends on the opposition between human beings and nature.  Chaudhuri argues that the 
equation of landscape painting with perspective—a system for representing three-
dimensional space on a two-dimensional plane—sets up a system of visual control that 
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appears to give access to a represented world.  Chaudhuri indicates that the coherence of 
the picture relies on and denies the fixed outside-the-frame position of the viewer.
198
  The 
landscape perspective further develops into an understanding of property as a site of 
individual experience, a cultural definition of subjectivity and identity, the photographic 
image of nations, and for theatre a technique that turns a spectator into a viewer of 
cultural products in a scientific quasi-mathematical calculation of perspective that rests 
on the assumption that a perspectival frame can fix the position of an outside viewer.   
The framing of culture—as a set of meanings common to a human community or 
principles that govern human behavior set apart from nature—does not allow for the 
variance and mobility inherent in an embedded more-than-human relationality.  This kind 
of stricture places vision at the apex of Western perception in ignorance of the manner in 
which sensory experience promiscuously bleeds throughout the entire human body.  In 
The Perception of the Environment, Tim Ingold claims that this kind of ordering of the 
senses has more to do with cognitive style than with a cultural preference in constructing 
reality.  He argues that a representationalist theory of knowledge—which equates vision 
with representations in the mind—relies on a division between the physical and the 
cultural (brain and body) dimensions of perception.
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  Delimiting sight as the sense that 
objectifies is a denial of the synaesthetic fusion of the senses in an ongoing adjustment or 
attunement to one’s surroundings.  An art institution can convey historical information 
and cultural meaning and yet also always participates in living relational processes—
emerging from active and ever-changing relationality.  In part, when a frame is 
understood as a way to control receptive experience—positioning a viewer outside an 
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artwork as an objective observer—seeing is wrenched away from embodiment and 
relationality as a modality that provides knowledge of that which is externally located 
from the viewer.  Herein, frames operate as a way to order experience and knowledge.  
However, frames are also an opening between interior and exterior horizons.  A frame as 
a threshold is the passage not by which practices and processes of attunement are 
governed but the opening that ensures that adjustments must be continually and 
relationally made.  
A variety of frames give perspective to Eiko and Koma’s Naked.  At the outset the 
installation is cordoned off—from the general gallery space and the flow of traffic of the 
public—with large canvases that act as a threshold for the audience to pass and peer 
through.  Museum docents stand at the installation entrance controlling the number of 
people entering.  A visible and well-defined border on the gallery floor further divides the 
audience and the dancers.  Eiko and Koma’s bodies are contained within a nest of 
feathers and are surrounded from behind by a receding darkness.  From outside the 
performance area, visitors can view glimpses of the dance through small holes that have 
been burned into the surface of the canvases.  Finally, the program frames the 
performance with a story of sorts while also describing the performance as a site of 
meditation and exchange without conventional storytelling.  The program gives the 
installation a vague storyline in stating, “the scene is an aftermath from an unspecified 
but lingering trauma.”  Even though this bit of story can serve to draw one deeper into the 
performance and the surrounding landscape, these abundant frames can also work to 
contain and give distinct context to Eiko and Koma’s naked bodies in a way that 
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authorizes rather than invites an audience member to watch and to look with an 
obligation for intimacy.  Even designating the performance as a work of art runs the risk 
of framing Eiko and Koma’s bodies as “unreal” representations that alleviate the 
pressures of encounter. 
The canvases, the docent guards, the border that marks the dance space, and the 
storyline operate in different ways to give context and meaning to the performance.  The 
canvases create an intimate space in which the performance occurs, mark the 
performance as something different than the other artworks in the gallery in its privacy 
and separation from the flow of traffic, and offer a protective function both in protecting 
patrons from open nudity (evident in the warning signs posted on the canvases) and in 
protecting the performance from the activity that occurs outside the hanging canvases.  
The docents give a sense of privacy and security to the performance in controlling the 
number of people that can enter the performance space.  The control of the number of 
people viewing the performance operates not just as a possible result of safety concerns 
that govern how many people can enter into a type of space but also as a control to limit 
the flow of traffic.  The border between the audience and dancers also creates an intimate 
space and acts as a protective marker that—while not ensuring that no patron will pass 
beyond the border and invade Eiko and Koma’s nest area—does discourage anyone from 
passing into the dancers’ domain.  Lastly, the fragment of a story that the Walker 
provides does less to definitively frame the performance and shape the audience’s 
perspective than open up one fragmented possibility through which the audience might 
understand or access the performance in an incomplete and vague way.  The physical 
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borders or frames around the performance serve contrasting functions—to create 
intimacy and protection.   
A frame risks encumbering a work of art in prioritizing a separation between what 
stands outside the frame and the work within the frame.  However, it would be a mistake 
to understand Naked as a performance that is controlled by its frames.  Perhaps the largest 
of these frames separates culture from nature—the indoor gallery from the outdoor 
natural landscape.  However, Eiko emphasizes that creating a set on an indoor stage and 
outdoor area is about creating an environment in which one could live and respond to for 
long time.
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  The emphasis on an ongoing multi-sensory encounter within unfolding 
relations in an environment—whether those relations unfold within a gallery or an 
outdoor venue—ruptures the nature-culture divide.  An art center or museum is not just a 
structure that keeps and generates cultural knowledge.  It is also a landscape of unfolding 
relations in which many bodies generate a lived encounter within and in response to the 
surroundings.  Herein, a landscape cannot be strictly defined as natural or cultural.  The 
division cannot be maintained when a landscape is constituted through processes of 
unfolding relation.  Therefore, an art center is not a purveyor of cultural information but 
an unfolding relational embodied landscape.  The Walker Art Center might be understood 
as an institution that conveys and preserves cultural products to and for the public.  This 
places the public in the position of a tourist and consumer of cultural products and 
cultural products in an abstracted position outside the lives of the public.  However, 
understanding institutions of art and culture as immersed in and emerging from rather 
than prior to living and lively relation revitalizes and reinvests the work that an art center 
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does not just in the lives of human patrons that visit the building but also in the processes 
of living relation that cannot be determined or contained within the correspondence of 
(human) cultural art institution and (human) art patron.  Herein, both patron and 
institution are immersed in and continually emerge from more-than-human living 
landscapes rather than fixable cultural products. 
The knowledge that Eiko and Koma’s Naked performance conveys is not of 
symbolic cultural meaning nor is it knowledge of the categories of culture and nature.  
Rather, the performance conveys practical and perceptual understanding rooted in 
encounter.  Eiko and Koma’s work guides their audiences around meanings unfolding 
within surrounding landscapes rather than signifying meanings that might be contained 
within a distinct construction or representation.  Herein, the frames that enclose Naked do 
not impose a frame of enduring representations that can be collectively held, abstracted, 
and accessed by the audience.  Rather, these frames—especially the peepholes of the 
canvases—entwine with the perceptions and sensations that the audience members 
encounter as part of the entire field of unfolding relations.   
The danger of these frames is that they might work against open encounter and 
encourage a turn away from the intimate relations that give rise to the performance—
raising the question how does an audience member reciprocate nakedness?  An audience 
member can choose if they look, how they look, how long they look, and where they look 
to some extent.  In these afforded choices, a level of vulnerability equal to nakedness—
physical or otherwise—is not necessarily demanded from the audience.  Even though 
Eiko and Koma ask for and foreground reciprocity in their naked openness, the frames 
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that surround the performance also work to manage the interaction.  Therefore, the level 
of vulnerability and intimacy that might be present in being naked—in being more naked 
than naked—can be kept in check.  However, even though the reciprocity of Naked does 
not necessarily ask the audience to be vulnerable to the level of nakedness, the audience 
reciprocates Eiko and Koma’s nakedness in other ways—by giving their time, attention, 
and curiosity.   
On one occasion, I overheard an audience member—peering in from outside the 
canvases—comment, “It looks real,” and her friend responded, “They are real.”  Other 
audience members asked, “Is there a story” and “How often do they move?”  These 
comments and questions do not necessarily reveal that the audience realizes the relational 
implications of the work.  However, the thoughts and questions posed touch on and begin 
to sensitively attune to the importance of Eiko and Koma’s work as an inclusive 
relational reality that includes dreams, the dead, and many different moving bodies within 
a landscape.  Oftentimes, reciprocity is only thought of as a “good” interaction—that 
reciprocity only occurs in a relation when there seems to be some kind of equality of 
exchange.  However, all visitors to the art center help create a landscape in which Eiko 
and Koma dance—even the visitors that respond flippantly or those that generate a lack 
of intimacy or those that are not just human.  Understanding an audience member’s 
seeing a performance as an a priori relational immersion resituates audience members 
from consuming spectators to relationally embedded participants.  In Eiko and Koma 
performances, audience members do not observe as much as they learn to attune with 
their entire bodies within ever-changing and vulnerable landscapes.  
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Even though Eiko and Koma are unclothed in the performance, the title of the 
work and the nakedness of Eiko and Koma’s bodies gesture towards nakedness beyond 
being without clothing.  Nakedness is a vulnerability associated with being unclothed but 
not necessarily tied to being unclothed.  As Eiko states, “Being seen and seeing is tender, 
ambiguous, odd—it asks the viewer to observe details.  A viewer can see the expanse of 
the whole body as well as very small parts of it.”201  Importantly, Naked invites viewing 
as relationally rooted.  Eiko invites the audience to “linger…and kinetically observe how 
our bodies move towards death.”202  Herein, Eiko’s invitation to the audience is at its root 
about inviting the care of the audience and a multi-sensorial or bodily perceptual 
encounter within a surrounding relational landscape.  It is an invitation to reciprocity 
without stipulating what kind of character that reciprocity will take on.  Nakedness 
speaks to an intimacy so close that it makes a body susceptible to many others’ influences 
and disruptions.  In intimate and relational nakedness, one is more naked than being 
without clothing and therefore must invite care.  Herein, nakedness in Eiko and Koma’s 
work emphasizes not that their bodies are unprotected by clothing but that they are 
unprotected beyond the intimate surfaces of their skin to relation with a multitude of 
others.     
In moments while visiting Eiko and Koma’s Naked performance, I did not feel the 
intimacy of nakedness.  In other moments—especially as I attended the entire duration of 
their last day at the Walker—the performance had an extreme sense of intimacy and 
belonging.  The energetic quality that pervaded the Walker was of taking and giving time 
and care—which is a way to offset the flattening of felt experience that might occur in a 
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representational frame.  Naked materializes and stages a nest in which one might hold 
and behold bodies dwelling within a nurturing and caring relational landscape.  If an 
audience member were to look long enough or in the right moment or the right way, he or 
she might become caught in an unclothed body’s naked eyes and in its watery wounds 
that cannot be contained by any frame, in a touch on the knee, in a poof of dust, in a 
shadow of darkness, in the force of bodily impulses.  The vision that Eiko and Koma’s 
work gestures towards is a vision that is not about seeing others but relationally feeling 
others pass through you—to expose oneself to the impositions of others in relation where 
all the senses have the quality of touch rooted in a surrounding relationally unfolding 
landscape.  
During a break in the performance at the Walker Art Center, I wandered the 
galleries and spoke to a docent who lamented, “I’m sorry to see them go.”  It was Eiko 
and Koma’s last day at the Walker of a month long performance in which they danced 
during most of the museum’s opening hours.  The docent’s comment reveals that the 
performance cannot be simply understood as an event that is contained within the 
temporal and spatial frame of an exhibition that has a beginning and an end—spatially 
confined by a gallery and temporally contained by an opening and closing.  The docent’s 
comment demonstrates that Eiko and Koma’s visit reaches well beyond “a last day at the 
Walker.”  The investment and attachment that the docent expressed given to Eiko and 
Koma’s going points towards the dancers’ ephemeral going—never fully leaving—not as 
an ending but a continuation in which they might or might not return but are always 
relationally rooted. 
 179 
 
Coming and Going 
While it might be easy to recognize that Eiko and Koma simply or not so simply 
come and go from a performance venue such as the Walker Art Center, the comings and 
goings in which the performance and dancers participate extend far beyond and below 
human perception.  The perceptible and imperceptible pervasive and intertwined flows of 
movement—comings and goings—realize a mobility in performance that cannot be 
completely grasped.  The audience member’s question in Naked, “How often do they 
move?” gestures toward the notion that with performance we continually adjust to 
ongoing movement no matter how imperceptible that movement might remain.  While 
movement unfolding within a landscape is wholly ungraspable, it is that to which I again 
turn—in examining Eiko and Koma’s The Caravan Project—to further theorize how 
performance operates as a becoming in terms of a practice of wayfinding—a continuous 
synaesthetic adjustment or attunement to and within a surrounding landscape. 
The premiere of The Caravan Project occurred in Corning, New York at the 
Cedar Arts Center in 1999.  The performance was co-commissioned by Art Awareness 
(Lexington, New York) and Dancing in the Streets (New York, NY).  Since that 
performance, Eiko and Koma have performed The Caravan Project at a number of 
locations including educational institutions such as Dartmouth College and Emory 
University, Bryant Park in New York City, Michigan Avenue in downtown Chicago, and 
on private property for small audiences.  Arts institutions—such as the Museum of 
Contemporary Arts Chicago in 2011, the University of Maryland Clarice Smith 
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Performing Arts Center in 2012, and New York’s Museum of Modern Art in 2013—have 
also hosted a performance of The Caravan Project.   
The Caravan Project is comprised of performances staged within and alongside a 
modified traveling trailer temporarily installed within outdoor landscapes after nightfall.  
In these and other performances, Eiko and Koma dance with a thoughtful, giving, gentle, 
and slow movement within a landscape.  The performances generate a sense of 
belonging—which recognizes the vulnerability and openness inherent in belonging rather 
than the safety of belonging.  Eiko and Koma describe The Caravan Project as being 
developed as an “art activism” piece in which the artists bring art to communities that 
might not otherwise have been exposed to their work—emphasizing that particular types 
of venues have the potential to draw different crowds.  A performing arts center might 
draw regular art patrons, students, or tourists and are not as subject to outdoor elements.  
A performance in a rural landscape such as a park, field, or river often requires an effort 
on the part of audience members to attend and is open to rural surroundings and outdoor 
inhabitants.  A performance in a city in the outdoors often draws spontaneous spectators 
that inhabit and walk the city and the community in which the performance occurs.  Like 
diverse rural landscapes, each city landscape creates a unique environment of sound, 
sight, light, smell, tone, and texture in which the performance unfolds.   
While I have not attended any live performances of The Caravan Project, I 
viewed archival recordings of the performances online at the artists’ Web site.  While an 
archival recording of a live performance cannot capture the contextual specificity of a 
live event, the live performance and the recorded performance are mutably bound 
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together and sensually embedded in different ways.  My engagement with and through 
archival material is not meant to treat the recording as if it were the same as the recorded 
performance.  There are differences in reading and experiencing a live performance than 
reading and experiencing an archival recording of that performance—such as a sense of 
inclusion in an audience, the inability to stop the performance and review it in fragments, 
and a sense of the immediacy of a certain kind of “liveness” that does not necessarily rely 
on or unfold through modern technology.  However, the live performance and the 
archival recording both require an engagement of the imagination, which gestures beyond 
the notion of reading just the facts or just the subjective experience of the performance.  
In order to begin to understand the felt reality of relationality, the imagination is needed.  
Through the imagination—whether during a live performance or engaging with an 
archival fragment of a performance—ungraspable relationality might be felt, thought, and 
practically encountered.  Therefore, I read archival fragments as I would a live 
performance—with a gesture of the imagination—not to recreate a past event but to 
understand how a performance is embedded in unfolding ongoing relationality, to 
understand the relational resonance and traces that permeate and continually generate a 
performance. 
The comings and goings in Eiko and Koma’s caravan performances set the 
imagination on the move.  One might find in the archive—or might have found in the live 
performances—trees and grasses rustling in the wind, concrete slabs shifting under 
pressure, ambient commotion within a city landscape, traces of bloody battles, or perhaps 
someone mourning or lamenting another’s going.  What is most vitalizing for my 
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theorization of wayfinding in a relationally thought performance is Eiko and Koma’s 
immersion within and passing through lively landscapes.  The perceptible and 
imperceptible comings and goings of these landscapes are what nurture and give life to 
Eiko and Koma’s dance.  I mention only the smallest and perhaps most thinkable layer of 
many comings and goings that surround Eiko and Koma in order to argue that a practice 
of wayfinding occurs amongst a plethora of perceptible and imperceptible comings and 
goings.  In The Perception of the Environment Essays on Livelihood, Dwelling, and 
Skill—Tim Ingold describes wayfinding “as a skilled performance in which the traveller, 
whose powers of perception and action have been fine-tuned through previous 
experience, ‘feels his way’ towards his goal, continually adjusting his movements in 
response to an ongoing perceptual monitoring of his surroundings.”203  Through their 
performance practice, Eiko and Koma continually fine-tune their bodies in order to adjust 
attentively to the specificity of the surroundings.
204
  As a practice of wayfinding, these 
skillful adjustments are made in an ongoing monitoring and response to the flow of 
comings and goings in a living landscape—whether that landscape includes urban traffic, 
layers upon layers of historical fragments, or atmospheric shifts.  This flow and Eiko and 
Koma’s participation within this flow gives not just context to Eiko and Koma’s work but 
more importantly life to their movement. 
The multiplicity of bodies that pass through and inhabit the landscapes within 
which Eiko and Koma find themselves performing feeds the richness and grace of their 
movement.  Every landscape within which Eiko and Koma perform is continuously 
different and retains the marks—whether visible or invisible, known or unknown—of 
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countless and ungraspable relational encounters.  Eiko and Koma’s movement is not only 
a glacial time consuming articulation of human bodies, it is also an ambulatory looking 
and finding of a way to live and unfold life within every-changing landscapes.  Eiko and 
Koma’s performance venues do not comprise a geographic or topographic map of 
locations.  Instead, these venues gather together making an ungraspable way within and 
by which Eiko and Koma live.  In performance, Eiko and Koma model attunement as 
finding a way within a field of ongoing relations.  This field is not a set of performance 
sites but a timely terrain within which Eiko and Koma—among others—come and go.  
Herein, these terrains are less spatial locations than timely and spatial relational 
unfoldings that are generated through the comings and goings of many different ever-
varying bodies moving perceptibly and imperceptibly.  Eiko and Koma’s coming and 
going—along with other comings and goings—binds together spatial and temporal 
mobility in relational mobility.  Therefore, Eiko and Koma do not so much perform The 
Caravan Project at venues defined as a city, a park, or a gallery but within currents of 
movement that generate a landscape comprised of innumerable and singular relational 
journeys.  Eiko and Koma therefore do not follow a course form one venue to another but 
follow a lively living path saturated with the more-than-human. 
The Caravan Project emphasizes a relational and itinerant immersion with many 
different intertwined and ambient comings and goings within a landscape that extends 
beyond the distinct parameters of a show.  Specifically, Eiko articulates that The Caravan 
Project is conceived as an inclusive work that in part welcomes people who are not 
theatre-goers because of financial and social circumstances.  For Eiko, the itinerant mode 
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of a caravan serves the work through “educating audiences through real encounters, 
exposing our work beyond theater-goers, sharing our process of experimentation, creating 
a dialogue with people, and offering a story and myth for communities to share.”205  The 
goals of the performance echo performance ecology’s aim to foreground the 
embeddedness of performance in community and the world.  Importantly, the shared 
dialogue of human communities is always rooted within a more-than-human landscape.  
Eiko and Koma’s path of movement is not an index of movement that can be wholly 
mapped culturally, geographically, topographically, in human terms, or otherwise.  
Instead, the path is one of intimate involvement with others.   
 Eiko and Koma’s body of work and the epigraph that begins this chapter brings to 
mind Edmund Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld [Lebenswelt] from the field of 
phenomenology.
206
  As one of phenomenology’s founders, Husserl rejects the opposition 
between things apprehended by thought and things apprehended by the senses in order to 
formulate a path of study that emphasizes describing human experience within a world 
that is immediately felt.  The trajectory of phenomenology that draws on Hussserl’s 
approach takes up the study of lived experience—the lifeworld—in order to better 
understand human activity from a perspective within the world rather than as an objective 
observer situated outside the world.  Husserl develops the concept of the lifeworld in The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, which was written 
from 1934 to 1937 prior to Husserl’s death in 1938.207  The notion of an intersubjective 
lifeworld that Husserl (a German Jew) theorizes bears particular weight coming on the 
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verge of the onset of World War II coupled with the scientific and rational justifications 
for the extermination of particular peoples.
208
   
The concept of the lifeworld designates a world of immediately and 
intersubjectively lived experience, which in Husserl’s terms indicates a “world of 
immediate experience” that is “prereflected” or “already there”—experienced in a 
“natural primordial attitude.”209  Marking a distinction between a theoretical and a pre-
theoretical attitude from which all theorizing is derived, Husserl explicates the work of 
phenomenology as a study of the phenomenal world as we immediately and pre-
reflectively experience it rather than as we categorize or conceptualize it.  Husserl’s 
maxim “to the things themselves” takes into consideration the constructedness of human 
knowledge and sets the task for phenomenology to develop inquiries that make explicit 
our human presuppositions, assumptions, and biases.
210
  Therefore, Husserl’s 
phenomenology aims at gaining understanding of the nature or meaning of everyday 
human experiences through an investigation of the pre-reflective existential and 
experiential structures that inhere in the lifeworld without abstracting or taxonomizing 
the world or lived experience. 
The concept of intentionality informs Husserl’s lifeworld conceptualization by 
emphasizing that the self is always already implicated in the world in a mutually 
dependent and reciprocal relation to others prior to conscious reflection.
211
  Husserl 
argues that things only become present to consciousness “in a worldly manner” as part of 
the totality of the world horizon, which is immanent in the possibilities of meaning in 
individual lived experience as part of its transcendent structure.  The “already-there” 
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transcendent structure is not immobile or static but conditional, lived, and historical.  
With a conceptualization of transcendence that marks a distinction between Husserl’s 
phenomenology and that of Martin Heidegger, Husserl theorizes a transcendental ego 
from which all intersubjective experience within the lifeworld derives.
212
  Husserl’s 
former student Heidegger places greater emphasis on practical engagement with the 
world and in a more significant departure from Husserl’s phenomenology aligns the work 
of phenomenology with ontology.
213
  
In contrast to Husserl’s phenomenological investigations of the lifeworld, 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology aims to reveal fundamental hidden structures 
within phenomena and more particularly of Being.  Herein, the notion of transcendence 
and the concept of intentionality in Heidegger’s phenomenology are unhinged from a 
transcendental ego.  Heidegger explains, ”if one characterizes every way of behaving 
toward [Ver-halten zu] beings as intentional, then intentionality is possible only on the 
basis of transcendence,” the reality transcended is not a distinct thing or an aggregate of 
things in experience—rather transcendence “is always already beings…in a totality 
[Seiende in einer Ganzheit].”214  For Heidegger, the basis of transcendence does not 
properly belong to a transcendental ego that derives sense from the world but is that in 
which we are first and foremost situated in the midst of beings.  Therefore, the self and 
consciousness are not given before the world as transcendental limits but are realized in a 
historical process embedded in a material world with others.  The totality of the world in 
a horizon of possible meanings surpasses knowledge of a metaphysical reality “in itself” 
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and universal categorical determinations of beings—and limits and enables the 
constitution of the self in the midst of resistance.  
 Phenomenological inquiries risk deteriorating into esoteric or hermetically sealed 
expositions on lived experience, which are impervious to theoretical critique and un-
critical of or blind to their own knowledge formations and practice.  Criticisms of 
phenomenology often focus on how phenomenological approaches employ the concepts 
of transcendence and intentionality, take up and/or reinforce normative understandings of 
subjectivity, and configure the relation between self and “body” and the world.  In 
critique of phenomenology, Brian Massumi argues that experience is never fully 
intentional.  Massumi takes the concept of intentionality in phenomenology as a “closed 
loop” in which the personal is prefigured in the world—establishing an identity between 
the structure of the world and the structure of the subject in the world.
215
  From 
Massumi’s perspective, phenomenological approaches—grounded in an ideal of 
authenticity—do not take into consideration the involuntary and the impersonal in 
personal experience.  Additionally, criticisms of phenomenology often contest 
Heidegger’s theorization of man as world-forming—through intentional activity.216 The 
contradictions in Heidegger’s thought come to the forefront in his attempt to think 
beyond categories such as man and animal in a framework of “existentials” that take up 
familiar structural divides and the same categorical titles.   
While the work of phenomenology—like any philosophical framework—risks 
privileging a mode of knowledge without questioning the conditions under which it 
operates and creating a structure of regulation and normatization, the emphasis in (a 
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radical) phenomenology is on a whole historically constituted realm of experience that 
does not coincide with and cannot be stabilized and identified in the formation of the 
human subject.  Against the assumption that subjective accounts are equal to the truth of 
phenomenological practice, phenomenology does not simply contrast private subjective 
impressions to general objective observations at the empirical level but takes up the 
question of the empirical along with questions of subjectivity and objectivity.  Therefore, 
phenomenology does not disclose some newly discovered universally applicable fact 
about experience or some previously unknown aspect of private experience but makes 
thinkable possibilities of meaning rooted in a mutable relational context of meaning in a 
shared world in which one is already implicated.  The work of phenomenology then is not 
to render the totality of the world completely knowable, identifiable, and interpretable 
through a set of hermeneutic codes but to renew lived experience and understanding of 
lived experience within lived experience.  The stakes in phenomenology are not authentic 
objective or subjective descriptions of “the way things are” nor empirically testable 
interpretations but a thinking of unthought meaning in which theorizing and lived 
experience are bound together—while maintaining the tension between the “pre-given” 
and the continuous play of differences. 
Eiko and Koma materialize a way of living in the world with others—in a 
horizonal totality and ongoing play of difference in lived experience.  As Eiko and Koma 
become sensorially receptive to the flows within which they travel via the caravan, they 
fine-tune their bodies to adjust to the movement in others and in the surrounding 
landscapes.  The caravan becomes a practice of finding a way within a world that refuses 
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observation as detached and disinterested and refuses the notion of movement as crossing 
boundaries that define the distinct parts of a global system.  Instead, the caravan’s 
observation and movement occurs through unfolding relation in a terrain of comings and 
goings and through the immersion of not-just-human performers and audience members 
equipped with sensory skills and experiences within lively landscapes.  Herein, 
wayfinding movement passes through and gathers up ever-varying terrains of lived 
experience.
217
  In passing through multiple and overlapping landscapes, Eiko and Koma’s 
performance does not just take up cultural significance or community activism or 
ecological-political issues.  The performance binds all of these elements together in a 
complex intertwining that materializes ecological principles in a wayfinding approach to 
movement, which emphasizes an ecology in which a mover feels and responds (in 
becoming affected) to a surrounding living and breathing relationally rooted landscape.   
Even though Tim Ingold explains that one completes finding a way when the 
destination is reached—a wayfinding performance practice emphasizes that in 
wayfinding there is no destination.
218
  Instead, the journey of finding a way is only 
complete along the way not in any particular arrival at any destination.  In wayfinding, a 
performer is engulfed in a relationally thought performance practice that happens over a 
lifetime—not ending in death—which is permeated with heterogeneous comings and 
goings that engage and attune their sensory practice.  Therefore, the perceptible and 
imperceptible (sensuous detail within) details that sensitize Eiko and Koma’s and other 
bodies—making us relationally adjust—are of utmost importance.  The subtle and 
gregarious sensual shifts within paths of movement—whether those shifts are in 
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temperature, light, moisture, or shape—require improvisation and a learning 
responsiveness. 
 
Improvisational and Imperceptible Movement 
For Eiko and Koma, the continual adjustment of feeling one’s way along a path 
occurs in part through improvisation.  Eiko and Koma do not have a choreographed 
routine that they perform.  Instead, the movement artists unfold their performance 
through improvisation, sensitive exploration, and with a sense of involvement within a 
landscape that surrounds them.  Herein, the caravan performances viscerally participate 
with the movements of a landscape concatenated with many comings and goings 
including other animal, elemental, and spirit bodies.  In The Caravan Project, a landscape 
is not something that is danced on—seen from a series of points of view—but rather 
literally surrounds, envelops, and feeds the embodiment-thought and improvisation.  The 
dancers’ find their way by improvising within living relations unfolding in living 
landscapes that fluctuate from moment-to-moment.  The improvisation recognizes that a 
landscape or a path within it can never be fully known in advance because—like 
improvised movement—a landscape is always changing.  Therefore, even though Eiko 
and Koma have a schedule that charts their performances, the performances more 
importantly occur in response to and within surrounding sensuous and changing 
landscapes that cannot be determined.  The improvisational path of wayfinding does not 
mark out a schedule of venues determined in advance as a route to be kept but rather an 
improvised performance path that must be continually worked out as it is woven into 
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detailed, living, and ever-generating landscapes that do not begin or end in a distinctly 
determined performance.   
The imperceptible and ungraspable nature of movement makes theorizing 
performance as a mobile relation difficult.
219
  However, failing and imagined perceptions 
are bound together with the imperceptible in performance to create a felt sense of the 
unpresentable moreness that unfolds relationally in part through comings and goings on 
the move.
220
  Eiko and Koma’s movement through and within the journeys of cities, and 
sidewalks, and rivers, and parks, and galleries articulates a continuous and unfolding 
itinerary of movement that while perceptible draws together the imperceptible.  The 
performances of The Caravan Project perhaps best realize the aspect of Eiko and Koma’s 
work that emphasizes continuity and itinerancy.  The mobility of this installation-on-
wheels allows the performances to occur within divergent landscapes that range from the 
intimacy of someone’s backyard to differently restricted areas such as public parking lots 
or city sidewalks that cannot be entirely known, comprehended, or perceived.  The 
strength of The Caravan Project is that the performances take place within widely 
different landscapes that nurture widely different perceptible and imperceptible comings 
and goings—including not just human casual onlookers, informed participants, and 
disruptive and disinterested passers-by.  At any time during a performance, anything and 
anyone can come and go or move from one perspective to any other.  
Eiko and Koma’s traveling trailer opens on four sides onto the surrounding 
landscape and overflows with a carpet of vegetation that calls attention to the opulent 
carpet of the surroundings.  The strange world that holds Eiko and Koma’s bodies inside 
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the trailer is an extension of the strange world that holds Eiko and Koma—and others—
outside the trailer.  The details in the surroundings are essential to finding a way.  The 
rich and potentially harrowing plethora of perceptible and imperceptible detail within any 
landscape is not a problem for Eiko and Koma in finding a way.  In fact, harrowing detail 
feeds itinerant movement like the movement of a caravan.  Caravans move with the 
movement in landscapes—with food sources, with seasonal changes, with population 
densities, with flows of waters.  As Tim Ingold argues that a map labors to erase detail in 
order to provide a comprehensive representation of reality upon which a route might be 
plotted—I propose that in wayfinding the more diverse and detailed the landscape the 
easier it is to find a way and paradoxically to lose one’s way.221  Importantly, caravans do 
not follow maps but are sensitive to the perceptible and imperceptible living details in the 
landscapes within which they move.  
From the perspective of earth’s landscapes, Husserl theorizes that the earth is 
experienced as inherently spatially and temporally spread-out and argues that the earth is 
the most immediate bodily experience of space and the basis from which conceptions of 
space are derived.
222
  The infinitely spreading out and ubiquitous ground that a body 
responds to and within always exceeds conceptualization and continually reveals the 
limited and expansive qualities of human perception and sensation, which revitalizes the 
phenomenological question of attunement.  In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger poses 
and examines the question: what is attunement or Grundstimmung?  The translators of 
Heidegger’s Being and Time most often translate the German Grundstimmung as 
attunement, which indicates mood or state of mind following Heidegger’s explication that 
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the term “state of mind” indicates “mood” or “Being-attune(d).”  Importantly, Heidegger 
emphasizes that having a mood is not a psychical condition or a factor of consciousness 
but a “disclosive submission to the world” or “letting something be encountered [in a way 
that] is primarily circumspective.”223  For Heidegger, our (human) mood or Being-attune 
does not just simply act on or sense others but implies concern and carries the weight of 
becoming affected in some way [Betroffenwerdens]. 
Heidegger theorizes three essential characteristics of attunement or state-of-mind.  
The first of these characteristics is a disclosure of Dasein in its “thrownness.”224  The 
expression of “thrownness” indicates for Heidegger the “facticity of being delivered 
over” in which the entity is thrown into its “there” in such a way that it is “there” as 
Being-in-the-world—in a way of finding itself in a manner of fleeing.225  Thrownness 
gives rise to the second characteristic of attunement, which is Being-in-the-world as a 
whole.  Being-in-the-world makes possible directing oneself toward something.  
However, in directing oneself toward something—the entity existentially “thrown” in its 
“there”—marks both openness and a closedness.  While Heidegger explains that Dasein’s 
openness to the world is existentially constituted by the attunement of a state-of-mind, the 
“there” closes off in a way that is more closed than on the level of “not-perceiving.”226  
Therefore, imperceptibility concerns not just what we cannot see or what moves beyond 
our ability to perceive but also what existentially closes off.  The third characteristic 
grounded in attunement or mood is circumspective concern.  Heidegger argues that the 
full disclosedness of the “there” is grounded in care, which is the constitution of Dasein’s 
Being.  In turn, understanding constitutes the Being of the “there.”  For Heidegger, every 
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understanding has a mood or attunement.  Therefore, understanding is never absent or 
finished but has varying modes of “projectedness” towards “one’s potentiality for 
Being.”227  In a Heideggerean framework, the term understanding means to be projected 
towards a potentiality for Being—in a mode that has attunement.  Herein, transcendence 
in Heidegger’s phenomenology indicates a potentiality for Being that hinges on an 
“ecstatico-horizonal” foundation in which understanding is the existential ground of 
“letting entities be encountered.”228 
The paradox of limitation and boundlessness—the embodiment of horizon—
ensures that attunement is a practice that occurs in a manner that cannot be identified in a 
single response or identifiable movement and that attunement cannot be located in a 
single body or part of a body.  Rather, a fully synaesthetic response unfolds with/in the 
world—occurring as a wayfinding—as a feeling and finding ways through and within a 
world where absolutely everything continually moves and keeps on moving.  Therefore, 
attunement is a practice that does not properly belong to any one body or one type of 
body but rather properly belongs to relational encounter.  While Heidegger recognizes 
that the attempt to tackle the question of attunement “coincide[s] with the demand for a 
complete transformation of our conception of man,” he theorizes attunement as that 
which belongs to man as a world-forming being in practical engagement with the world 
through moods such as profound boredom, anxiety, and nostalgia.
229
  Heidegger states:  
If attunement is something that belongs to man…and this cannot be clarified with 
the aid of consciousness and unconsciousness, then we will not come close to this 
matter at all so long as we take man as something distinguished from material 
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things by the fact that he has consciousness, that he is animal endowed with 
reason, a rational animal, or an ego with pure life-experiences that has been 
tacked onto a body.
230
 
While Heidegger asserts that this concept of man—as the conscious animal—leads to a 
failure to recognize the essence of attunement, his move to situate attunement as 
belonging only to the Being of the human being undermines the emphasis that Heidegger 
also places on practical engagement with the world.  Heidegger theorizes that the being 
of human beings is Being in the world with a state of mind (mood or attunement) 
whereby what touches the entity shows itself in an affect.
231
  The delimitation of sense to 
the Being of the being that “submitted itself…to having entities within the world matter 
to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance” risks making attunement a 
distinction that sets man’s being comparatively and transcendently against others insofar 
as other entities do not submit themselves to affect or to having others matter in some 
way.
232
  The phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty also wrestles with understanding 
phenomena and lived experience but endeavors to avoid Heidegger’s existentials that risk 
devolving into comparative categories along with Husserl’s transcendental ego.  Merleau-
Ponty theorizes an intertwining that he calls the chiasm in which embodied perceptions 
and sensations are formed in the midst of the world.  The chiasm cannot be accounted for 
in a “For the Other” or “For Oneself” antithesis.233  Rather, the chiasm is an ungraspable 
co-functioning—a co-becoming if you will. 
In The Caravan Project, attunement or adjustment occurs in the midst of lively 
visually imperceptible detail within the landscape that permeates the performance 
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particularly through sound.  Eiko and Koma choose not to use recorded music in order to 
immerse the performance in the rich detail of ambient rural and city sounds.  The sounds 
of comings and goings—from the hum of insects to the hum of electrical lights—
permeates the performance.  The audience and the performers are invited by the veneer of 
sounds emanating from the surrounding landscape to attend to contrasting and nuanced 
juxtapositions that create a rich auditory fabric.  These juxtapositions and mobile 
intermixings generate a surround of texture and tonality.  The use of visual and auditory 
montage is also reflected in the work of performance artists and dancer/choreographers 
such as John Cage and Merce Cunningham.  In particular, chance elements strike, 
deterritorialize, and strain perception not only as a process of audience consciousness but 
also as the indistinct elements of an indeterminate relationally and imperceptibly 
unfolding landscape.
234
 
In Eiko and Koma’s caravan performance considered as a wayfinding—process is 
not eliminated; comments of passers-by are not eliminated, the sheer darkness of a field 
is not eliminated; movement is not eliminated.  In fact, Eiko and Koma’s dance depends 
on the details of a landscape-in-the-making.  A practice of attunement depends on 
adjustment to detailed and imperceptible surrounding comings and goings.  Where 
everything moves and breathes, finding a way is not necessarily easy but necessarily 
entails an oscillation between finding one’s bearings and losing them always adjusting 
according to the surroundings—not as a representation removed from the surrounding 
landscape.  Therefore, attunement is not a skill achieved but a skill always in the process 
of being learned.  The continuous and itinerant character of Eiko and Koma’s caravan 
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performances gives the impression that sometime—whether walking the streets and 
galleries of Minneapolis, sitting on a riverbank at the family farm, or driving through a 
state park—that I might have the opportunity to watch and experience Eiko and Koma’s 
living dancing performance again, unexpectedly appearing within the flows of other 
comings and goings that swirl around me and within which I am immersed.  Having a 
feeling of anticipation, waiting, and wondering is a feeling that Eiko and Koma’s work 
generates.  It is also a feeling that nurtures attunement within a landscape.  Therefore, the 
key to ambulatory movement in performance—not from site to site but in finding a 
way—is that relational movement encourages one to be sensitive and attentive at all 
times to what is going on perceptibly and imperceptibly around, in, and through you. 
 
Wayfinding as Wayfollowing  
The last of Eiko and Koma’s performances that I take up in this chapter is River 
(1995 – 2011) in order further examine how im/perceptibility shapes a practice of 
wayfinding—which informs my theorization of how performance operates as a 
becoming.  Eiko and Koma have performed River many times in many different locations 
from Japan to Minnesota since the project’s inception.235  The performance was 
commissioned by Art Awareness, the Williams Center for the Arts, the Atlantic Center 
for the Arts, the American Dance Festival, the Walker Art Center, the Jacob’s Pillow 
Dance Festival, and the Environmental Performance Network.  While River has been 
sponsored by a number of institutions, the performance was created in a small stream in 
the Catskill Mountains and was originally performed with a floating driftwood sculpture 
by Judd Weisberg.  The performance previewed in 1995 at Schoarie Creek in Lexington 
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New York and premiered the same year at the Delaware River (Eddyside Park) in Easton 
Pennsylvania.  Lafayette College produced the premiere along with the sponsorship of 
the National Environmental Performance Network.  Eiko and Koma’s River is also often 
produced in collaboration with environmental groups, volunteers, and park officials that 
clean the area, check water quality, and foster community partnerships.  While River is 
usually performed in a river—the dance also has been performed in lakes and ponds, 
which move differently depending on their surroundings, size, and configuration.  I 
viewed filming of River at the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis, Minnesota in 2012 and 
on the documentary film “Dancing in Water: the Making of River,” which can also be 
viewed online at the artists’ Web site. 
Previously, I wrote that Eiko and Koma’s coming and going gave an impression 
that the dance might be unexpectedly experienced within another landscape at another 
time.  I anticipate the comings and goings of and within the performance.  The 
anticipation comes not only from the peripatetic movement, it also emerges from a 
dreaming modality that a landscape generates.  In dreaming, I anticipate and wait for 
Eiko and Koma to suddenly—without regard to any set time or place—appear dancing 
within a landscape.  Even though I might mark out a particular time and place that I could 
go to a River performance, I attend through anticipation the ongoing performance in a 
dream.  The quality in dreaming in which something can happen anywhere and anytime 
ensures that movement is not just about what has been or what will be in “liveness” but 
also what has been ephemerally-continually happening.  In dreaming, performance might 
appear anywhere and anytime.  
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 Dreaming is caught up with questions concerning perception and consciousness.  
The connections between dreaming, perception, and consciousness are taken up in 
Sigmund Freud’s psychotherapeutic prescriptive practice and mapping of the conscious 
and the unconscious, in the inquiries of phenomenology concerning perception, and more 
particularly in Gaston Bachelard’s phenomenological investigation of different kinds of 
space that invite the poetic imagination.  Freud’s topographical mapping of the conscious 
and the unconscious depends on a discontinuous temporality in which the ahistorical, 
deterministic, and unintentional unconscious might rupture everyday reality.
236
  The 
Freudian division between the conscious and the unconscious reinforces a strict 
separation between dreams and real life.  In the Freudian paradigm, dreams inhabit the 
domain of the unconscious, which is a deterministic structure that reconstructs reality in a 
way that the conscious cannot control.  In contrast, in Martin Heidegger’s 
phenomenological paradigm a pre-reflective and intentional consciousness—rather than 
constituting consciousness—precedes the fully self-aware cognitive individual and 
provides access to the world as a historical system of meanings.  While Heiddegger’s 
conception of consciousness is both pre-reflective and also intentional—inextricable from 
historicity—Maurice Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that perceptual body world relationships 
constitute pre-reflective experience, which can be consciously reflected upon.  Each 
paradigm theorizes a reflective or conscious domain differently connected to an 
unconscious or pre-reflective domain.   
For Freud, the unconscious is a wholly other reality—that includes dreams and 
repressed memories—set apart from and yet erupting into conscious reality.  In contrast, 
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Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty maintain a distinction between a pre-reflective domain—
understood for Heidegger as consciousness and for Merleau-Ponty as perceptual body 
world relationships or pre-reflective experience—and a reflective domain of the self-
aware or consciously reflective individual.  However, the distinction between the 
reflective and pre-reflective domains is more of an entanglement than a separation.  In 
particular, in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception embodiment is inextricably 
caught up with cognitive process.  Therefore, the imagination, dreaming, hallucinating, 
and all perceptual processes are caught up with cognitive processes.  Gaston Bachelard—
one of the most prominent phenomenologists on dreaming—aligns with Freud’s 
understanding of the atemporal and separate nature of the dreaming imagination but 
situates dreaming in individual consciousness rather than the unconscious.  However, 
Gaston Bachelard’s phenomenology—like Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on body world 
relations—looks to things, landscapes, and other perceptual encounters within the world 
unlike Freud who investigates a delimited psychic interiority.  I take up Eiko and Koma’s 
River in the midst of these inquiries in order to better understand the role that dreaming 
plays in a practice of wayfinding attunement for understanding and theorizing 
performance as a becoming. 
 
A Question of Reality 
 While a patron upon seeing Naked poignantly asked, “Are they real?” in the 
gallery at the Walker Art Center, the question also permeates the outdoor landscapes in 
which Eiko and Koma perform.  Just as a performance introduces a question of reality 
into a landscape, a landscape introduces a question of reality into a performance.  
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Importantly, the question is raised not just from a particular patron or from an artwork or 
a performance.  The question emerges from the ungraspable relationality in which the 
particular audience member and show are embedded.  The question of reality might be 
one of analysis in order to make a situation more knowable and manageable—to 
determine what is real and what is not real—or the question might attend to the 
emergence and mixing of different domains of reality through forms that have detached 
themselves from their descriptive and determinate identifying function.  The rupture of 
the opposition between dream and reality that Eiko and Koma’s work emerges from does 
not reconcile dream with reality but intimately entangles them.  The boundaries between 
dream and reality become uncertain and fluid.  Cognition mixes with imagination and 
hallucination.  Dreaming therefore is not the activity of a mind detached from 
embodiment and the world contemplating a less literal factual reality or illusion.  
Dreaming does not coat reality with illusory images or occur as a break from reality in a 
clinically diagnosed madness.  Rather, dreaming is a relational way of participating with 
the surrounding landscape.  Likewise, performance as a becoming is also a relational way 
of participating with the surrounding landscape.   
In Eiko and Koma’s River, the movement and activity of river waters cultivates a 
practice of adjustment or attunement.  The deep and glassy surface of the river water 
challenges perception.  One of the most striking acts of a river landscape is the doubling 
of the performers and the river’s surroundings.  These reflections are not set apart from 
reality but are a doubling of and within unfolding reality.  When I attempt to conjure 
words to describe how striking the doubled and rippling reflections in performance and 
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the river are, I fall short.  I can only say that these reflections are ghosts—solid, liquid, 
and vapor at the same time.  And, as ghosts they…are somewhere and yet 
nowhere…always will be and always have been haunting the dreaming of Eiko and 
Koma’s immersion in river waters.  Bodies and materialities unfolding within the 
unrepresentable plenitude within a landscape efface the opposition between reality and 
imagination and create an uncanny and shifting perceptual encounter.
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The ungraspable co-functioning that Merleau-Ponty terms the chiasm provides a 
way to understand landscape as an infinitely extending horizon and elements working and 
belonging together rather than a unit of a global structure or a simple stage for human 
life.  Landscape expands and grounds the synaesthetic and responsive intertwining of 
many differentiating moving bodies.
238
  A landscape does not stabilize a known world but 
rather stands as an enigmatic moving body that continually drives a multitude of bodies 
to adjust as perpetual foreigners.  A landscape cannot be completely and definitively 
grasped not simply because the matter of one’s surroundings is impenetrable but because 
a landscape—as evident in the flow of a river—is always changing in imperceptible 
ways. 
Heidegger situates this withdrawn quality in a distinction between earth and 
world.  For Heidegger, world—a term more comprehensive than culture—is the realm of 
human activity and earth is the realm of everything beyond human relations.  Even 
though Heidegger’s formulation again sets up a uneasy comparison between human 
beings and other beings, Heidegger provides insight into the withdrawn nature of what he 
calls earth.  He states:   
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The stone presses downward and manifests its heaviness.  But while this 
heaviness exerts an opposing pressure on us it denies us any penetration into it.  If 
we attempt such a penetration by breaking open the rock into pieces, it still does 
not display in its fragments anything inward that has been disclosed.
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The stone presses against and withdraws from us.  In the oscillations of pressing and 
withdrawing—even in violent breaking—the unyielding stone is not rendered completely 
open (knowable and disclosed).  The senses—again not as discrete units of measurement 
but as an entire unfolding body-encounter—never arrive at the sensed and perceived 
object.  In like manner, a landscape unfolds—yielding and withdrawing in the 
continuously mobile yielding and withdrawing of others.  Mentor to Eiko and Koma, 
Ohno Kazuo contemplates, “We tend to think that there’s nothing to be gained in 
observing the elements….  No matter how skillfully you imitate the rain, you’ll never 
succeed.  It’s truly inimitable.  The question is: Why, then, should we practice.”240  I 
think the answer is in part—we practice in order to be born again and again, to die again 
and again, and to cherish unfolding living and dying surrounding landscapes through a 
practice of attunement that passes through and teaches adjustment (in other words, 
attunement that retains the etymological connotation of justice). 
The plenitude of a landscape in its unrepresentable and impenetrable qualities is a 
driving force that draws all the senses together awakening a multi-sensory attunement-
adjustment to ephemeral-ongoing traces, conditions, and the flows of and in different 
bodies.  Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s chiasm provides theoretical insight into a synaesthetic 
adjustment-practice.  In this intertwining, the senses are not distinct registers that 
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generate separate data brought together through cognitive processing.  Rather, the senses 
are integrated into the functioning of an entire body with and within a surrounding 
landscape.  Merleau-Ponty argues that sensual qualities such as cold, dark, dry, or green 
are not sensory contents but “certain kinds of symbioses” where the relation between 
perceiver and perceived are reversible and the senses take up with phenomena as they 
invade the body.
241
  Merleau-Ponty states, “In reality there is neither me nor the other as 
positive, positive subjectivities.  There are two caverns, two opennesses, two stages 
where something will take place—and which both belong to the same world, to the stage 
of Being.”242  In this statement that concisely articulates the chiasm, Merleau-Ponty 
distances his inquiry from phenomenology’s emphasis on the experiencing inter-subject 
as the locus of knowledge and from understanding ontology’s questions of Being via 
comparative ontological distinctions between beings.  In Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenological paradigm not only does subjectivity give way to a cavern, Being does 
as well. 
It would be a mistake to understand Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological insights 
as claiming that all things are laid bare to subjective experience through perception.  In 
his phenomenology of perception, a body exists as an intermeshing of all that is, 
“between exterior horizons and interior horizons ever gaping open…an ephemeral 
modulation of this world…which for its part is not a thing but a possibility, a latency, and 
a flesh of things.”243   Herein, embodied perception occurs through ongoing modulation 
rather than the determination of distinct subjects.  Even though Merleau-Ponty describes 
the exchange between the perceiver and the perceived as an exchange between two 
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opennesses, his emphasis on modulation and openness points towards perception as a 
continuous and unfolding movement amongst a multitude of mobile bodies.   These 
opennesses—rather than identified subjects or objects—unfold in a modulation that keeps 
perceptual exchanges at play and also confuses perception.  This modulation—which 
requires entire embodied sentient and perceptive capacity—would not occur if the entities 
of a landscape were completely open or available for determinate perception.  
Merleau-Ponty describes embodied lively synaesthetic incarnation as occurring 
through a beckoning call.  He argues that neither a perceiver or perceived is completely 
passive.
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  In the exchange, the perceiver gives or commits the sensing body to a vague 
beckoning and anticipated sensation.
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  Merleau-Ponty describes the exchange between 
perceiver and perceived as an intertwining of unrestricted and reversible perceptual 
exchange that does not result in a synthesis.  The immersive intertwining—the chiasm—
does not result or aim at synthesis with the surrounding world but rather direct 
experience.  In this experience, senses are more like rhythms—each rhythm having its 
own dynamism and magnetism.  Herein, the eyes, ears, skin, mouth and other sensitive 
cells do not so much as see and hear but more so pulse.  These pulsations resonate with 
other moving bodies and rhythms that have different unfolding tones and textures.   
 While no single sensing organ can stand in for another sensing organ on equal 
footing—sensing is not merely visual, merely auditory, or merely tactile.  There is a 
pulsating viscerality to all sensing.  Every seemingly distinct sense echoes through every 
other seemingly distinct sense.  Learning attunement means becoming posed to the 
snapping point, struggling with in/corporeal matter, and accumulating embodied gestures.  
 206 
A body as an openness continually gestures towards completion within a surrounding 
landscape but never achieves completion.  Rather, the ongoing modulation generates gaps 
and ambiguity in perception.  The gaps intensify and amplify relation and an uncertainty 
inextricable from every perception.  When a vague beckoning poses a problem, and takes 
possession—as Ohno Kazuo claims, “Faced with such uncertainty, our souls become 
desperate and listen all the more attentively.”246  Therefore, with embedded relationality 
attunement then is not about achieving perception but reaching toward the limit of 
sensibility and encountering with care—in Deleuze’s words—the “paradoxical existence 
of a ‘something’ that cannot be sensed…and can only be sensed.”247  Herein, the 
processes of perception and sensation are mutable, have no determinate cause, and 
confirm belonging within the world.
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Eiko and Koma’s performances appear somehow to possess too much and not 
enough life.  In The Uncanny, Sigmund Freud explains that the uncanny in experience 
results in a test of materiality and reality.
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  Freud determines that the uncanny has many 
different and sometimes contrary connotations.  One of these connotations—from the 
German word Heimlich—reveals the uncanny as that which is familiar and concealed.  In 
part, Eiko and Koma test im/materiality by meandering amongst a landscape of unfolding 
familiar and concealed relational realities that include the living and the dead.
250
  Rather 
than adhering to a Western philosophical tradition that opposes reality and imagination, 
the work of these performers—and their predecessors Ohno and Hijikata—demonstrates 
the mobility and instability of reality and how difficult or easy it might be to slip around 
in reality with changing modes of perception and sensation.
251
  Reality-relationality 
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continually moves and multiplies ensuring that attunement-adjustment is always a 
following rather than a finding. 
 
Into Moving Reflections 
A river landscape and performance as a becoming multiplies and reflects the 
world—importantly not as a replica or simulation but as an increase of the world.  A 
river’s reflections are not pure and straightforward—they ripple and waver.  Watery 
reflections parlay a dreamer into deeper and more plentiful worlds.  As Gaston Bachelard 
argues in Water and Dreams—the reflections of water—and I argue in performance as a 
becoming—invites dreaming, which in turn encourages a dreamer to examine the fluidity 
and solidity of matter and materiality.
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  For Eiko, this relational involvement is a joy.  It 
is also a deep sorrow.  While watery reflections initiate inquiries into materiality, they 
also set a challenge to perception.  This challenge lures a dreamer deeper into wonder.  A 
river or a pond’s reflections create lustrous visual, auditory, and tactile effects that entice 
and lead a dreamer into further and further fanciful and plentiful landscapes.  The 
wondrous recesses are not located in the mind or in the water below but in an unfolding 
relationality within the world—a fluid and wavering in/corporeality of strange creatures 
slipping in and out of apprehension, in and out of the dark shadows.  In this way, Eiko 
and Koma commit their bodies—and invite the audience—to the limitless dreaming of 
rivers and of performances that run and creep away into the night. 
Within a river landscape, Eiko and Koma become liquid.  Their bodies—clothing, 
hair, gestures of face and movement—become fluid flames within a river’s current.  
Water envelops and entangles everything.  More than any other image, the image of 
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bodies in water makes one attune to flow, which encourages abandon.  Letting oneself go 
in a current is not to drown in the depths but to float and meander within the relational 
depths.  Eiko and Koma allow water to rush over and through their bodies carrying them 
off in gentle but forceful waves.  While Eiko and Koma perform, the water works on 
them just as water wears away hard earth over years and years of gentle and violent 
touch.  Therefore, a river teaches endurance.  Endurance in contradistinction to 
convenience is necessary for learning attunement. To maintain and to cultivate 
attunement requires endurance that has no beginning or end.  To practice attunement is to 
persist, to endure, to follow.  Water teaches the persistent and steady work of attunement.  
It is in this way that a river moves and carries Eiko and Koma and others into the night. 
 
Into the Dark Night 
Eiko and Koma’s River is performed at twilight with Eiko and Koma, the dance, 
and the landscape being carried off into darkness—a darkness which is of the water and 
of the night.  A river is most often not blue or green but brown and black—a river is dark 
water.  In darkness, night persists even in the light of day.  Therefore, a river’s dream is 
one of passing through dark waters.  Even though in River Eiko and Koma are lit with 
lamps so that they are perceptible to sight, they perform in and descend into darkness.  
Nightfall turns the entire landscape into dark water.  A river at night takes flight or 
perhaps better stated—the entire landscape becomes a river of darkness, which lends an 
excess of mobility to things of the night.  Night mobility does not adhere to the 
conventions of time and space that seemingly control how a body is and is not able to 
move.  In the dark, nocturnal bodies come nearer and travel more freely than so-called 
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illusions.  In the uncertain and sometimes frightening mobility of bodies within a dark 
landscape, Eiko and Koma are not just carried off gently into the night.  Eiko and Koma 
and others are carried within a potentially troubling dream that extends beyond the 
supposedly known and knowable landscape.  Night is a landscape of water that envelopes 
and hides everything—and has the potential to reveal anything in any moment.   
While Gaston Bachelard describes water as a vast unity in which water 
harmonizes the notes of a landscape, with nightfall discord awakens within a landscape 
because the joy of inclusiveness gives way to a certain fear of inclusiveness.  In darkness 
and night, it becomes more difficult to judge one’s distinct relation to and position 
oneself in regards to identifiable things in the surroundings.  Quoting Claudel, Bachelard 
asserts, “Night…takes our proof away from us; we no longer know where we are…Our 
vision no longer has the visible as its limit, but the invisible as its prison, homogeneous, 
immediate, indifferent, compact.”253  Anything can happen within the night and 
everything moves more easily and readily.  The sounds and bodies of others are both far 
away and yet so quickly and easily so close—extra mobile.  The hiddenness of things 
makes it much more difficult to judge distance, location, and character of others.  It also 
never gives warning of what and when something might move.   
On and past the cusp of twilight perception and sensation are heightened.  Rising 
mists, settling fogs, drizzling rains—all participate in a wavering at twilight that limits 
and opens the eyes making one feel the darkness.  The dream of night waters is not about 
what sleeps but what awakens in the dark—of what cannot be seen, of what cannot be 
known.  Night sticks to the bones.  Night brings us closer to death than any sleep.  At 
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twilight, the breath of the entire landscape is slowly drawn, held, and released as a sigh 
into watery darkness.  As night falls in River, water leaves its banks and mingles 
throughout the landscape—becoming landscape.  In order to follow the water’s 
mingling—in a performance as a becoming—one must inhabit a threshold, paying 
attention to the manner in which things draw close and yet remain distant.  Understanding 
performance as a becoming requires inhabiting a threshold—a continuous passage—
where the meaningful material of a performance is not just the live show or a subjective 
consciousness of the show but moreover the indeterminate and ongoing relationality from 
which encounter in performance emerges, which is to say everything. 
 
Into the Sorrow of Separation and Togetherness 
A river’s dreaming follows a flow that runs along a river’s edge, sinks to dark and 
seemingly unmoving murky bottoms, floats with water’s shimmering surface, and 
unfolds in lacunae of reflections.  A dreamer who inhabits a river or a riverbank—a 
becoming—is enticed into dreaming by the rhythm of moving water.  The rhythm 
permeates a human body with currents of cool wet tactility and cool wet sound conjuring 
a feeling of solitude.  Water divides and joins—separates and binds together a world.  
Solitude manifests the paradoxical coincidence of loneliness and belonging.  Solitude 
depends on togetherness as much as togetherness depends on solitude.  As the poet 
Mitsuharu Kaneko explains in his “Song of Loneliness,” “I was born / out of the deep fog 
of this land, which is covered with loneliness.”  The poem is based on Kaneko’s 
understanding that every aspect of what makes the Japanese Japanese—the land, 
clothing, customs, behavior, etc.—is a manifestation of sabishisa or loneliness.254  
 211 
Solitude and loneliness are integral for a practice of wayfinding/following and for 
understanding how performance operates as a becoming. 
The sigh of Eiko and Koma’s River at twilight carrying on into the night is a sigh 
of melancholy and mourning connected to death.  A deep melancholy emerges when the 
waters of a river or a lake bleed into the night.  Drifting demonstrates that death does not 
occur in an hour or a minute but as a long journey that brings sorrow.  If death is a 
mournful wasting away, Eiko and Koma drift away mournfully rendering their bodies to 
the river landscape, dissolving into the water and the darkness.  These waters not only 
absorb Eiko and Koma, they also absorb all shadows and reflections—all seemingly 
distinct performances.  Eiko and Koma dissolve within the landscape abandoning their 
reflections to the darkness.  The invitation to dream offered by a river couples an 
invitation to die or at the very least an invitation into the sorrow of death.  A practice of 
attunement recognizes that the dead are not gone but more mobile and perhaps more or 
less hidden.  Attunement wrought with the sorrow of death is attunement in separation 
and togetherness.  In silence the voice of sorrow and loneliness can be heard.
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Continuous passing gives rise to the sorrow of separation.  When loved ones come 
and go and when rivers flood with remorse, the dead begin to live inside other bodies.  A 
practice of attunement sheds the tears of melancholy—awakening a death that dies little 
by little, a death that stays in us—that stays in our performances relationally.  Perhaps no 
other death is more sufferable than death that happens slowly and continually.  However, 
dreaming death is by nature slow and continuous—always carrying the seeds of remorse.  
As Eiko and Koma’s River slows with the night growing in dark viscosity, it murmurs 
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and gestures towards silence—the silence of remorse.  Even though I understand 
mourning and melancholy as integral to Eiko and Koma’s River dreaming, Eiko marks 
September 11, 2001 as a point and event after which mourning became important in their 
work.  In this context and the context of the deaths of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bombings and of a personal friend, Eiko formulates her understanding of sustained 
mourning.   
Eiko describes sustained mourning as “a quiet protest to forgetfulness” in which 
one gives attention to what has been lost and as “an antidote for human aggression.”256   
Her desire—and perhaps Koma’s—is that their work might be created out of mourning 
and function as sustained mourning, which might be shared with others in order to 
remember rather than to avenge.  Eiko claims: 
Though I realize there is a logical difference in mourning for someone I have 
loved and mourning for victims I have not met, what is common in my mind is 
that what I call mourning is both quieter and more sustainable than the way Freud 
describes either mourning or melancholia.
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In Mourning and Melancholia, Sigmund Freud draws an uncertain and clinical distinction 
between mourning and the pathological disposition of melancholia.  Freud outlines 
mourning as a reaction to the loss of a loved one or the loss of an abstraction that has 
taken the place of a loved one or object.
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  In contrast, Freud attributes melancholia to a 
loss that—although might have been activated by a conscious loss—created a wound in 
the unconscious.  In Freud’s treatise, the grieving process associated with mourning is a 
test of reality that proves that the loved one no longer exists and thereby requires the 
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libido to withdraw its attachment. The withdrawal of the libido from the loved object and 
its transference to a new loved one occurs with the completion of mourning.  In contrast, 
the melancholic transfers the libido to the ego instead.  Significantly, Freud emphasizes 
detachment and transference of the libido from a non-existent loved object for mourning 
and for melancholia.  For mourning, one completes the grieving process once the loved 
object is proved in reality to no longer exist and: 
passes its verdict….upon each single one of the memories and hopes through 
which the libido was attached to the lost object, and the ego, confronted as it were 
with the decision whether it will share this fate, is persuaded by the sum of its 
narcissistic satisfactions in being alive to sever its attachment to the non-existent 
object (italics added).
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The work of grief is to impel the ego to give up the object—to declare the object dead so 
that the ego can go on living.  While Freud’s attempt to separate mourning and 
melancholia clinically is not successful, he still emphasizes for both mourning and also 
for melancholia a required process of detachment and reality testing of the loved object’s 
non-existence.  It is at this juncture where Eiko and Koma’s work as sustained mourning 
differs from Freud’s clinical and prescriptive practice. 
 In Eiko and Koma’s work, mourning is not just sustained it is also sustaining—
not a cure but an ongoing process of healing.  Mourning is not a process that should be 
completed in order for one to detach the ego from the dead in reality.  Rather, the dead 
are loved and cherished after death with no transference of attachment onto other objects 
and the loved object does not leave reality and become non-existent.  In performance as a 
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becoming, one maintains love for and relation with the dead while still loving and 
participating with the living.  This perspective—as a practice of wayfinding attunement 
in performance—does not detach the existent reality of the living from the non-existent 
reality of the dead.  In sustained mourning, one continues to feel the loss, to remember, 
and acknowledge a loved one’s dying not pathologically but as giving time and 
attention—continually adjustment—to a loved one that continues to be a part of one’s 
own living and dying and learning and the ongoing unfolding relationality in which both 
are immersed.  Eiko and Koma’s performances offer an opportunity to practice 
attunement with continually-ephemerally relationally “living” not just human others that 
is akin to attending the death of a loved one.  Sustained mourning as it manifests in Eiko 
and Koma’s work is not about transference of love in order to bring an end to grief.  
Rather, mourning in performance as a becoming is a way to follow death in continued 
living.  In particular, Eiko and Koma’s River awakens a sense of loss and mourning in 
dreaming.  In the flow of a river’s waters, melancholy draws together and separates the 
nameable and the unnameable, the living and the dead.   
 
Conclusion: Wayfinding/Following in Performance  
In this chapter, I took up Eiko and Koma’s Naked in order to examine how 
exposure and belonging within landscapes is entangled with artistic cultural framing—
evident in landscape painting, institutionalized art spaces, and perspectival theatre 
conventions.  I reaffirmed that the stakes of my inquiry are invested in a relationally 
thought performance in which “culture” and “nature” are inextricably intertwined.  I took 
up Eiko and Koma’s The Caravan Project in order to argue that wayfinding 
 215 
adjustment/attunement is an improvisational practice that occurs within a multitude of 
perceptible and imperceptible moving comings and goings within an expansive 
landscape.  Lastly, I took up Eiko and Koma’s River in order to argue that wayfinding 
attunement is also a dreaming-cognition-hallucination that generates wayfinding as a 
wayfollowing through the experience of separation and togetherness.  In an analysis of 
these performances, I worked to explicate a practice of wayfinding/following that 
permeates and informs my theorization of performance as a becoming.  
Wayfinding/following—a synaesthetic, continual, careful, relational, and mobile 
adjustment to the specificity of one’s perceptible and imperceptible lively surroundings 
rooted in ever-changing and expansive landscapes—builds on insights in the three 
previous chapters concerning how performance relationally operates at the nexus of 
human encounter with animals, objects, and machines/technology.  
Wayfinding/following is not about achieving perception and identification or reaching a 
destination but becoming continuously and ephemerally relationally with others.   
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Conclusion 
  
 
In Summation 
In my inquiry, I entered into the conversation on performance ontology occurring 
in part in the work of Herbert Blau (1999/2007), Peggy Phelan (1992/1997/2007), Philip 
Auslander (1999/2007), and Aleksandra Wolska (2005).  While Blau and Phelan ground 
the nature of performance in its liveness and ephemerality, Auslander argues that no 
essential distinction can be made between the live and the mediatized for understanding 
performance ontology.  Wolska also challenges the emphasis on liveness and 
ephemerality in Blau’s and Phelan’s work—arguing that performance has an ontology of 
becoming.  In Wolska’s proposal, performance persists and continues past the parameters 
of a live show to participate in the processes of life—continuing not only in the memories 
of audience members that attended the live production.  In my inquiry, I took up 
Wolska’s theorization that performance has an ontology of becoming and further 
examined how performance operates as a becoming in its relationality—asking more 
explicitly how performance operates as a becoming relationally participating in the 
processes of life.  Therefore, I moved beyond Wolska’s theorization—which is rooted in 
demonstrating the continuation of performance past a live show—in order to examine 
how performance is relationally embedded.  
I took up becoming as an ongoing relationality that precedes and cannot be 
completely understood and accounted for in the interactions of distinct terms.  In David 
Hume’s conceptualization of the nature of relations, relation is that which occurs between 
terms that interact.  Herein, relation occurs as a becoming between and heterogeneous to 
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us.  Relation and becoming have a principle of movement rather than correspondence.  
Therefore, relation is not the result of the interactions of distinct and identifiable terms—
such as a dog and an owner or you and I.  Rather, relation precedes and exceeds 
interactions.  We emerge from rather than determine the heterogeneous and ungraspable 
relational domain.  With this in mind, I organized my inquiry along four relational fields 
in which humans are involved—with animals, machines and technology, landscapes, and 
objects.  My inquiry worked to think through these relational fields for a better 
understanding of how performance operates as a becoming beyond a mere opposition 
between ephemerality (human bodies performing live) and continuity (the becoming of a 
performance past the parameters of a live show) and beyond an anthropocentric emphasis 
on human embodiment while attending to the specificity of the material conditions from 
which a performance site emerged. 
In organizing the inquiry along the lines of human encounter with others, I 
emphasized that the distinct and indistinct subjects and objects encountered (a human 
performer, an object, an animal, or a performance site) emerge from relation in a whole 
perceptual field rather than determine relation.  I worked to theorize performance—and 
this inquiry—as relational practice rooted in ongoing process and openness-of-interaction 
in-the-making.  The organization of the dissertation via human encounter with others—
animals, objects, machines/technology, and landscapes—indicated perceptual fields by 
which performance ontology as a becoming might be newly thought.  An object, a 
landscape, a human, or others in becoming are not determinate contents or aggregates of 
properties but indistinct unfolding embodiments that infuse ecological and interactive 
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performance contexts with process-oriented uncertainty and unpredictability.  
Understanding performance and (human and more-than-human) bodies in performance as 
becoming—as continually emerging from relation—challenges perspectives on 
performance practice and research that take as a starting point performance as a human-
centered representational and conventionalized product and production.  Rather than 
basing inquiry in performance ontology on identifying what performance is through 
conventional categories and structures of performance, my inquiry attempts to understand 
performance ontology through the ungraspable relationality from which bodies and 
performances emerge.  
The dissertation is an assemblage of different valences of performance ontology 
that accumulate through the chapters.  In Chapter One: Holding Animals, I took up 
human-animal encounter through the GFP Bunny project.  I examined the implications 
and stakes of how performance participates in the determination and identification of 
subjects and in a relational exposure that resists and ruptures stable identities and familiar 
organizations of relation.  In a explicating a contrast between a determinate and positional 
configuration of relation and an indeterminate and ungraspable configuration of relation, 
I examined the encounter in which the GFP Bunny project unfolds as operating in both of 
these configurations.  I argued that identifying determinate subjects—within paradigms 
of domestication and discovery—risks making a normatizing gesture that is caught up 
with ontological suppositions about the animal.  Insofar as transgenic art calls into 
question stable definitions of the body and of life and challenges the political, cultural, 
and ethical involvement of humans with other species—I argued that a transgenic 
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chimera such as Alba potentially resists power structures that legislate and classify life 
into taxonomies and hierarchies.  However, I worked to elicit a tension between the 
subjection of these power structures to forces of critique and transformation and the 
potential reduction of the new understandings of life that transgenic artwork provokes to 
a single understanding and delimitation of life as a manipulable informational code.  The 
challenge then is not necessarily to ascribe to the rabbit a determinate subject position—
within a truth and practice of domestication, mutual evolution, and discovery—that 
provides access to and delimits reality but to understand how bodies including rabbit 
bodies pluralize and produce subjectivity revitalizing their mobility and quality of living.   
I argued that the GFP Bunny project operates in at least two registers—as a 
testing of the self and social order that is necessary for decentering power relations and as 
a knowledge formation that constructs a regime of truth and practice in which it might be 
situated.  In our biotechnologically shaped world, biomaterials and performance ontology 
should not be removed and detached from histories, lives, and experiences.  At stake in 
performance ontology is not giving back to the animal what has been denied it by the 
human but overhauling the entire question of relational being-becoming such that 
ontological inquiries no longer take a vantage point external to ongoing relation and no 
longer undertake the measurement and identification of the being of a being as if a being 
could remain static, identified, and contained.  With this comes the recognition that there 
is no static individual being as such or simple relation to or subjective mediation of a 
being as such in performance.  I argued that how performance challenges or normatizes 
modes of thought concerning human-animal encounter impacts how a reconfiguration 
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and redistribution of agency and subjectivity might be made possible—not whether 
agency (and the subject) is called “human” or “rabbit” or “jellyfish” but that it emerges in 
a multiplicity of continually unfolding bodies in relation.   
Reconfiguring performance ontology as a relational process and practice 
emphasizes the continuous emergence of bodies from relation rather than the emergence 
of relation from the capabilities and actions of determined beings with stable ontological 
categories.  While Alba upsets rabbit filiations and classifications, an emphasis on the 
transgenic characteristic in Alba reduces human-animal relation to a science of genetic 
manipulation and genetic structure.  However, the performance as a relational unfolding 
has more to do with affect than scientific coding and recoding.  In the chapter, I argued in 
part that the relationality from which performance emerges is not just a factor of a body’s 
subjective (in)abilities but of affect and argued that—for performance as a becoming—
listening and proposal grounds emerging bodies and subjectivities in an affective 
relationality and an ordeal of exposure. 
In Chapter Two: Materializing Objects, I took up two performances—the Iranian 
performance-film Home is in Our Past (2003/2005) and a 2007 production of Heiner 
Müller’s Explosion of a Memory/Description of a Picture (1984)—at the nexus of 
human-object encounter.  The vein of performance ontology that I examined occurred 
through questioning how a historically and materially rooted liveliness—rather than 
liveness—operates in performance.  I examined fragmented and mobile constellations 
and collections of objects in order to think through the manner in which encounter with 
objects informs an understanding of how performance operates as a becoming.  I argued 
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that a relationally embedded and critically constellated object creates fissures in historical 
and representational perspectives and an excess of living and lively—critical and 
material—impacts in performance.   
The constellation as a critical and constructive practice for performance and 
performance research—in the historical materialism of Walter Benjamin and Theodor 
Adorno—takes up diverse historical fragments in a modality that works to provoke a new 
consciousness of the ideological condition of modern society in which the commodity 
form is the structuring principle.  In the exposure of historical contradiction, the 
constellation of historical-material objects for performance challenges ideologically 
historically perpetuated barbarism, identity thinking, and domesticated habituated 
thought.  In my inquiry, I argued that collecting and constellating objects undermine 
normatized structures of intelligibility that reinforce stable configurations of memory and 
of history as progress and linear continuity within capitalist systems of abstraction.  
Through the reconfiguration of historical narrative from a linear narrative of human 
progress to a mutable and ongoing living encounter with objects—with the debris of 
history and the junk of pastness—I theorized relational process with over instrumental 
use of objects.  I argued that historical debris—while deeply connected with actual and 
unfolding events and peoples—cannot be utilized to turn vibrant and chaotic living 
historical relation into ordered and easily communicable experience or stable ontological 
categorizations of the animate and the inanimate, the organic and the inorganic, or the 
living and the dead.  I argued that historical-material objects affirm that “pastness” is not 
a certification of a universal collective or hermetically sealed individual memory but a 
 222 
questioning of how what has taken place resurges in the now through historical and 
relational processes that disrupt the linearity between ephemeral “liveness” and recorded 
documentation.  Objects emerging relationally through historical and collecting 
modalities in performance indicate that performance as a becoming operates with 
continuous-ephemeral (nonlinear) liveliness rather than an ephemeral human-centered 
live embodiment. 
The question of performance ontology, which concerns itself with how 
performance operates as a becoming, is bound up in the historical materialist concern 
with how we make meaning out of the fragments of historical materiality—and with a 
“reliquification” of ontological suppositions.  Therefore, I took up performance ontology 
by way of a critical consideration of performance-in-the-making not as an essential 
ontological identification of performance but as a concern with how performance and 
performance ontology might be understood fluidly and critically with uncertainty and 
complexity via an examination of encounter with others in performance.  Resisting the 
conversion of performance into the same commodified, codified, and reified object that 
might appear as an ontological totality, performance ontology needs to be taken up as a 
constellation—a nonlinear continuous-ephemeral spatio-temporal divergent and critical 
inquiry that reinforces that any totality is false. 
In Chapter Three: Moving Machines, I took up the experimental theatre 
production machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines, machines 
(2008), and the 2006/2007 rehearsal-performance process for Heiner Müller’s Die 
Hamletmaschine (1977).  The vein of performance ontology that I examined in this 
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chapter was concerned with the problem of domination and the implications and 
relevance of domination in thinking performance as a becoming at the nexus of human 
encounter with machines and technology in capitalist systems of production.  The two 
sites in this chapter enabled a way to think through the complex operations of machines 
and technology, which are entangled in webs of complexity and structures of domination.  
I argued that human involvement with machines and technology indicates embeddedness 
in webs of complexity and integration into productive mechanisms wrought with socio-
historical forces of domination.  Therefore, becoming—as an unfolding relationality—
envisions symbiotic webs of complexity and involvement in instrumental industrial 
productivity. 
The entanglement of domination and sociality marks the capitalist mode of 
production and what Adorno calls the “administered life” of late capitalism.  In the 
sociality of late capitalism—in which mastery over a classifiable and malleable nature is 
bound to self-mastery and mastery over other humans—domination and capitalist 
production are inextricably intertwined with machines and technology.  Since domination 
concerns how the materials of life are abstracted, managed, produced, and consumed and 
how knowledge identifies, classifies, and makes the world known—the manner in which 
any body is technologically reconfigured cannot be construed as either participating in an 
autonomous symbiotic relational machine or participating in structures of domination.  
Therefore, I argued that performance must not only deny utility it must also reject the 
distribution and transformation of life via explicit calculation and knowledge.  I 
reinforced that even though nothing and nobody can be extracted from relationality, 
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relational embeddedness does not operate outside the challenge of domination.  In other 
words, the threat of extraction—which comes with the challenge to perform in modern 
society—carries no weight for a relational ontology but the threat of domination does. 
Machines and technology can participate in and promote systems of domination 
under the rubric of a science that methodologically renders every thing knowable in 
human terms.  In fulfilling this role, machines and technology are heralded as the crux of 
human progress and are promoted for their supposedly inherent and increasing efficient 
and effective productivity and performance.  However, I argued that machines and 
technology do not guarantee improved conditions—just different and adapted 
conditions—in which failure is inevitable.  Moreover, I argued that failure reinstalls and 
revitalizes practice, which along with processes of deviation combat the capitalist 
commodification and reification of relation.  I worked to demonstrate that domination is 
not necessarily sustained by technology and machinery but through the mechanization 
and commodification of relation in a form of automatism that neglects to act with care—
not recognizing that the relational is the foundation for (research and performance) 
practice and that relation is not a reified product (of practice) or a commodity form. 
In Chapter Four: Following Landscapes, I examined three performances of the 
movement artists Eiko and Koma in order to consider how performance operates as a 
becoming at the nexus of human-landscape encounter.  I took up the vein of performance 
ontology that runs more explicitly through the concerns and theorizations of 
phenomenology.  I theorized performance relationality as embeddedness in the 
materiality of landscapes—which inextricably intertwines culture and nature, unfolds 
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through a multitude of perceptible and imperceptible comings and goings, and binds 
together bodies in the midst of separation and togetherness.  I argued that a landscape 
generates a practice of wayfinding/following as a synaesthetic feeling and finding a way 
in continuous adjustment or attunement to one’s surroundings.  Wayfinding/following 
affirms for performance ontology that relationality—in contrast to atomistic 
configurations of the individual subject or genetic codes of organisms—is not about 
achieving perception and identification or reaching a destination but becoming 
continuously and ephemerally always relationally embedded with others. 
An ontology of becoming challenges thinking of performance and performance 
ontology that adheres to an opposition between imitation and reality; that defines a 
performance through a set of conventions such as the beginning and end of a live show; 
that keeps the human being, the human body, and the human drama as central to its 
purpose; and that prioritizes the determination of positions (e.g. the roles of scholars and 
practitioners, the ontological categorizations and identifications of others) over and above 
the mobile and incomprehensible relationality out of which these positions emerge.  The 
intersection of performance with an ontology of becoming enables us to think more 
thoroughly through questions concerning how creative practices depend on and 
materialize through processes of participation with human and more-than-human others.  
Performance understood as a becoming disrupts traditional framing of participatory 
performances as audience interaction in as set against passive consumption of a 
production and collaborative work as the non-hierarchical partnership between 
conventional roles of production (i.e. human actors, designers, directors, etc.).   
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Approached through a lens of relationality, participation cannot be limited to the 
rehearsal room or to human interaction or delimited as a method that theatre and 
performance practitioners use as a tool or strategy.  Instead, participation occurs through 
a complex network of involvement “on the go” with others and is practiced through a 
continuous engagement and movement of embodiment.  In my inquiry, I labored to think 
performance as continuous practice and process—an involvement in ongoing 
relationality—that is cultivated with other human and more-than-human bodies.  Herein, 
the socio-historically and corporeally constituted borders between humans and 
nonhumans—in particular, the animals, objects, machines, and landscapes in 
performances—cannot be solidified into a taxonomy of opposing difference and/or 
sameness but are the very fluid and resistant limits and becomings that make a 
performance unfold and which offer a modality of thinking through relationality and 
performance practice. 
 
A Divergence 
The danger and power of a body relentlessly questioning and probing relation lies 
in the perverse possibilities and realities that affectively spew forth.  This power of 
creativity is a movement that bleeds in the veins of the unknown.  An excavation of 
suffering, a resurrection that is acute and failing awareness, a bridge that releases controls 
and mobilizes fodder…that can catch in the throat.  Disturbance occurs here through 
alteration and dissolution, the splitting of every so-called identifiable and knowable thing.  
Hsss.  Crack.  Rip.  Gash.  Is a woman a woman…or a knife...or an envelope?  Is a rabbit 
a weapon or a paintbrush?  Is a kiss a caress or a contusion?  Is a corpse a lockbox or a 
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lunchbox?  Every touch produces touch.  Every assemblage produces assemblage.  The 
shift in performance ontology from what things are to what they do in the making of 
historical and material worlds refuses the authoritarian and totalizing roles of knowledge 
practices in order to take an inclusive approach to thinking, critiquing, and attending to 
relational belonging—separate and together—across the entire culture nature spectrum.   
As I wrote and thought this dissertation document, I struggled with every word 
and every body—especially how to write “I” and “me” and “you” and “other” and “we” 
and “us” not as a force of my authority but as an invitation for considering your mobility 
and involvement as essential in the process.  I have not always chosen the best word, in 
part because the best word changes from moment to moment, in part because a body and 
a word inherently conceal and trigger misreadings—excesses and confusions—and in 
part because relationally I, we, you, them, us…cannot not be determined.  The 
hummingbird is not the hummingbird but the flower, and the wind, and the sugar, and the 
rain, and….  To do this work requires greater humility and ability than I possess—not to 
mention intelligence and energy—but the work is driven by an implacable necessity to 
touch upon the unfolding ongoing living-dying relationality with others in which 
performance as a becoming and my inquiry participates.  
So, in trying to say something worthwhile beyond human behavior and social 
interaction, of becoming and performance, I must “write for the illiterates, the idiots, and 
the animals.”  I must write for you who cannot read or write but who have much to carry.  
If only I had remained silent, maybe I might have known how to say and what to say—so 
pay attention.  Alba hailed me from across the street late one night.  Her hair disheveled 
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and with darkened eyes, she turned and sank into the concrete before words could escape 
my mouth and my fingers.  The landscape followed after.  It was a machine hailing me, 
and I beckoned to you with my rigid voice.  I must admit the street is not as strange as it 
might sound.  It embodies parts of my inquiry that might have struck me.  It’s all 
hypotheses—our inexistence in the minds of those who are not in the know.  A labyrinth, 
which I’m weaving for you. 
The madness of having to write and not being able to.  Identify a jellyfish.  Who 
might have appeared upon this page to you.  I mean to say by you.  To the animals.  To 
the machines.  To the objects.  To the landscapes.  If I eat them, can I secrete them?  It’s 
incomprehensible.  A shadow-object and I spun around each other on opposite sides of a 
Ferris wheel that night.  The wind was cold and the day dark.  The air is thick with heat.  
I moved forward through the dissertation as bodies, scholars, and philosophers kept piling 
up.  What about this task that I have completed?  I cannot complete it but possibly it 
might come to an end.  I wondered if a machine might get us there.  To the present 
moment.  The presentation moment.  I sense a knawing knowing.  Things can change on 
their way through me.  I never have written or will I write a dissertation but I could do 
my best to submit.  I will stop the becoming rot with the expert terms.  How is the world 
created?  How is an animal invented?  The limits of becoming radiate open into realms of 
potentiality or is it realtionality.  A body disintegrates, mechanizes, presses against its 
own materiality.   
Who then speaks?  One Green Protein?  But what then is the subject of my 
inquiry?  Or not.  And I was.  The insanity of not trying to find a coherent history, a 
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coherent memory, a coherent self, a coherent other.  Minding my own business.  The 
business of my dissertation.  What does it matter if I succeed or fail?  I have broken no 
social rule.  There is no bunny.  I must keep on squirming squirreling and resisting.  
Becoming is the river that I attempt to cross.  Jellyfish die.  The dissertation is suicide for 
everyone mentioned in the presentation preservation.  Have I written it all out, thought it 
all out?  Is the inventory and thinking accurate?  They gave me every bit.  Every bird.  
For others hurry me along keeping me on track as it were.  On tracks.  Injected veins 
twisting around my thoughts.  Footprints hunted in the dirt.  Once the conclusion ends, 
there we are.  Or not.  Dog-eared.  Listening with the shadows.  But how? 
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121
 I have used the phrase “performance-film” to reference Home is in Our Past in order 
to mark its double character as a live performance and a film.  Importantly, the visual-
auditory recording does not operate as a simple documentation of a past live theatrical 
event.  The directors use filmic techniques such as slow and stop motion, multiple and 
spliced together camera angles, and visual and sound editing to create scenic-auditory 
images that surpass the frame of a recording or documentation of live performance.  In 
taking up the filmic medium as part of a constructive strategy, the directors expose the 
involvement of technologies of recording in shaping past historical events.  The recording 
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for critique ways of seeing and narrating history and live performance.  In fact, since the 
final image of the performance-film—of Kantor’s The Dead Class—takes up the entirety 
of the filmic image on the screen rather than being seen as projected on the live screen in 
the live performance via the film recording, I thought for a long time that this fragment 
belonged to an erased performance on a used and unmarked DVD upon which Home is in 
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126
 I considered sending you a box of things and wondered how you might engage with 
them as you unpacked the box: handling them with care or perhaps with curiosity or 
dread.  Perhaps you might wonder how and why these objects found their way into your 
hands.  Questioning what they were saying…while attending to their contours, weights, 
colors, shapes, and textures.  Perhaps some of them would resist your handling….I 
wonder what I might send you….What in my collection would arouse your thoughts and 
your senses?  So many things. 
 
a glassy fish eye 
a box of rusty hinges, glass vials, and cut hair 
a shriveled leg of a bird 
an old barn door with chipped red paint 
a hollowed and leathered body of a turtle 
bits of bugs, burlap and other textured fabrics… 
 
Just a few so as not to overwhelm you. 
 
Everywhere a thing calls out wanting to be picked up, handled, touched, engaged with.  I 
am sorry…resisting the urge to touch.  It is not possible to touch everything…or is it?  I 
am sorry to throw away the small pieces of a broken object, keeping only large 
fragments.  It seems that every part of every object must be handled with care.  An object 
must have a place where it would be most happy and most alive.  My mother’s good 
dishes always did prefer the mud under the evergreen trees to the stifling cramped 
quarters of the kitchen cupboards.  In sending you a box of things, I dream of what you 
might do with them and they with you. 
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the Collection, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 151. 
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 Benjamin in fact calls Fuchs a packrat in his essay “Eduard Fuchs: Collector and 
Historian.” 
 
132
 Stewart, On Longing 153 – 154. 
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134
 Benjamin claims: “What is decisive in collecting is that the object is detached from all 
its original functions in order to enter into the closest conceivable relation to things of the 
same kind….  It is a grand attempt to overcome the wholly irrational character of the 
object’s mere presence at hand through its integration into a new, expressly devised 
historical system: the collection.”  In Walter Benjamin, “Convolut H [The Collector],” 
The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin, (Cambridge: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 204 – 205. 
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 Ibid., 205. 
 
136
 Walter Benjamin, “First Sketches,” The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland & 
Kevin McLaughlin, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), 
858. 
 
137
 As Benjamin states: “We need only recall what importance a particular collector 
attaches not only to his object but also to its entire past […] It suffices to observe just one 
collector as he handles the items in his showcase.  No sooner does he hold them in his 
hands than he appears inspired by them and seems to look through them into their 
distance, like an augur.”  Ibid., 858. 
 
138
 Benjamin explicates for the collector Henri Bergson’s theorization of perception, 
which occurs according to different rhythms.  Benjamin writes, “At the conclusion of 
Matière et mémoire, Bergson develops the idea that perception is a function of time.  If, 
let us say, we were to live vis-à-vis some things more calmly and vis-à-vis others more 
rapidly, according to a different rhythm, there would be nothing ‘subsistent’ for us, but 
instead everything would happen right before our eyes; everything would strike us.  But 
this is the way things are for the great collector.  They strike him.  How he himself 
pursues and encounters them, what changes in the ensemble of items are effected by a 
newly supervening item—all this shows him his affairs in constant flux […] (At bottom, 
we may say, the collector lives a piece of a dream life.  For in the dream, too, the rhythm 
of perception and experience is altered in such a way that everything—even the 
seemingly most neutral—comes to strike us; everything concerns us…).”  Benjamin, 
“Convolut H” 205 – 206.   
 
139
 In Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes describes the capacity of the punctum to rupture 
the studium in terms of the photographic image.
 
 In writing on photography, Barthes is 
interested in the ways in which the photographic image participates in human practices of 
meaning making.  These image-making practices—which include but are not limited to 
photography—are entwined in memory, history, and constructions of reality.  Barthes 
explicates the punctum as a force of the image that wounds or pricks the viewer and 
ruptures the studium—understood as a sort of field of knowledge and civility—of the 
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sovereign consciousness of the viewer (recall my previous claim in Living Things that 
consciousness is immanent in practice and ongoing relationality).  Importantly, the 
punctum rises out of an image and is not sought out by the viewer.  Barthes states: “This 
time it is not I who seek it out (as I invest the field of the studium with my sovereign 
consciousness), it is this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an 
arrow, and pierces me.  A Latin word exists to designate this wound, this prick, this mark 
made by a pointed instrument: the word suits me all the better in that it also refers to the 
notion of punctuation, and because the photographs I am speaking of are in effect 
punctuated, sometimes even speckled with these sensitive points; precisely, these marks, 
these wounds are so many points.  This second element which will disturb the studium I 
shall therefore call punctum; for punctum is also: sting, speck, cut, little hole—and also a 
cast of the dice.  A photograph’s punctum is that accident which pricks me (but also 
bruises me, is poignant to me).”  In Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida Reflections on 
Photography, trans. Richard Howard, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 26 – 27.  
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142
 Benjamin states, “Possession and having are allied with the tactile, and stand in a 
certain opposition to the optical.  Collectors are beings with tactile instincts.”  In 
Benjamin, “Convolut H” 206. 
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 Theodor Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (London: New Left Books, 
1974), 246. 
 
144
 Adorno states, "My argument is that precisely because art works are monads they lead 
to the universal by virtue of their principle of particularization.  In other words, the 
general characteristics of art are more than just responses to the need for conceptual 
reflection: they also testify to the fact that the principle of individuation has its limits and 
that neither it nor its opposite should be ontologized.  Art works approach this limit by 
ruthlessly pursuing the principle of individuation, whereas if they pose as universals, they 
end up being accidental and pseudo-individual like examples of a type or species."  In 
Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (London: Athlone, 
1997), 259. 
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 Ibid., 280. 
 
146
 Moreover, Adorno argues, “Aesthetic feeling is not what is being aroused in us. It is 
more like a sense of wonderment in the presence of what we behold; a sense of being 
overwhelmed in the presence of a phenomenon that is non-conceptual while at the same 
time being determinate. The arousal of subjective effect by art is the last thing we should 
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want to dignify with the name aesthetic feeling. True aesthetic feeling is oriented to the 
object; it is the feeling of the object, not some reflex in the viewer.”  Ibid., 236. 
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 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans Colin Smith, (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945/1962), 284. 
 
148
 William Henry Fox Talbot—in writing about the new technology of the camera—
states: “The phenomenon which I have now briefly mentioned appears to me to partake 
of the character of the marvelous, almost as much as any fact which physical 
investigation has yet brought to our knowledge.  The most transitory of things, a shadow, 
the proverbial emblem of all that is fleeting and momentary, may be fettered by the spells 
of our ‘natural magic,’ and may be fixed for ever in the position which it seemed only 
destined for a single instant to occupy.” See William Henry Fox Talbot, “Some Account 
of the Art of Photogenic Drawing,” The London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine 
and Journal of Science, vol. 14, March 1839.  Reprinted in Photography into Print, ed. 
Vicki Goldberg (New York: Simon &Schuster, 1981), 36 – 48. 
 
149
 Again Roland Bathes in reference to the photograph states that, “each perception and 
reading of a photo is implicitly, in a repressed manner, a contact with what has ceased to 
exist, a contact with death.”  Roland Barthes, The Grain of the Voice Interviews 1962 – 
1980, trans. Linda Coverdale, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 356. 
 
150
 All Explosion of a Memory/Description of a Picture text can be located in Heiner 
Müller, Explosion of a Memory: writings by Heiner Müller, ed. & trans. Carl Weber 
(New York: PAJ Publications, 1989). 
 
151
 Jean-François Lyotard maintains that a representational practice needs to evoke, “the 
unpresentable in presentation itself, that which refuses the consolation of correct forms, 
refuses the consensus of taste permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the 
impossible, and inquiries into new presentations—not to take pleasure in them, but to 
better produce the feeling that there is something unpresentable.”  In Jean-François 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained Correspondence 1982-1985, trans. Don Barry, 
Bernadette Maher, Julian Pefanis, Virginia Spate, & Morgan Thomas (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 15. 
 
152
          Benjamin thinks, 
 
“[In using waste products children] do not so much imitate     
ping-pong ball  
the works of adults as bring together, in  
the artifact produced in play, materials of  
widely differing kinds in a new,     
child, director, scholar, collector 
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creative intuition 
discontinuous relationship.” 
  alone does not produce 
assemblage 
old clocks     
but moreover  
creativity in things in relation  
produces 
In striking me  play. 
an object refuses to go unrecognized   
and unwanted   
and refuses to be trifled with. 
And asks to be trifled with.      of thought. 
An object refuses rejection and  
makes a claim on my joy and sorrow. 
in consciousness     an artist exposed 
in body, in imagination, in spirit?       in practice 
       
with a thing they do not  
so much imitate…   or use 
 
a piece of spare chicken-wire  
 
as participate. 
    and listen. 
  
         ponytail of hair 
 a thing-in-itself?  
lead pipe  always a thing-in-relation    pieces of rope and  
wire 
an object lives   
 
vague and indistinct      wind-up key thingy  
and easily changes. 
 
A things becomes  an enchantment,  
a hallucination,       a cloud 
a mode of transmutation.  The movement and position of things in a 
collection is a paradox  surprising and confusing   
Playing with things    fuses  
concrete immateriality and  
imagination     reality? 
in persistent liveliness.     
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      An object in an environment 
  enduring  butterflies 
beyond use.       Perhaps in a dreamscape.   
 
    Becoming intimate with  
things.   
how does a moving     thing  
 
call you?      
 doll-face mask 
a bit of black gaffe tape 
white kitchen garbage bags 
 
here and there 
playing ground framing trash 
hiding places hidden spaces swallowing life 
into the depth dump heaped objectscape shadowing 
liveliness in performance 
child searching thrown away stories 
hollowed carcasses hollowing lives generations not known 
---- 
they found a body or at least 
they found traces of it 
 
Quote in Walter Benjamin, “Old Forgotten Children’s Books,” Selected Writings, 1913 – 
26, eds. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 1996), 408. 
 
153
 Poet Rainer Maria Rilke writes: “But outside, everything is immeasurable.  And when 
the level rises outside, it also rises in you, not in the vessels that are partially controlled 
by you, or in the phlegm of your most unimpressionable organs: but it grows in the 
capillary veins [...] This is where it rises, where it overflows from you, higher than your 
respiration, and, as a final resort, you take refuge, as though on the tip of your breath.  
Ah! where, where next?  Your heart banishes you from yourself, your heart pursues you, 
and you are already almost beside yourself, and you can’t stand it any longer.  Like a 
beetle that has been stepped on, you flow from yourself, and your lack of hardness or 
elasticity means nothing any more.  Oh night without objects.  Oh window muffled on the 
outside, oh, doors carefully closed; customs that have come down from times long past, 
transmitted, verified, never entirely understood.  Oh silence in the stair-well, silence in 
the adjoining rooms, silence up there, on the ceiling.”  In Bachelard, The Poetics of 
Space, 229 – 230.   
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 A slightly different version of the production that I attended in Washington D.C. can 
be viewed online at http://vimeo.com/5923204.  Performers: Quinn Bauriedel, Trey 
Lyford, and Geoff Sobelle;  Machines designed by Steven Dufala and Billy Blaise 
Dufala; Set by Hiroshi Iwasaki; Sound design by James Sugg; Lights designed by James 
Clotfeller; Directed by Aleksandra Wolska and Charlotte Ford. 
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 Jon McKenzie, Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance (New York: 
Routledge, 2001). 
 
156
 Foucault states, “By means of such [hierarchized, continuous, and functional] 
surveillance, disciplinary power became an ‘integrated’ system, linked from the inside to 
the economy and to the aims of the mechanism in which it was practised.  It was also 
organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power; for although surveillance rests 
on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations,” which holds the whole 
together.  In “The Means of Correct Training,” Discipline and Punish The Birth of the 
Prison, 176 – 177. 
 
157
 Ibid., 172. 
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 Ibid., 177. 
 
159
 Bachelard, The Poetics xxxi. 
 
160
 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment Philosophical 
Fragments, eds. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 1 – 34. 
 
161
 In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Horkheimer and Adorno understand the history of 
civilization as a history of the introversion of sacrifice, which anticipates the structure of 
commodity exchange.  In contrast to magic and mimesis in which the object does not 
operate as a substitute for the individual, sacrifice regards the object as a representative 
stand in for the individual.  Herein, the mimetic element is given over to art as a 
supposedly a-rational domain devoid of cognition and cognitive thought takes on the task 
of classification and identification. Ibid., 40 – 43. 
 
162
 Ibid., 19 – 20. 
 
163
 Ibid., 35 – 62. 
 
164
 Horkheimer and Adorno further critique in their philosophical fragments the non-
transparency of social relations and mode of productivity—the production of exchange 
value for its own sake—indicative of the culture industry that generates a form of fascist 
and anti-Semitic hatred and fear that tends toward barbarism and self-destruction. 
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165
 Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour A Critique of Epistemology 
(London: The Macmillan Press, 1978), 56 – 57.  
 
166
 In The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, Martin Heidegger 
describes the essence of technology as a way of revealing that in the modern age is tied to 
an ordering of knowledge defined as Enframing [Ge-stell]—a self-revealing—that 
challenges-forth the world as a picture.  Heidegger states, “The fundamental event of the 
modern age is the conquest of the world as picture.  The word ‘picture’ [Bild] now means 
the structured image [Gebild] that is the creature of mans’ producing which represents 
and sets before.  In such producing, man contends for the position in which he can be that 
particular being who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that 
is.”  In Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. 
William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1977), 134.  Herein, technology 
functions as a represenationalist way of revealing in which the world is constructed as an 
object of representational knowledge where man is the only and entire subject.  
Heidegger argues that through modern technology man’s challenging [Herausfordern] 
“puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and 
stored as such” for maximum yield at minimum expense.  In Martin Heidegger, “The 
Question Concerning Technology,” Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The 
Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
1977), 296.  What Heidegger describes as modern technology’s inauthentic mode of 
revealing challenges forth the world in a way that conceals the way of revealing of truth.  
This way of revealing—in contrast to a representationalist way—is not the 
correspondence of a representation to an objective or subjective reality but poiesis—a 
bringing-forth of the world in a revealing that also conceals.  
In critique of Heidegger’s philosophical use of terms such as “Dasein” and “care,” 
Theodor Adorno argues that after WWII the use of existential terms such as evident in 
Heidegger’s work generates a jargon of authenticity that obscures the relation between 
language and objective content.  Adorno emphasizes that idealized symbols of the jargon 
of authenticity do not represent actual social relations but rather abstract relations 
between concepts that appear to remain untouched by processes of abstraction and 
history.  See Adorno, The Jargon.  Therefore, Heidegger’s phenomenology and 
ontological language feeds on the opposition between the authentic and the inauthentic, 
which reinforces knowledge of the subject as an object of explicit calculation and pre-
established knowledge formations. 
 
167
 Michel Foucault, “The Means of Correct Training,” The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul 
Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 204. 
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 Foucault, “The Means” 172. 
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169
 Foucault writes, “Historians of ideas usually attribute the dream of a perfect society to 
the philosophers and jurists of the eighteenth century; but there was also a military dream 
of society; its fundamental reference was not to the state of nature, but to the 
meticulously subordinated cogs of a machine, not to the primal social contract, but to 
permanent coercions, not to fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of 
training, not to the general will but to automatic docility,” In Michel Foucault, “Docile 
Bodies,” Discipline and Punish The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1977), 169. 
 
170
 Michel Foucault, “Right of Death and Power over Life,” The Foucault Reader, ed. 
Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 261 – 262. 
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 “Ibid., 265. 
 
172
 In Walter Benjamin, “Convolut I [The Interior, The Trace],” The Arcades Project, 
trans. Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 223.  Benjamin quotes Karl Marx from Der historische 
Materialsimus. 
 
173
 Benjamin points out that the etymology of the word comfort changes meaning from 
consolation and wellbeing to indicate in, Wladimir Weidlé’s words, “nothing more than 
rational convenience.” Ibid., 225. 
 
174
 In Foucault’s argument, factory surveillance “took into account the activity of the 
men, their skill, the way they set about their tasks, their promptness, their zeal, their 
behaviour.”  In Foucault, “The Means” 174 - 175. 
 
175
 Walter Benjamin, “Convolut I [The Interior, The Trace],” The Arcades Project, trans. 
Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1999), 227. 
 
176
 The word factory “designates the combined operation of many orders of work-
people…in tending with assiduous skill a system of productive machines continuously 
impelled by a central power…[T]his title, in its strictest sense, involves the idea of a vast 
automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting in 
uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them being 
subordinated to a self-regulated moving force.”  In Andrew Ure, The Philosophy of 
Manufactures: Or An Exposition of the Scientific, Moral, and Commercial Economy of 
the Factory System of Great Britain (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 1861/2010), 
13 – 14. 
 
177
 The first quote comes from an Indian citizen commenting on a widespread blackout in 
India.  The second quote is a statement made about the prospects of arctic drilling. 
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 Following the lead of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, recent social theorizations—
as exemplified in works such as Rosi Braidotti’s metamorphosis Towards a Materialist 
Theory of Becoming (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2002) and Brian Massumi’s Parables 
for the Virtual Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2002)—have taken up Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualization of the machinic as a 
process in which connections multiply and proliferate in infinite and ungraspable webs of 
complexity.  
 
179
 The 2006 Die Hamletmaschine production was performed in the Charles M. Nolte 
Xperimental Theatre at the University of Minnesota.  The rehearsals for this production 
generated the material for both productions.  The 2007 production was performed for the 
Minnesota Fringe Festival at the Theatre de la Jeune Lune.  The primary creative 
collaborators included: Xanthia Walker, Bryce Volrath, Blake T. Snortland, Nikki 
Schultz, Laura Purcell Gates, Malin Palani, Angela Olson, Sara Munzesheimer, Merrick 
Mayer, Howard Kenty, Garrett Fitzgerald, William Daddario, Eric J. Colleary, Lee R. 
Chriske, and Jeffrey Aldrich. 
 
180
 For a detailed explication of Adorno’s critical approach see Theodor Adorno, 
Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, 1973/2007).  
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 Rollo May, The Courage to Create (New York: Bantam Book, 1975), 50. 
 
182
 This anecdote comes from the rehearsal-performance process of the remount of Die 
Hamletmaschine.  Similar exercises were used for the first rehearsal-performance process 
as well. 
 
183
 Martin Buber in particular describes community as specifically inter-human.  He 
states, “The primal hope of history depends upon a genuine, hence thoroughly 
communally disposed community of the human race.”  He goes on to ground the 
communally disposed in the commonness of need, of spirit, of trouble, and of salvation.  
Buber calls for a human “upright village” that can grow in the midst of “rationalized 
factories.”  However, it is important to note that the phrase “in the midst of” disrupts the 
notion that community might be delimited to the domain of the inter-human and the 
notion that the “upright village” might be set apart (as upright) from what it is in “the 
midst of.”  In Martin Buber, On Intersubjectivity and Cultural Creativity, ed. S.N. 
Eisenstadt (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 99.  
 
184
 Jerzy Grotowski, Towards a Poor Theatre, ed. Eugenio Barba (New York: Routledge, 
2002/1968), 57. 
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 Heiner Müller, Hamlet-Machine and Other Texts, ed. & trans. Carl Weber (New 
York: PAJ Publications, 1984).   
 
186
 Annals of Psychology, “Social Animal,” The New Yorker, January 17, 2011, p. 26.  
Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/01/17/110117fa_fact_brooks. 
 
187
 What specific social relations are produced between humans and art and between art 
and the living world?   The relation between art and the living world might be considered 
not as an opposition between nature and culture in which art is sometimes both relegated 
to the embodied irrational domain and also set apart from natural reality but as an 
intertwining in which every human is involved and implicated.  Still, the distinct and 
specific social relationships that are produced of course depend on many different 
historical and contextual factors.  Perhaps a social relation that is generative, that affirms 
life, perhaps a social relation in which thought does not operate to classify life into 
hierarchies and to promulgate systems of privilege and cruelty.  Of course, what is 
unmentioned in the question and the answer is the “who or what.”  If not the subject and 
object, if not the human and the more-than-human—then who or what?  Generosity 
comes into play in an ethical practice of the self in not answering this question but in 
continually posing it to the extent that one’s self must continually listen and adjust to the 
ever-varying, contradictory, and ungraspable who or what emerging and becoming in 
encounter. 
Art is a mode that I can point to that informs the generosity and care that I 
cultivate in a practice of “the self with others.”  While I suggest art as a way to cultivate 
generosity and care, this does not mean that I make an opposition between the artist and 
the non-artist and/or scholar but that in the work that I do—whether writing, drawing, 
directing, or teaching, etc.—I approach the work as a way of living in the world with an 
openness to others (and to being affected).  That is the most concrete indication of how I 
cultivate generosity and care—which has a fundamental and artful relationship to time 
and materiality.  However, this relationship is not a model that I can outline because it is 
worked and reworked in terms of my self (with others).  The relation between I and we 
for understanding “our” practice of performance and performance research is an 
important one—and one that I do not often effectively maneuver.  On one hand, I want to 
reaffirm the autonomy of a practice of the self (with others) and therefore in some ways I 
am uninterested in providing a model (of art) that (we) can follow to engender generosity 
linked to a practice of the self with others—which I explicate and theorize as a 
“wayfinding/following” in Chapter Four of my dissertation.  However, I am concerned 
with the potential for a generous and caring materialization of relationships in the world 
(and in providing a meaningful address to the question of how my practice speaks to 
others).   
The connection between a practice of the self with others (wayfinding/following 
as an artful practice) and scholarship inheres in the notion that concepts emerge from and 
are bound to a material world that exceeds conceptual thought.  The potential for 
scholarship interweaving with a practice of the self with others hinges on the manner in 
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which scholarship “connects” to the material world (and to art).  Of course, this by itself 
is a huge area of contestation that not in the least of which plays out in the divisions that 
are propagated between theory, practice, and pedagogy; in the conflictions between 
embodied writing and critical analysis; and in the evaluative judgments that are made on 
others’ thinking and embodiment that unwittingly reinforce normative standards.  The 
potential for interweaving artful wayfinding/following with scholarship is a risk that 
might rupture the very disciplinary ground upon which we supposedly stand.  However, 
wayfinding/following interwoven with performance scholarship enacts a reinvestment not 
only in a performance-philosophical project of self-transformation but also of continuous 
and enduring wonder that binds (artful) non/conceptual and practical thinking together.  
A colleague further asked, what relationships (not kinds of scholarship) might we 
see in the world of scholarship (once generosity has been produced and the social 
relations between humans and more-than-humans acknowledged and embraced)?  What 
relationships might we see in the world of scholarship?  I repeat the question because I 
want to acknowledge how the question sits in me not as a breath of hope for a bright 
future but as a vice grip that inhibits my ability to breathe.  Even though I cannot envision 
with any kind of certainty the emergence of potential relationships and therefore the 
underlying response is that I do not know, I would propose that the kind of relationship is 
one in which we are all in this together (a flexible field of inquiry rooted in the world) in 
which our roles and lives are not compartmentalized and institutionalized in a 
comparative and hierarchical structure.  The word that I have to understand and to 
cultivate this kind of relationship in scholarship-practice is “classroom”—working 
together with autonomy of embodied thought in the midst of and in affirmation of 
belonging together with others in the world. 
 
188
 Heiner Müller, Germania, trans.Bernard and Caroline Schütze, ed. Sylvère Lotringer, 
(New York: Semiotext(e), 1990), 76.  It is important to recognize the tension between 
relation infused with care and conflict in a rehearsal-performance process and the subject 
obligations in Müller’s text that involve fulfillment of historical roles tied to 
domination—and the tension between the textual consumption of the King that fortifies a 
societal bond of domination and violence and the sharing of a meal in the rehearsal-
performance process that fortifies bonds of companionship. 
 
189
 The Practicing Machine part of this chapter was first presented at the 2011 Mid-
America Theatre Conference in Minneapolis, Minnesota as part of the Acting and 
Directing Symposium: In the Company of the Classics. 
 
190
 These words were written in a daily newspaper to describe the sound of the first 
assembly lines at the Ford Motor Company plant and are fitting to describe the machine 
sound that I requested for Die Hamletmaschine.  This sound encircles the performance in 
a seemingly infinite machinic loop.  Henry Ford American Experience, PBS. 
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191
 Walter Benjamin argues that the commodity form produces “[a] hollow comfort of 
never having to experience how the productive forces had to develop under [one’s own] 
hands.”  The concern is that human reception of technology “consists of a series of 
energetic, constantly renewed efforts, all attempting to overcome the fact that technology 
serves this society only by producing commodities.” Benjamin, “Eduard Fuchs” 232.   
 
192
 My conceptualization of wayfinding/following materializes in stark contrast to 
wayfinding as it is conceived in the professional fields of design, which take up 
wayfinding in terms of a system and graphics of signage that organizes and facilitates the 
efficient and effective travel of human people through a built environment. 
 
193
 Wendy Arons and Theresa May, “Introduction,” Readings in Performance and 
Ecology, eds. Wend Arons and Theresa May (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 4 – 
6. 
 
194
 Eiko and Koma’s work emerges from Butoh—a Japanese dance form founded by 
Ohno Kazuo and Hijikata Tatsumi.  In part, Butoh emerged from an environment marked 
by the catastrophic atomic bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, Japan’s military defeat 
in 1945 and the subsequent American occupation, and the artistic intellectual 
provocations and socio-political tensions of the 1960s.  The 1960s in Japan saw both a 
substantial resistance to Americanization and a significant influx of American culture.  
While the earliest years of Hijikata’s and Ohno’s work demonstrates the influences of 
Western modern dance, Hijikata and Ohno turned away from technique and 
choreography in order to foreground a practice of dance that unfolds experientially.  In 
1968, Hijikata’s earlier explorations of erotica and sacrifice gave way to a more 
forthcoming reengagement with the rural Tohoku region of northern Japan in which he 
grew up.  The performance titled Hijkata Tatsumi and the Japanese: Rebellion of the 
Body marks most overtly Hijikata’s rejection of a Western style of dance that values 
lightness and long elegant extensions that defy gravity.  The harsh and remote region of 
Tohoku along with the working bodies that peopled the landscape during his childhood 
became fodder for Hijikata’s dance experience.  While the beginnings of Butoh have 
inspired a long and extremely diverse tradition, the work of Ohno and Hijikata and the 
contemporary movement artists Eiko and Koma manifests a deep and powerful 
environmental and earthly rootedness.  In a contemporary moment in which ecological 
crises appear to loom beyond distant horizons and also to shadow and threaten the 
immediate everyday lives of all life on earth, art that continues to foreground immersion 
within the world draws attention to environmental concerns and gives priority to the 
relational over the individual subject.  Hijikata’s rejection of values that aim at mastering 
a landscape rather than participating and rooting one’s experience within it responds to an 
atomic landscape devastated by the human capacity for exploitation, domination, 
annihilation, and occupation of others and by the horror that sometimes comes with 
scientific development and progress.  Likewise, understanding the ontology of 
performance as a becoming reinvests the work of performance and performance 
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research—often taken up as human-centered practices and products—in relational 
participation with/in the world. 
 
195
 The William and Nadine McGuire Commissioning Fund, the National Endowment for 
the Arts, and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation made the commission possible. 
 
196
 In the work of Ohno Kazuo and Hijikata Tatsumi a landscape is neither a simple 
backdrop for human activity nor an ordered space with clear boundaries.  Hijikata states, 
“But first of all I must, I think, wipe out all art and culture.  This ‘dance experience,’ 
which fiercely took up this challenge for the sake of cultural material, has been for me a 
marvelous spiritual journey.  There is, I always feel, an unfathomable ocean before my 
body.”  In Hijikata Tatsumi, “Inner Material/Material,” The Drama Review, Vol. 44, No. 
1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Spring 2000), 41.  Understanding a landscape also as an 
unfathomable ocean, Ohno speaks in his dance workshops of delving into a limitless 
world—soaring through the sea and detaching the arms from the body.  In Kazuo Ohno 
and Yoshito Ohno, Kazuo Ohno’s World from Without & Within, trans. John Barrett 
(Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2004), 206 – 7.  Together their words 
express that a landscape is a terrain that draws together all perception and sensation in an 
ongoing movement.  A practice of attunement or adjustment within a surrounding 
landscape goes on and on in perceptible and imperceptible ways.  As a landscape 
spatially and temporally spreads out beyond all horizons, attunement must be continually 
learned and made. 
 
197
 Una Chaudhuri, “Introduction: Land/Scape/Theater and the New Spatial Paradigm,” in 
Land/Scape/Theater, eds. Elinor Fuchs and Una Chaudhuri (Ann Arbor, MI: The 
University of Michigan Press, 2002), 14. 
 
198
 Ibid., 19. 
 
199
 Ingold, The Perception 282 – 283. 
 
200
 “Movement as Installation Eiko and Koma in Conversation with Matthew 
Yokobosky,” PAJ: A Journal of Performance and Art, No. 64 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2000), 32. 
 
201
 Interview with Philip Bither, “Time Is Not Even, Space Is Not Empty,” Walker, 
November – December 2010, 15. 
 
202
 The excerpt comes from the program. 
 
203
 Ingold, The Perception 220. 
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204
 I have also tried in my practice to carefully adjust along the way to the surrounding 
landscape of bodies and thinking. 
 
205
 On the artists’ Web site at www.eikoandkoma.org. 
 
206
 Importantly, Hijikata’s statement in the epigraph places the basis for embodied being 
and becoming not in a delimited subjective or intersubjective domain but in that of 
desire—where experience does not just mediate through the subject but where experience 
unfolds immediately through a body wrought with the overwhelming ways in which 
everything and anything might be encountered. 
 
207
 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970). 
 
208
 Even though Husserl heralds the importance of reason in the face of the rising threat 
of European fascism in the 1930s, Rosi Braidotti argues that in The Crisis Husserl 
situates Europe as “the site of origin of critical reason and self-reflexivity,” which thereby 
equates Europe with universal consciousness in a “Humanistic norm” that implies a self-
other dialectic in which otherness is meant in the pejorative.  In Rosi Braidotti, The 
Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013), 15.    
 
209
 Husserl’s “natural attitude” is pragmatically directed at the world “toward this or that, 
being directed toward it as an end or as a means, as relevant or irrelevant, toward the 
private or public, toward what is daily required or obtrusively new.”  In Husserl, The 
Crisis, 103 – 186. 
 
210
 Husserl uses the term “bracketing” to describe how one must place presuppositions, 
assumptions, and biases rooted in knowledge formations outside phenomena and 
phenomenological inquiry.  In Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology (The 
Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1970), 33 – 42. 
 
211
 Herein, consciousness does not produce the relation that is already there.  “What 
distinguishes intentionality…is that the unity of the world, before being posited by 
knowledge in a specific act of identification, is ‘lived’ as ready-made or already there.”  
In Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology xix. 
 
212
 Husserl claims, “this world…derives its whole sense and its existential status, which it 
has for me, from me as the transcendental Ego, the Ego who comes to the fore only with 
the transcendental-phenomenological epoché.”  In Edmund Husserl, First Meditation 
section 10, Cartesian Meditations, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970), 189. 
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213
 Heidegger argues that the terms phenomenology and ontology characterize philosophy 
itself.  Heidegger states, “Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes 
its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has 
made fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to 
which it returns.”  In Martin Heidegger, Being 62.  However, please recall Adorno’s 
critique of Heidegger in The Jargon of Authenticity, which affirms that the language of 
authenticity and universal togetherness entraps and condemns subjects to the roles 
outlined and identified for them. 
 
214
 Martin Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University 
Press, 1969), 29, 39. 
 
215
 Massumi, Parables 191.  
 
216
 The contention is raised with Heidegger’s argument that, “A stone is worldless.  Plant 
and animal likewise have no world; but they belong to the covert throng of a surrounding 
into which they are linked.  The peasant woman, on the other hand, has a world because 
she dwells in the overtness of beings […] The work as work sets up a world.”  Heidegger 
situates man’s essence in his “Ek-sistenz” with a capacity for representation and 
ontological thinking—which generates a contradiction between being-with others in a 
shared world and denial of a shared world.  In Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the 
Work of Art,” Basic Writings from Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking 
(1964) ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993), 170.  Also in Martin 
Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert 
Hofstadter (HarperCollins, 2001), 43 – 44.  See for example Rosi Braidotti, 
metamorphoses Towards a Materialist Theory of Becoming (Cambridge, UK: Polity 
Press, 2002); Seyla Benhabib, “The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt,” Modernity 
and Social Thought, 10 (Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); and Luce Irigaray, The 
Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger (Paris: Minuit, 1991). 
 
217
 For performance ecologist Baz Kershaw, theatre is a site of heterogeneous 
ecosystems.  Kershaw theorizes a performance commons in which two or more ecologies 
meet.  In Kershaw’s performance ecology and theatre ecology paradigms, the 
performance commons indicates an overlapping of multiple performance systems from 
which homologous structural ecological principles in nature and culture emerge.  In Baz 
Kershaw, Theatre Ecology Environments and Performance Events (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 21. 
 
218
 Ingold, The Perception 239. 
 
219
 In a different context, Deleuze and Guattari assert that movement has an essential 
connection to imperceptibility and is by nature imperceptible.  Deleuze and Guattari write 
that, “movement in itself continues to occur elsewhere…always tak[ing] place above the 
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maximum threshold and below the minimum threshold, in expanding or contracting 
intervals (microintervals).”  In Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 280 – 281. 
 
220
 On a trip to the Dead Sea, Ohno Kazuo describes looking across a barren landscape 
that seems to possess no life but with an adjustment demanded by movement in a 
scurrying animal he is able to become aware of an emerging unknown world.  He realizes 
and instructs, “But not only was that hillside home to thousands of creatures; they were 
also closely connected with me […] It was another world, once I opened myself up to it 
[…] Remember, the visible world is only one of many.”  Importantly, opening and 
extension within a landscape also means a landscape’s non-visible imperceptible domain. 
In Kazuo Ohno and Yoshito Ohno, Kazuo Ohno’s, 253 – 254. 
 
221
 Ingold, The Perception 242. 
 
222
 Edmund Husserl, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the 
Spatiality of Nature,” trans. Fred Kersten, in Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston, 
eds. Husserl: Shorter Works (Brighton, England: Harvester Press, 1981). 
 
223
 Heidegger, Being 176 – 177.  
 
224
 While the etymological construction of “Dasein” means “Being-there,” Heidegger 
uses the term to indicate the entity—“man himself”—whose Being is an issue for it.  
Even though Heidegger works to re-conceptualize the human being in all its ways of 
being beyond terms like “human,” “man,” and “subject”—the concept of Dasein as 
“being in such a way that one has an understanding of Being” nonetheless ontologically 
separates the entity “man” essentially and universally apart from all others.  Ibid., 32.  
 
225
 Ibid., 174. 
 
226
 Ibid., 176. 
 
227
 Ibid., 385. 
 
228
 Heidegger argues, “Thus the significance-relationships which determine the structure 
of the world are not a network of forms which a worldless subject has laid over some 
kind of material.  What is rather the case is that factical Dasein, understanding itself and 
its world ecstatically in the unity of the ‘there’, comes back from these horizons to the 
entities encountered within them.”  Ibid., 416 – 418. 
 
229
 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, 
Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1995). 
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230
 Ibid., 62. 
 
231
 The beginnings of Butoh emphasize the weight of becoming affected in many ways.  
The dance experience that Hijikata and Ohno develop engages in part with similar 
concerns in phenomenology of how we experience the world and others within the world.  
Hijikata and Ohno’s work takes up experience in all its varieties without reference to the 
question of whether what is experienced is objectively real or not.  Rather, the emphasis 
in understanding and experiencing the world in Hijikata and Ohno’s work is on how one 
is affected.  Hijikata’s dance-movement gathers up the vast ever-changing landscape in 
the remote region of Tohoku in northern Japan.  During Hijikata’s childhood, Tohoku 
was an area where seasonal changes penetrated everyday life.  Rural landscapes can be 
both cruel and sustaining, making inhabitants perpetual foreigners to so-called 
civilization.  Remote and severe climates possess an isolation that can be both maddening 
and magical, instilling in bodies an intense and relentless awareness of processes of life 
and death.  Hijikata asserts that for him Butoh began in Tohoku with what he learned 
from the mud in the early spring season.  He describes: “Fallen down in the mud and 
barely being able to move […] a mouth comes out from the sole of my foot and sucks the 
mud up from my sole.  Tongues of mud appear between my toes and my head and feet go 
topsy-turvy.”  In Hijikata Tatsumi, “Wind Daruma,” The Drama Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Spring 2000), 73.  I grew up poor in the sometimes-harsh 
climate of rural Iowa on a farm, which could (and still can) be reached from one direction 
on a dirt road that in a rainy season turns to deep and sucking mud.  Those who have 
stepped into a deep rut of mud know the capacity of mud to swallow, suck, and 
desperately hold things in its malleable consistency.  Mud not only resists distinct 
formations but also sucks up and holds distinct forms in its dark depths.  Mobile materials 
like mud within landscapes complicate the understanding of landscape as fixed and/or 
fixable—landscape as that which can be mastered.  Hijikata’s topsy-turvy and constricted 
movement is built on being “born of the mud” and on his embodied relationally rooted 
experiments that rupture distinct formations.  
 
232
 Heidegger, The Fundamental 62. 
 
233
 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Intertwining—The Chiasm,” in The Visible and the 
Invisible, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964/1968). 
 
234
 John Cage emphasizes that silence enables free association and that anything can 
operate as an instrument.  Greatly influenced by Zen Buddhism and Eastern philosophy, 
Cage situates the future of music in unintentionally made sounds that might be captured 
and used to improvise a composition.  Cage’s composition 4’ 33” in 1952—a recording 
where no sounds are intentionally produced—fully engages with the notions that meaning 
making occurs as a process of consciousness in the audience and that chance acts an 
unintentional and generative principle.  Sigmund Freud’s configuration of the conscious 
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and unconscious—despite rebuffing the notion of chance for a deterministically 
structured unconscious—inspired a new kind of creativity that emphasized indeterminacy 
and chance in artistic practice even earlier in avant-garde movements such as surrealism. 
 
235
 In 1996 the Chattahoochie River (Roswell Park) in Georgia, the Japanese Pond (Sarah 
P. Duke Gardens) in North Carolina, Medicine Lake (French Regional Park) in 
Minnesota, and Nakatsugawa (Yadorigi) in Japan; in 1998 the Winooski River (Winooski 
One Hydroelectric Park) in Vermont and the Huron River (Nichols Arboretum) in 
Michigan; in 1999 the Monongahela River in Pennsylvania and again at the Japanese 
Pond; in 2006 the Cherry Creek and Platte River in Colorado; and in 2011 again for the 
American Dance Festival in Durham North Carolina. River also has a proscenium 
version. 
 
236
 Freud’s ahistorical unconscious contrasts the Marxian class-consciousness, which is 
fundamentally historical. The practical historical function of class-consciousness implies 
that class is conditioned in the unconscious.  Historical materialism plays a key role in the 
struggle for consciousness. 
 
237
 Hijikata and Ohno’s Butoh demonstrates that synaesthetic modulation continually 
teaches a sentient-sensible body to respond to and within the modulating plenitude within 
a surrounding landscape. Hijikata exclaims, “My body trains itself as a matter of course. 
[…] When you come in touch with such things, something is naturally forced out of your 
body. […] Where does the rain start and where does it end?  The surrounding space too 
gets mixed up in this time of rain with no start and no end and there is no longer any 
distinction between time and space.  And I wonder if, like the rotting cabbage, I will end 
up rotten to the core.”  In Hijikata Tatsumi, “Wind Daruma” 76.  Hijijkata describes how 
his unfolding body practices and learns attunement in processes of affective 
transformation through encounter with others.  He observes how time and affect move 
through rain permeating the surrounding landscape and wonders if his body will be 
affected in the same way as the cabbage.  The dynamic and magnetic processes that 
unfold in the earth’s landscapes give movement to life and cannot be divided into or 
summarized into constituent parts.  As Ohno claims, “The sun and earth are just cosmic 
debris from a universe perpetually falling apart only to come together again.”  Even the 
sun and earth participate in the flow of movement and stillness—the basis from which the 
flow of all phenomena might be experienced.  Like Hijikata, Ohno guides his workshop 
participants in practicing-learning attunement.  He directs, “Don’t use your eyeballs.  
Instead, look at us with your entire body, let your whole body and soul become your 
eyes.”  In Kazuo Ohno and Yoshito Ohno, Kazuo Ohno’s 293, 262.  Synaesthesia finds or 
makes a way by participating in an immersive relationality of unending activities in 
perpetual motion.  It is on this basis from which Hijikata can speak of responding to a 
majestic landscape—on the basis of the contingency of his body experienced fully with 
respect to living and dying within a living landscape.  When Hijikata claims that his 
butoh is not an expression, the dancer instructs that the dancing body and landscape is not 
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a representation of something else or somewhere else.  Instead, it is a lively synaesthetic 
incarnation and invocation of bodies transforming within an ongoing and unfolding 
landscape. 
 
238
 Ohno and Hijikata understand that a landscape is integral to perceptual and sensual 
encounter and that the endlessly shifting and expansive elements of a landscape can never 
be arrived at or contained.  Hijikata wonders at the disparate combinations of seemingly 
distinct things around him—a splintered board, a hidden space, a rabbit.  Heeding the 
vague and dense urgings of im/materiality, Hijikata states, “The salty scent of the sea 
turned me into a foreigner.” In Hijikata Tatsumi, “Inner” 42. 
 
239
 Heidegger, “The Origin” 45. 
 
240
 Ohno Kazuo contemplates, “We tend to think that there’s nothing to be gained in 
observing the elements. […] No matter how skillfully you imitate the rain, you’ll never 
succeed.  It’s truly inimitable.  The question is: Why, then, should we practice?”  In 
Kazuo Ohno and Yoshito Ohno, Kazuo Ohno ‘s 197. 
 
241
 Merleau-Ponty argues that all bodies are sentient and sensible.  He writes, “in so far as 
my hand knows hardness and softness, and my gaze knows the moon’s light, it is as a 
certain way of linking up with the phenomenon and communicating with it.  Hardness 
and softness, roughness and smoothness, moonlight and sunlight, present themselves in 
our recollection, not pre-eminently as sensory contents, but as certain kinds of symbiosis, 
certain ways the outside has of invading us and certain ways we have of meeting this 
invasion.”  In Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 370. 
 
242
 Merleau-Ponty, The Visible 263. 
 
243
 Ibid., 132 – 133. 
 
244
 Ibid., 264 – 265. 
 
245
 Merleau-Ponty’s beckoning of the sensible is perhaps most strongly evident—yet 
remaining always vague—for Ohno Kazou in the call that he hears from the dancer La 
Argentina.  After death, La Argentina pleads with Ohno to dance: “Onho-san, I’m going 
to dance, so please let’s dance together.” Ohno’s body responds to the call and Ohno 
maintains that he and La Argentina inhabit each other—always being together even as 
ashes.  Even so, the two bodies—the two opennesses—are not synthesized into a single 
and distinct body.  La Argentina and Ohno’s togetherness hinges on in/corporeal 
openness, participation in a zone of indistinction, and a vague beckoning.  In Kazuo 
Ohno and Yoshito Ohno, Kazuo Ohno’s 266. 
 
246
 Ibid., 259 
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247
 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1968/1994), 236. 
 
248
 Merleau-Ponty writes, “each perception is the term of an approach, of a series of 
‘illusions’ that were not merely simple ‘thoughts’ in the restrictive sense of Being-for-
itself and the ‘merely thought of,’ but possibilities that could have been, radiations of this 
unique world that ‘there is’…—and which, as such, never revert to nothingness or to 
subjectivity as if they had never appeared, but are rather, as Husserl puts it well, ‘crossed 
out’ or ‘cancelled’ by the ‘new’ reality.” In Merleau-Ponty, The Visible 41 – 42. 
 
249
 Freud’s claim that the effacement of the opposition between imagination and reality 
produces the uncanny betrays the strict division between the conscious and the 
unconscious that Freud also posits.  In Sigmund Freud, The Uncanny (London: Penguin 
Classics, 1925/2003). 
 
250
 Hijikata Tatsumi writes of himself as a frenzied boy who experimented with his body 
and the landscape—casting himself into surging rivers and turning his chest into a 
bellows for air.  Hijikata wonders, “Why on earth did I used to get so frenzied?  It was 
probably because of living in the freezing north country of Tohoku, where it was so cold 
that when you bent a finger it made a crackling sound.”  In Shibusawa Tatsuhiko and 
Hijikata Tatsumi, “Hijikata Tatsumi: Plucking off the Darkness of the Flesh, An 
Interview,” The Drama Review, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Spring 
2000), 50.  These experiments continue throughout Hijikata’s life.  He insists that such 
embodied transformations are not merely delusions.  Embodied experimental extensions 
test the capacity of the senses to expand and work together promiscuously in order to 
encounter novel and strange unfolding relationality within a landscape.  Hijikata’s 
detailed descriptions of his childhood and his continued experimentations reveal his 
movement as testing the indiscrete involvement and sensible capacity of relational 
embodiment within a landscape.  
  
251
 Ohno conveys, “Today, I’d thought to get straight to the point and explain what reality 
consists of, but I was unable to do so.  In fact, this very inability to do so is an integral 
part of reality.”  In Kazuo Ohno and Yoshito Ohno, Kazuo Ohno’s 251.  
 
252
 Gaston Bachelard, Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter, trans. 
Edith Farrell (Dallas, TX: Dallas Institute of Humanities and Culture, 1942/1999).  
 
253
 Ibid., 103. 
 
254
 Mitsuharu Kaneko, “Song of Loneliness,” Rakkasan (Parachute), trans. & ed., Nihon 
Miraiha Hakkosho, 1948. 
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255
 Two days after reading From Trinity to Trinity—Hayashi Kyoko’s book recounting 
her journey to the Trinity atomic bomb test site in New Mexico—for Eiko Otake’s 
Delicious Movement seminar, I listened to a segment on National Public Radio of an old 
recorded interview of J. Robert Oppenheimer, the man who led the team at Los Alamos 
in the development of the atomic bomb.  One question posed to him was whether he had 
any regrets. His answer—his only regret was that people no longer trusted science.  The 
notion that science can or cannot be trusted as a whole fails to recognize that science is 
always a practice immersed within and affecting a living world.  Perhaps a better 
question might have been to ask whether Oppenheimer had any remorse.  The slight shift 
in wording recovers the weight of sorrow that comes with remorse—which is much more 
difficult to confront than a simple articulation of “what could have happened differently.”  
The sorrow in surviving the atomic bomb and the sorrow of death within the atomic 
landscape resides in Hayashi’s profound silence and questioning of what is not acceptable 
and why—a silence and questioning infused with the silences of the dead and of other 
hibakusha that haunt the silences of those who witnessed the Trinity test.  Hayashi’s 
profound silence in the face of death resonates with the profound silence of dark waters 
and sets a contrast to the words of Oppenheimer describing the moments after the 
successful Trinity test—“A few people laughed.  A few people cried.  Most were silent.” 
 
256
 Eiko Otake, “Sustained Mourning,” unpublished manuscript. 
 
257
 Ibid., 2 
 
258
 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” Collected Papers IV, (London: The 
Hogarth Press, 1925/1953). 
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